Wold v. Funderburg

• Decision Date: 25 September 1967
• Docket Number: No. 18705,18705
• Citation: 250 S.C. 205,157 S.E.2d 180
• Parties: Donna WOLD, Respondent, v. Louis G. FUNDERBURG, Myrtis P. Funderburg, Marty Allen Crawford Funderburg, aminor under the age of 14 years, Melody Ann Crawford Funderburg, a minor underthe age of 14 years, and John Allen Crawford, Appellants.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

Page 180

157 S.E.2d 180

250 S.C. 205

Donna WOLD, Respondent, v. Louis G. FUNDERBURG, Myrtis P. Funderburg, Marty Allen Crawford Funderburg, aminor under the age of 14 years Melody Ann Crawford Funderburg, a minor underthe age of 14 years, and John Allen Crawford, Appellants.

No. 18705.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Sept. 25, 1967.

Kenneth R. Chance, of Harris, Chance & McCracken, Augusta, Ga., for appellant.

Frank H. Cormany, Aiken, for respondent.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice.

In July, 1964, Louis G. Funderburg and Myrtis P. Funderburg, husband and wife procured from the Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia, a decree of adoption of Marty Allen Crawford Funderburg and Melody Ann Crawford Funderburg, who are the natural children of Donna Wold and of her divorced husband, John Allen Crawford. The record in this proceeding includes the apparent consenting signatures of both parents as required by the Georgia adoption statutes.

Thereafter, Donna Wold brought an action in the same Georgia court against the adopting parents only, to invalidate the adoption decree on the sole ground that she had not consented to the adoption. The action was tried before a jury and resulted unfavorably to her; the jury on March 23, 1966, found that she had in fact signed the adoption papers and consented thereto.

This action was brought in April, 1966, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Aiken County by Donna Wold, the respondent, against the adopting parents, the minor children--all of whom have now moved to Aiken County, South Carolina--and against John Allen Crawford, her former husband, asking the court to grant to her custody of the minor children, and asking the court to set aside the Georgia decree of adoption on the ground (1) that she did not consent or, if she consented, her consenting signature for the adoption was procured by fraud, and on the ground (2) that the signature of the natural father, John Allen Crawford, was forged and he never signed the consent of adoption as is required by the law of Georgia.

The adopting parents interposed a general denial, alleged that both the plaintiff and her former husband consented in writing to the adoption, and alleged that this suit is barred by reason of the suit this plaintiff brought and lost in the Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia, referred to above. The answer alleges that the unfavorable verdict in that action constitutes a complete bar by way of Res judicata.

The natural father, John Allen Crawford, filed an answer to the complaint alleging that the decree of adoption in Georgia was obtained fraudulently in that his name and consent were forged in that proceeding. He asked that the adoption decree be declared void and asked that the natural mother be granted exclusive custody of the minor children.

The issues were submitted to the Honorable Howard K. Williamson, Judge of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Aiken County, who, after receiving the evidence, rendered his judgment, finding that the father's signature was forged and he was never made a party to the suit, granting to the plaintiff custody of the two said minor children and declaring the Georgia decree of adoption null and void and restoring the relationship of parents and children. The Funderburgs, who are the father and stepmother of the plaintiff, Donna Wold, appealed to this court from such decree, raising two questions as set forth in appellant's brief as follows:

'Did the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Aiken County, South Carolina, have jurisdiction of the subject matter of this action? (Exceptions I and II.)

'Was the plaintiff barred in the present action by the former judgment of the Georgia Court under the principle of Res judicata and estoppel? (Exceptions III and IV.)'

The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the trial judge as relate to the merits of the case are not challenged in this appeal and we are only concerned with the two strictly legal questions set forth above.

QUESTION I

The Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Aiken County was created in 1965 by an Act of the General Assembly, No. 441, which gives to that court the same authority as possessed by the circuit courts in actions involving child custody and adoptions:

'SECTION 27. Jurisdiction--further.--In addition to the jurisdictions and powers conferred on the court by this act, it shall have and exercise the jurisdiction and power conferred on the family court division of a juvenile and domestic relations court as set forth in Sections 15--1221 to 15--1276 of the 1962 Code. The court shall also have jurisdiction over adoption proceedings * * *.'

Section 15--1222 of the 1962 Code of Laws, in the chapter and article relating to family courts, provides as follows:

'Certain jurisdiction concurrent with circuit court; procedure and appeals.--The court shall have all the power, authority and jurisdiction vested in the circuit courts of the State in actions for separation, divorce from bed and board and custody and adoption of children and may hear and determine the validity of any marriage when its validity or invalidity shall be relevant and material to the consideration and decision of any case properly before it. Such jurisdiction shall be concurrent with that of the circuit courts. * * *.'

The Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia, is a court of general jurisdiction.

It is the contention of appellants that the Aiken Court must give full faith and credit to the Georgia decree of adoption. It is argued by the appellants that only a court of general equity jurisdiction would have authority to grant the relief sought.

The Aiken Court does not have general equity jurisdiction, but does have equity jurisdiction as relates to custody and adoption cases, and this jurisdiction is concurrent with the circuit court.

Here we have two courts: the Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia, and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Aiken County, both authorized by constitution and/or statute to deal with the same subject matter--to wit, the custody and/or adoption of children; and though the courts are obviously not equal in other areas of litigation, they are equal as relates to the trial of child custody and adoption cases, and the Legislature, by Section 15--1222, has given to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Aiken County '* * * all the power, authority and jurisdiction vested in the circuit courts of the State in actions for * * * custody and adoption of children * * *.' It...