Wittmer v. Dexter Manufacturing Co.
| Decision Date | 01 July 1927 |
| Docket Number | 38286 |
| Citation | 214 N.W. 700,204 Iowa 180 |
| Parties | ARNOLD WITTMER, Appellee, v. DEXTER MANUFACTURING COMPANY et al., Appellants |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
Appeal from Jefferson District Court.--E. S. WELLS, Judge.
The district court reversed an order by the industrial commissioner denying compensation to plaintiff under the Workmen's Compensation Act, and the defendants appeal.
Reversed.
Miller Kelly, Shuttleworth & McManus, for appellants.
Ralph H. Munro, for appellee.
The appellee, Wittmer, was in the employ of the Dexter Manufacturing Company. He received an injury while proceeding, with other employees at the close of the day's work, to register his departure at one of two time clocks located in the factory building, and provided by the employer for that purpose. Another employee, one Steel, was endeavoring to prevent appellee from reaching the clock, and caught hold of him. They fell, and appellee's leg was fractured. There was no obstruction on the floor, and no other cause for the fall than the conduct of one or both of the men. Whatever was done by either Steel or the appellee was in a friendly spirit of fun, and with no ill will.
The industrial commissioner affirmed a finding by an arbitration committee to the effect that the claimant had failed to carry the burden of proving that his injury arose out of his employment, and denied compensation. This result was based upon a finding of fact by the commissioner that the claimant participated in a contest, suggested by Steel, as to which should first reach the time clock. The district court found that there was "no competent evidence that the claimant voluntarily participated in any so-called horseplay," and allowed compensation.
Appellants contend that the finding of fact by the industrial commissioner that appellee participated in a contest with Steel as to which should first reach the clock was upon conflicting testimony, and was, therefore, conclusive upon the court.
The statute requires that an injury to an employee, to be compensable, must have been one arising out of and in the course of the employment. Section 1363, Code of 1924. The terms are not synonymous, and the burden is upon a claimant to establish, not only that his injury was received in the course of his employment, but also that it arose out of his employment. Sparks v. Consolidated Ind. Coal Co. 195 Iowa 334, 190 N.W. 593. It is conceded that appellee received his injury in the course of his employment. The sole ultimate question in the case is whether it arose out of the employment.
It was recognized by the industrial commissioner that, in a number of states, compensation under workmen's compensation acts is denied where the injury resulted from sportive acts or horseplay of employees, it being held that an injury so received did not arise out of the employment. He put his conclusion, however, upon a less broad and general ground than that, saying:
"The department, however, has been disposed to hold with decisions elsewhere to the effect that the victim of a sportive act who has not himself actively or passively participated in disastrous horseplay is entitled to recover for disability sustained."
Cases illustrating these different views will be found in exhaustive notes in 13 A. L. R. 540, 20 A. L. R. 882, 36 A. L. R. 1469, and 43 A. L. R. 492. The situation in the present case does not require us to determine this precise question; for it appears to be conceded by appellee that, if he participated with Steel in the horseplay or skylarking which resulted in his injury, he was not entitled to compensation. Our consideration of the case will be confined to this narrower aspect of it.
At the outset, appellee is confronted with the finding of the commissioner that he did participate in the play which resulted in his injury. The findings of fact made by the commissioner, in the absence of fraud, are conclusive. Section 1452, Code of 1924. His order or decree, if within his powers, and not procured by fraud, can only be reversed on appeal to the courts if the facts found by him do not support the order, or there is not sufficient competent evidence to warrant the making of the order. Section 1453. We have many times construed these provisions, and have held that the commissioner is the final and exclusive judge of questions of fact under conflicting evidence. Pace v. Appanoose County, 184 Iowa 498, 168 N.W. 916; Flint v. City of Eldon, 191 Iowa 845, 183 N.W. 344; Sparks v. Consolidated Ind. Coal Co., supra; Murphy v. Shipley, 200 Iowa 857, 205 N.W. 497.
If, therefore, the evidence is in conflict upon the question, and there is sufficient evidence to support the finding of the commissioner that appellee participated in the playful acts which brought about his injury, it is apparent that the judgment of the district court cannot be sustained. The determination of this question requires an examination of the evidence.
The appellee testified:
On cross-examination, his attention was called to a written statement of facts, signed by him some days after the accident, in which he said:
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Wittmer v. Dexter Mfg. Co.
... ... Reversed.[214 N.W. 700]Miller, Kelly, Shuttleworth & McManus, of Des Moines, for appellants.Ralph H. Munro, of Fairfield, for appellee.VERMILION, J.The appellee, Wittmer, was in the employ of the Dexter Manufacturing Company. He received an injury while proceeding, with other employees at the close of the day's work, to register his departure at one of two time clocks located in the factory building and provided by the employer for that purpose. Another employee, one Steel, was endeavoring to prevent appellee ... ...