Wolf Run Mining Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety

Decision Date04 November 2011
Docket NumberNo. 10–1392.,10–1392.
Citation659 F.3d 1197
PartiesWOLF RUN MINING COMPANY, Petitionerv.FEDERAL MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH REVIEW COMMISSION and Secretary of Labor, Respondents.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

On Petition for Review of a Decision of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission.Ralph Henry Moore argued the cause for the petitioner.Samuel Charles Lord, Attorney, United States Department of Labor, argued the cause for the respondent. W. Christian Schumann and Jerald S. Feingold, Attorneys, United States Department of Labor, were with him on brief. John T. Sullivan, Attorney, entered an appearance.Before: HENDERSON, TATEL and GRIFFITH, Circuit Judges.Opinion for the Court filed by Circuit Judge HENDERSON.KAREN LeCRAFT HENDERSON, Circuit Judge:

Petitioner Wolf Run Mining Company (Wolf Run) seeks review of a decision of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission (Commission), an agency within the United States Department of Labor (Labor). Wolf Run Mining Co., 32 FMSHRC 1228 (2010). The issue on appeal is whether a Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) inspector is authorized to designate the violation of a safeguard notice issued pursuant to section 314(b) of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Act of 1977, 30 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (Mine Act), as “significant and substantial” under section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act, which limits the “significant and substantial” designation to a violation of a “mandatory health or safety standard.” 30 U.S.C. § 814(d). For the reasons set forth below, we agree with the Commission majority that the violation of a safeguard notice issued pursuant to section 314(b) amounts to a violation of section 314(b) and is therefore a violation of a mandatory safety standard which can be designated “significant and substantial.” Accordingly, we deny Wolf Run's petition.

I. Background
A. Statutory

Section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor (Secretary), through her authorized representative,1 to designate an operator's violation of a mandatory health or safety standard as “significant and substantial” “if ... such violation is of such a nature as could significantly and substantially contribute to the cause and effect of a coal or other mine safety or health hazard.” 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1). “Designation of a violation as ‘significant and substantial’ under section 104(d)(1) can have significant consequences to a mine operator.” Cyprus Emerald Res. Corp. v. FMSHRC, 195 F.3d 42, 43 & n. 1 (D.C.Cir.1999). For instance, the minimum penalty for a citation involving a “significant and substantial” violation issued under section 104(d)(1) is $2,000 whereas a citation without the “significant and substantial” designation has no minimum penalty. Compare 30 U.S.C. § 820(a)(3)(A) with id. § 820(b)(1). “Significant and substantial” violations can also lead to a withdrawal order. See infra note 6.

Section 3( l ) of the Mine Act defines a “mandatory health or safety standard” as “the interim mandatory health or safety standards established by [Titles] II and III of this [Act], and the standards promulgated pursuant to [Title] I of this [Act].” 30 U.S.C. § 802( l ). Under Title I of the Mine Act, the Secretary may, through notice and comment rulemaking, “develop, promulgate, and revise as may be appropriate, improved mandatory health or safety standards for the protection of life and prevention of injuries in coal or other mines.” Id. § 811(a). Title II of the Mine Act provides for interim mandatory health standards “applicable to all underground coal mines” that are to “be enforced in the same manner and to the same extent as any mandatory health standard promulgated under the provisions of [Title I of the Act].” Id. § 841(a). Title III of the Mine Act provides similar authority for interim mandatory safety standards “applicable to all underground coal mines” and “enforced in the same manner and to the same extent as any mandatory safety standard promulgated under [Title I of the Act].” Id. § 861(a).

Included in Title III is section 314(b) which provides that [o]ther safeguards adequate, in the judgment of an authorized representative of the Secretary, to minimize hazards with respect to transportation of men and materials shall be provided. 30 U.S.C. § 874(b) (emphases added); see also 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403 (repeating verbatim section 314(b)). The Secretary has chosen to implement section 314(b) by authorizing a MSHA inspector to issue a safeguard notice on a mine-by-mine basis and has established “the criteria by which [the inspector] will be guided in requiring” such safeguard. Id. § 75.1403–1(a).2 To require a safeguard pursuant to section 314(b) and 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403, the MSHA inspector issues a written safeguard notice to an operator specifying the safeguard the operator must provide and the operator is then given a certain amount of time to comply. “If the safeguard is not provided within the time fixed and if it is not maintained thereafter,” the inspector issues a citation to the operator pursuant to section 104 of the Mine Act. Id. § 75.1403–1(b); see 30 U.S.C. § 814 (setting forth citation issuance procedure).

