Witherspoon v. Daviss

• Decision Date: 04 February 1914
• Citation: 163 S.W. 700
• Parties: WITHERSPOON et al. v. DAVISS, District Judge.
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

163 S.W. 700

WITHERSPOON et al. v. DAVISS, District Judge.

Court of Civil Appeals of Texas. Austin.

February 4, 1914.

Original application for peremptory writ of mandamus by C. L. Witherspoon and others against H. B. Daviss, District Judge. Mandamus refused.

W. J. McKie and J. S. Callicutt, both of Corsicana, for relators. Richard Mays and R. S. Neblett, both of Corsicana, for respondent.

KEY, C. J.

C. L. Witherspoon and Lucy P. Hines, joined by her husband, Frank Hines, have made application to this court for a peremptory writ of mandamus against Hon. H. B. Daviss, judge of the Thirteenth judicial district, to compel him to obey the mandate of this court, issued on the 8th day of January, 1914, in a case decided at the last term of this court, in which case this court determined and settled the rights of the litigants, and by its opinion, judgment, and mandate remanded the case to the district court of Navarro county, with instructions to that court to render a certain specified judgment. The case originated in the district court of Navarro county, and involved the right of possession to a certain tract of land. Frank Hines and his wife were owners of the land, and on the 30th day of September, 1910, they executed a mineral lease contract to W. H. Staley; and thereafter, on the 3d day of February, 1911, Frank Hines and his wife executed another lease contract, covering the same land, to C. L. Witherspoon. The suit referred to was a contest between Witherspoon and Hines and his wife on one side, and Staley and T. N. Barnsdall, who was claiming under Staley, on the other side, as to the validity and legal effect of the lease contract between Frank Hines and Staley. When the suit was first brought, a temporary injunction was issued against Staley, which was afterwards dissolved, and from the order of the judge dissolving that injunction, Witherspoon prosecuted an appeal to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth District, which court approved and affirmed the action of the district judge in dissolving the temporary injunction, but did not direct or instruct the trial court what character of judgment to render when the main case was tried. Witherspoon v. Staley, 138 S. W. 1191. Thereafter the main case was tried by the district court of Navarro county, and judgment rendered for Staley and his codefendant Barnsdall, from which judgment an appeal was prosecuted to the Court of Civil Appeals for the Fifth District; and, by order of the Supreme Court, the case made by that appeal was transferred to this court.

Afterwards, and in due order, the case was heard and decided by this court, and judgment rendered in favor of the appellants, with instructions to the district court of Navarro county "to render judgment for appellants canceling, annulling and setting aside said lease from Hines to Staley, and perpetually enjoining and restraining said appellees, their agents, employés, and contractors from going on the said Hines' property for the purpose of developing oil or minerals, or any other purpose whatsoever. And, further, that they be likewise enjoined from interfering in any way with appellants in their effort to develop said property." Witherspoon v. Staley, 156 S. W. 557.

Being dissatisfied with that judgment, the appellees Staley and Barnsdall presented a motion in this court for a rehearing, which was overruled; whereupon they applied to the Supreme Court for a writ of error, which application was refused by that court. After this court was properly apprised of the action of the Supreme Court in refusing to grant a writ of error, this court issued its mandate to the district court of Navarro county, commanding that court to observe, obey, and execute the judgment rendered by this court. The mandate was filed in the district court of Navarro county on the 12th day of January, 1914. Whereupon C. L. Witherspoon and Frank Hines and his wife made application to Judge Daviss in chambers for a writ of injunction against W. H. Staley and T. N. Barnsdall, requiring them to cease taking oil from the Hines farm, and not to interfere with or impede the right of Witherspoon and the Hineses to enter and take possession of said property. That application was heard in chambers, and was refused by Judge Daviss, and thereupon the Hineses and Witherspoon applied to this court for relief. The matter was set down for hearing, and was submitted upon the sworn application referred to, the sworn answer of Judge Daviss, the respondent, and written and oral argument by counsel for both sides.

Without dwelling upon minor matters, we will now consider the principal questions discussed at the bar. The respondent's answer raises the question, which was argued at length by counsel, that, inasmuch as Navarro county is not within the limits of this the Third supreme judicial district, but is within the limits of the Fifth supreme judicial district, therefore this court is without power and has no further jurisdiction to issue any writ or do anything else for the purpose of enforcing the judgment of this court, or for any other purpose. By section 6 of article 5 of the Constitution of this state it is declared that the Courts of Civil Appeals "shall have appellate jurisdiction coextensive with the limits of their respective districts," and that they shall also "have such other jurisdiction, original and appellate, as may be prescribed by law."

This latter provision places it within the power of the Legislature to enlarge or diminish the jurisdiction of the Courts of Civil Appeals by changing either the character of cases that may be heard and determined by those courts, the method of bringing cases before them or their territorial limits. In 1895 the Legislature, acting in pursuance of that provision of the Constitution, and by the authority thereby conferred, enacted a statute for the purpose of equalizing the dockets of the different Courts of Civil Appeals, by which statute the Supreme Court was authorized to direct the transfer of cases from such Courts of Civil Appeals as might have a greater amount of business upon their dockets to those having a less amount; and we quote as follows from that statute, which is article 1587 of the Revised Statutes of 1911: "And said Courts of Civil Appeals, to which such cases shall be transferred, shall have jurisdiction of all such cases transferred without regard to the districts in which cases were originally tried and returnable on appeal."

The constitutionality of that statute was challenged in Bond v. Carter, 96 Tex. 359, 72 S. W. 1059, but the Supreme Court held that the clause of the Constitution last referred to was ample authority for the enactment of the statute. By the very terms of that statute, when a case has been transferred from one Court of Civil Appeals to another, the latter acquires jurisdiction, without regard to the county or district in which the case originated and was tried. That phrase must have been put in the statute for the purpose of removing all possible doubt and rendering it absolutely certain that it was the intention of the Legislature, when a case had been transferred from one Court of Civil Appeals to another, that the latter should have as much jurisdiction over that case as over those which originated and were tried within the territorial limits of that court. So this court has no shadow of doubt upon the proposition that, when the case of Witherspoon v. Staley was placed upon its docket, it acquired jurisdiction thereof, to the same extent as it would have if the case had been originally tried by and appealed from the district court of Travis county, or any other county within the limits of the Third supreme judicial district. It does not seem to us that plausible room for difference of opinion can exist upon that subject. It cannot be denied that the Constitution authorizes the Legislature to confer such jurisdiction, and the Legislature has declared that, when a case has been transferred, as authorized, by the statute, the court to which it is transferred has jurisdiction, without regard to where the case was originally tried. If this language does not mean that, in determining the extent of the jurisdiction conferred, the place, the...