SOUTH CAROLINA DSS v. Basnight
| Decision Date | 08 January 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 3282.,3282. |
| Citation | 551 S.E.2d 274,346 S.C. 241 |
| Court | South Carolina Court of Appeals |
| Parties | SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Respondent, v. Larry B. BASNIGHT, Appellant. |
Steven G. Mikell, of Florence; and H. Mac Tyson, II, of Fayetteville, North Carolina, for appellant.
Gus C. Smith, of the South Carolina Department of Social Services, of Conway, for respondent.
ORDER WITHDRAWING AND SUBSTITUTING OPINION
Pursuant to Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, it is ordered that the opinion heretofore filed, Opinion No. 3282, heard December 13, 2000 and filed January 8, 2001, be withdrawn and the attached Opinion be substituted. Appellant's Petition for Rehearing is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Larry B. Basnight appeals from an order of the family court adjudicating him the father of a minor child and awarding child support. We affirm.
Helen Point is the natural mother of the minor child, the subject of this action. In January of 1986, the mother initiated an action in South Carolina, pursuant to the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (the Act),1 to establish support for the minor child, born December 14, 1984. The State of North Carolina, as the responding state, proceeded with the action pursuant to the Act and Basnight was notified to appear before a North Carolina district court. On April 11, 1986, the State of North Carolina filed a voluntary dismissal of the action because it had information that Point no longer lived in South Carolina. Point, however, did still reside in South Carolina and the State of North Carolina thereafter filed a motion to reopen the case, which was granted. Basnight filed a motion to dismiss the action, which was denied.
Basnight appealed this denial and, by order dated July 6, 1987, the North Carolina Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the action to the trial court on the ground that "a party cannot make any motions, and the court cannot enter any order, in a cause after a voluntary dismissal has been taken in the cause." On remand, the North Carolina district court dismissed the case with prejudice.
On August 16, 1994, the South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS), as assignee of support payments due the child, instituted this action against Basnight in South Carolina. The complaint alleged, inter alia, personal jurisdiction over Basnight, a resident of Texas, pursuant to South Carolina Code Annotated Section 20-7-953(A)(1985).
By amended answer, Basnight denied DSS's allegations as to personal jurisdiction, and asserted the claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Basnight also filed a motion to dismiss for, among other things, lack of personal jurisdiction. After a December 7, 1994 hearing, the family court denied the motion to dismiss. Basnight filed "exceptions" to the order with the family court, objecting to "any and all findings of fact, conclusions of law, [and] the entry and signing of a `Final Order.'"
The family court held a hearing on the exceptions and reaffirmed the prior order denying Basnight's motion to dismiss. Basnight filed an appeal, which was dismissed by our Supreme Court as an unappealable interlocutory order.
Following a hearing on the merits, the family court issued its final order concluding Basnight was the natural father of the minor child, and establishing his child support obligation at $474.09 per month. The court found the support obligation should be made retroactive to the date of the December 7, 1994 hearing, and thereby established Basnight's arrearage at $22,282.23, to be repaid at a rate of $25.00 per week. This appeal followed.
Basnight argues the family court should have dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. We disagree.
The party seeking to invoke personal jurisdiction against a nonresident defendant via a long-arm statute has the burden of establishing jurisdiction. White v. Stephens, 300 S.C. 241, 387 S.E.2d 260 (1990). The determination of whether a trial court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant involves a two step analysis. Id. First, the defendant's conduct must meet the requirements of the applicable long-arm statute. Id. Second, the defendant must have sufficient contacts with South Carolina so that the constitutional standards of due process are not violated. Id.
We find Basnight's conduct met the requirements of the long-arm statute applied by the family court. The family court exercised personal jurisdiction over Basnight pursuant to South Carolina Code Annotated Section 20-7-953(A) (1985). Section 20-7-953(A) provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who has sexual intercourse in this State thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this State as to an action brought under this subarticle with respect to a child who may have been conceived by that act of intercourse.
S.C.Code Ann. § 20-7-953(A)(1985). The mother testified she and Basnight had sexual intercourse in South Carolina the weekend of March 16, 1984, which resulted in the conception of the minor child. Basnight argues the long-arm statute does not apply as it was not enacted until after the date of the minor child's conception. We disagree.
Section 20-7-953(A) became effective on March 22, 1984, approximately six days after the minor child's conception. See 1984 Act No. 307, § 1. In Thompson v. Hofmann, our Supreme Court considered the application of a long-arm statute to actions commenced after the passage of the statute. Thompson, 263 S.C. 314, 210 S.E.2d 461 (1974). Distinguishing long-arm statutes from implied consent statutes, the court concluded the long-arm statute applied "regardless of when the cause of action may have arisen." Id. at 320, 210 S.E.2d at 463. See E.H. Schopler, Annotation, Retrospective Operation of State Statutes or Rules of Court Conferring in Personam Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents or Foreign Corporations on the Basis of Isolated Acts or Transactions, 19 A.L.R.3d 138, 141-42 (1968) (); see also Johnson v. Baldwin, 214 S.C. 545, 53 S.E.2d 785 (1949) ().
We conclude the long-arm statute acted retrospectively to confer personal jurisdiction over Basnight although the minor child was conceived prior to the enactment of the statute. Accordingly, we affirm the family court's application of the long-arm statute to Basnight.
In analyzing the second step necessary to exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, we find Basnight had sufficient minimum contacts with South Carolina to meet the constitutional standards of due process. In determining whether a finding of minimum contacts comports with the due process requirements of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, the court must consider: (1) the duration of the activity of the nonresident within the state; (2) the character and circumstances of the commission of the nonresident's act; (3) the inconvenience resulting to the parties by conferring or refusing to confer jurisdiction over the nonresident; and (4) the state's interest in exercising jurisdiction. Clark v. Key, 304 S.C. 497, 405 S.E.2d 599 (1991).
The mother testified she met Basnight in late 1982 when he was stationed at the United States Army post in Columbia, South Carolina. Basnight and the mother engaged in sexual relations in early 1983 and again in March, 1984. We find Basnight's tour of duty in South Carolina and continuing relationship with the mother from 1983 to early 1984 sufficient under the first and second factors.
In analyzing the third factor, the inconvenience to the parties, we recognize that Basnight is now stationed outside the state and defending a suit in South Carolina is inconvenient for him. However, we must weigh this against the final factor, South Carolina's interest in exercising personal jurisdiction over Basnight. We conclude South Carolina's interest in the support of a minor child residing within its borders is compelling. Accordingly, we find the state's interest in exercising personal jurisdiction over Basnight outweighs any hardship or inconvenience created by haling Basnight into the courts of this state.
Basnight also argues the family court erred in failing to find that the North Carolina order of dismissal barred this action under the doctrine of res judicata. We disagree.
"The doctrine of res adjudicata (or res judicata) in the strict sense of that time-honored Latin phrase had its origin in the principle that it is in the public interest that there should be an end of litigation and that no one should be twice sued for the same cause of action." First Nat'l Bank v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 207 S.C. 15, 24, 35 S.E.2d 47, 56 (1945). Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, without fraud or collusion, is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies. Griggs v. Griggs, 214 S.C. 177, 51 S.E.2d 622 (1949).
Res judicata precludes the parties from relitigating issues actually litigated and those that might have been litigated in the first action. Town of Sullivan's Island v. Felger, 318 S.C. 340, 457 S.E.2d 626 (Ct.App.1995). In order for the doctrine of res judicata to apply, the following elements must be shown: (1) the identities of the parties...
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