B. Factual

Wolf Run operates the Sentinel underground coal mine in Barbour County, West Virginia. On June 27, 2000, a MSHA inspector issued safeguard notice number 7095089 with respect to the Sentinel mine. The notice required that all moving conveyor belts at the Sentinel Mine be provided with “suitable crossing facilities where persons are required to cross over or under [them].” 3 The safeguard notice cited both section 314(b) and 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403–5(j) 4 as its authority.

On January 23, 2008, a MSHA inspector issued citation number 6606199 to Wolf Run for failing to provide “a suitable crossing facility” at the Sentinel mine in violation of 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403–5(j) and the safeguard notice issued on June 27, 2000. The inspector designated the violation “significant and substantial.”

Wolf Run contested the citation and the case was assigned to an administrative law judge (ALJ).5 Before the ALJ, Wolf Run moved for a partial summary decision, arguing that a violation of a safeguard notice cannot be designated “significant and substantial” under section 104(d)(1) of the Mine Act because it does not constitute a violation of a mandatory health or safety standard. The Secretary opposed Wolf Run's motion. On December 18, 2008, the ALJ denied Wolf Run's motion. Wolf Run then sought review of the ALJ's decision before the Commission. It stipulated that it had violated 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403–5(j), that the gravity level was “reasonably likely” to cause “lost work days or restricted duty” injury for at least one miner, that its negligence level was “moderate” and that the Secretary's proposed civil penalty of $1,304 was appropriate 6 pursuant to the criteria listed in the Mine Act. 32 FMSHRC at 1230; see 30 U.S.C. § 815(b)(1)(B).7

On October 21, 2010, the Commission affirmed the ALJ's decision. The Commission majority concluded that the Congress “directly address[ed] the question of whether a violation of section 314(b) constitutes a violation of a mandatory safety standard” by placing section 314(b) [ ] within the section 3( l ) definition of a mandatory safety standard.” 32 FMSHRC at 1256. Accordingly, the Commission continued, [b]ecause a proven violation of a safeguard notice is necessarily a violation of section 314(b), it follows that the violation of a safeguard notice is a violation of a mandatory safety standard and can constitute a [significant and substantial] violation.” Id. The dissenting commissioner concluded inter alia that a MSHA inspector cannot designate a violation of a safeguard notice issued pursuant to section 314(b) “significant and substantial” because neither 30 C.F.R. § 75.1403–5(j) nor the safeguard notice itself falls within the statutory definition of a mandatory safety standard.

Wolf Run timely filed a petition for review of the Commission's decision. The court has jurisdiction pursuant to section 106(a)(1) of the Mine Act. 30 U.S.C. § 816(a).

II. Analysis

Wolf Run challenges the Commission's interpretation of section 314(b) of the Mine Act as authorizing the “significant and substantial” designation to attach to the violation of a safeguard notice issued pursuant thereto. We review the Commission's legal conclusions de novo. Sec'y of Labor v. Keystone Coal Mining Corp., 151 F.3d 1096, 1099 (D.C.Cir.1998). In matters of statutory interpretation, the court ‘must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.’ Sec'y of Labor ex rel. Bushnell v. Cannelton Indus., Inc., 867 F.2d 1432, 1435 (D.C.Cir.1989) (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984)). To determine whether the meaning of a statutory provision is plain, the court's analysis begins with “the most traditional tool of statutory construction, [reading] the text itself.” City of Tacoma v. FERC, 331 F.3d 106, 114 (D.C.Cir.2003) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) (brackets in Tacoma ). In deciding whether the text resolves the meaning of a statutory provision, the court considers “the particular statutory language at issue, as well as the language and design of the statute as a whole.” Id. (quoting Halverson v. Slater, 129 F.3d 180, 184 (D.C.Cir.1997)). If “the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,” the court defers to the Secretary's interpretation provided the interpretation is ‘a permissible construction of the statute.’ Cannelton Indus., 867 F.2d at 1435 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, 104 S.Ct. 2778).

As we have previously held, the Mine Act clearly provides that the “significant and substantial” designation is limited to a violation of a “mandatory health or safety standard.” 30 U.S.C. § 814(d)(1); see Cyprus Emerald, 195 F.3d at...

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