Woo v. El Paso Cnty. Sheriff's Office
| Decision Date | 10 September 2020 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals No. 19CA1360 |
| Citation | 490 P.3d 884 |
| Court | Colorado Court of Appeals |
| Parties | James WOO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EL PASO COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE and Fourth Judicial District Attorney's Office, Defendants-Appellees. |
James Woo, Pro Se
Diana K. May, County Attorney, Mary Ritchie, Assistant County Attorney, Colorado Springs, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees
Opinion by JUDGE NAVARRO
¶ 1 Plaintiff James Woo appeals the district court's judgment dismissing his replevin claim against the El Paso County Sheriff's Office and the Fourth Judicial District Attorney's Office. He sought the return of property seized during and after his arrest. We conclude that (1) the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), §§ 24-10-101 to - 120, C.R.S. 2019, bars Woo's replevin claim; (2) applying the CGIA to bar his claim does not violate his due process rights because he had a meaningful post-seizure remedy in a related criminal case; and (3) the district court properly dismissed his claim with prejudice. Accordingly, we affirm.
¶ 2 In April 2016, officers arrested Woo at the Seattle airport on suspicion of first degree murder. Officers seized his luggage and later searched his apartment.
¶ 3 A trial in the criminal case concluded in February 2018, and a jury convicted Woo of first degree murder.1 A week later, the court sentenced him to life in prison without the possibility of parole. Thereafter, Woo's counsel filed a motion in the criminal case seeking permission to return certain computer hard drives to Woo. The record does not make clear how that motion was resolved.
¶ 4 In April 2019, Woo filed this replevin action against the defendants. He alleged that the items seized during his arrest and from his apartment included personal documents, jewelry, an iPad, a camera, clothing, cash, credit cards, and a computer. According to his allegations, those items were his property, were not used as evidence in the criminal trial, and should be returned to him because they lack any evidentiary value for future proceedings. He also sought damages from the alleged wrongful detention of the property.
¶ 5 Citing the CGIA, the defendants moved to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion asserted that Woo had failed to comply with the CGIA's 182-day notice of claim requirement and, in the alternative, that the defendants are immune from replevin actions. Woo responded that he had filed a notice within 182 days of his discovery of the injury (which he alleged was in February 2019). He also argued that the CGIA violates his due process rights if it bars his replevin action.
¶ 6 Without holding a hearing, the district court dismissed Woo's complaint with prejudice on the ground that he "[a]pparently" failed to provide proper notice to the defendants before filing this action and, thus, the court lacked jurisdiction. The court also concluded that "the return of property, if any," should be resolved in Woo's criminal case.
¶ 7 Applying somewhat different reasoning, we affirm.
¶ 8 Governmental immunity raises a jurisdictional issue. Springer v. City & Cty. of Denver , 13 P.3d 794, 798 (Colo. 2000). When the jurisdictional issue involves a factual dispute, we apply the clearly erroneous standard of review in considering the district court's findings of jurisdictional fact. Id. If the alleged facts are undisputed or the issue is purely one of law, we review the jurisdictional matter de novo. Id.
¶ 9 Here, the parties presented factual disputes as to when Woo discovered his alleged injury and when he gave the defendants notice of his claim. The district court, however, did not hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve those disputes based on the evidence. So, we are in the same position as the district court to address the jurisdictional question, and we review the court's legal conclusions de novo. See Colo. Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. Menor , 166 P.3d 205, 209 (Colo. App. 2007). Additionally, whether the CGIA deprives a court of jurisdiction to hear a particular type of claim is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de novo. See City of Colorado Springs v. Conners , 993 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Colo. 2000).
¶ 10 The CGIA provides that, subject to specific enumerated exceptions, "sovereign immunity shall be a bar to any action against a public entity for injury which lies in tort or could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief chosen by a claimant." § 24-10-108, C.R.S. 2019; see also § 24-10-106, C.R.S. 2019 (enumerating exceptions). "Through the CGIA, the General Assembly sought to protect public entities not only from the costs of judgments but the costs of unnecessary litigation as well." Hernandez v. City & Cty. of Denver , 2018 COA 151, ¶ 5, 439 P.3d 57.
¶ 11 Woo filed a "verified complaint in replevin." Replevin is a possessory action in which a claimant seeks to recover possession of personal property that has been wrongfully taken or detained, as well as damages for its unlawful detention. C.R.C.P. 104(b) ; City & Cty. of Denver v. Desert Truck Sales, Inc. , 837 P.2d 759, 763 (Colo. 1992). The "basic elements" of a replevin claim are "the plaintiff's ownership or right to possession, the means by which the defendant came to possess the property, and the detention of the property against the rights of the plaintiff." Desert Truck Sales , 837 P.2d at 764.
¶ 12 Woo did not allege that the initial seizure of the property was wrongful; rather, he alleged that the defendants’ continued detention of it had become wrongful. Thus, he pleaded an action in replevin in detinet — "[r]eplevin ... where defendant rightfully obtained possession of property but wrongfully detains it." Id. at 765 (citation omitted). He also sought monetary damages for the wrongful detention and for any damage the items sustained during that detention.
¶ 13 Our supreme court has held that replevin in detinet , including a claim for damages, is an action which lies or could lie in tort. Id. As a result, the CGIA bars such an action unless a waiver applies. Id. But, as the supreme court further explained, the CGIA does not waive immunity for an action in replevin to obtain possession of property validly seized pursuant to a public entity's police power and to recover damages for its detention. Id. at 767.
¶ 14 For these reasons, the CGIA bars Woo's replevin action against the defendants.2
¶ 15 Because the CGIA bars Woo's replevin action to recover the property and damages, we must address his contention that barring his action violates his federal and state constitutional rights against deprivations of property without due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1 ; Colo. Const. art. II, § 25. He does not present a facial challenge to the law; so, we must decide whether the CGIA is unconstitutional as applied to his claim.
¶ 16 Given that Woo preserved this constitutional claim in the district court, we review it de novo. See People v. Perez-Hernandez , 2013 COA 160, ¶ 10, 348 P.3d 451. We presume a statute is constitutional, and the challenger bears the burden to prove its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt. TABOR Found. v. Reg'l Transp. Dist. , 2018 CO 29, ¶ 15, 416 P.3d 101. To show a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must first identify a liberty or property interest that has been interfered with by the state. Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson , 490 U.S. 454, 460, 109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989). Next, the plaintiff must show that the procedures attendant to that deprivation were constitutionally insufficient. Id.
¶ 17 We assume for the sake of our analysis that the property Woo seeks to obtain belongs to him. Under that assumption, he suffered a deprivation of a property interest when the state seized and did not return the property. Woo does not argue that the initial seizure was unconstitutional. The question thus becomes whether applying the CGIA to preclude Woo's replevin action to recover the property violates his due process rights. See Hudson v. Palmer , 468 U.S. 517, 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (1984) ().
¶ 18 On this question, Desert Truck Sales is again instructive because the supreme court considered whether applying the CGIA to preclude the replevin action violated the purported property owner's due process rights. 837 P.2d at 768. Like Woo, the plaintiff in that case argued that barring a replevin action denied due process because it was the only remedy to recover the property — there, a vehicle seized by police on suspicion of theft and then detained because its vehicle identification number had been removed. Id. at 762. The supreme court rejected that argument, reasoning that the plaintiff had a statutory right to a post-seizure hearing to prove ownership and obtain possession of the car, and that the hearing was mandatory. Id. at 767-68 (citing § 42-5-110, C.R.S. 2019 ). The court concluded that this procedure adequately protected the plaintiff's due process rights. Id. ; cf. Hudson , 468 U.S. at 533, 104 S.Ct. 3194 ().
¶ 19 Likewise, Woo had an adequate post-seizure remedy. He could have sought (and, as to some property, he did seek) return of the property in his criminal case. Though no statute or rule sets out the procedure available to a criminal defendant to recover property that was legally seized, longstanding Colorado case law...
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