Wood, Matter of

• Citation: 768 P.2d 1370,236 Mont. 118
• Decision Date: 14 February 1989
• Docket Number: No. 88-313,88-313
• Parties: In the Matter of Keith Wayne WOOD, a Youth under the age of Eighteen.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

Page 1370

768 P.2d 1370

236 Mont. 118

In the Matter of Keith Wayne WOOD, a Youth under the age of

Eighteen.

No. 88-313.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted Nov. 15, 1988.

Decided Feb. 14, 1989.

Stephen J. Nardi, Sherlock & Nardi, Kalispell, for appellant.

Marc Racicot, Atty. Gen., George Schunk, Asst. Atty. Gen., Helena, Ted O. Lympus, Flathead County Atty., Kalispell, for respondent.

Robert B. Allison, Kalispell, Guardian Ad Litem.

HUNT, Justice.

Pursuant to Sec. 41-5-206(3), MCA, the youth court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County, ordered the case of Keith Wayne Wood, a youth, transferred to District Court. The youth appeals the transfer, arguing that Sec. 41-5-206(3), MCA, is unconstitutional. We affirm the District Court.

The following issues were raised on appeal.

1. Is Sec. 41-5-206(3), MCA, unconstitutional because it:

(a) denies a youth's right to due process?

(b) denies a youth's right to equal protection?

(c) violates the separation of powers doctrine of the Montana Constitution?

Keith Wayne Wood, a youth, was arrested on March 30, 1988 for two counts of deliberate homicide. He was brought before the youth court on March 31, 1988 for the purpose of appointing him a counsel and determining whether he should be detained. On April 4, 1988, the county attorney for Flathead County filed a motion pursuant to Sec. 41-5-206(3), MCA, in the youth court to transfer the case to the District Court. Wood appeared before the youth court on May 6, 1988, at which time he conceded he was 16 years old at the time of the wrongful acts alleged in the petition and, if true, the acts alleged would constitute two counts of deliberate homicide under Sec. 45-5-102, MCA.

On May 10, 1988, the youth court, by written order, granted the county attorney's motion and transferred jurisdiction over the matter of Keith Wayne Wood to the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial District, Flathead County. In its findings of fact, the youth court found that at the time of the alleged wrongful acts Wood was 16 years of age, the acts, if true, would constitute deliberate homicide as defined in Sec. 45-5-102, MCA, and probable cause existed to conclude that Wood committed the alleged acts.

In granting the order, the youth court relied on Sec. 41-5-206(3), MCA, which states that

The court shall grant the motion to transfer if the youth was 16 years old or older at the time of the conduct alleged to be unlawful and the unlawful act would constitute deliberate homicide as defined in 45-5-102, mitigated deliberate homicide as defined in 45-5-103, or the attempt, as defined in 45-4-103, of either deliberate or mitigated deliberate homicide if the act had been committed by an adult.

The youth court found this statute rationally based upon the age of the offenders and the seriousness of the offenses. The youth court thus found that the statute does not create an unreasonable age classification and therefore does not violate a youth's right to due process nor to equal protection. The youth court also found that the statute does not violate the constitutional guarantee of the separation of legislative and judicial powers, but rather found that redefining the Youth Court Act is a valid exercise of legislative authority. Wood appeals the transfer to District Court, presenting three constitutional issues for review.

The first issue raised on appeal is whether Sec. 41-5-206(3), MCA, denies a youth's constitutional right to due process.

One of the purposes of the Montana Youth Court Act, Secs. 41-5-101 through 41-5-809, MCA (1987), is to substitute rehabilitation in lieu of punishment for youths who have violated the law. Section 41-5-102(2), MCA. To further this purpose, the youth court is granted exclusive original jurisdiction of youths who have violated any law other than a traffic or fish and game law prior to having reached 18 years of age. Section 41-5-203(1), MCA. The Act, however, also provides for a youth's transfer to district court upon a motion of the county attorney in certain instances. Section 41-5-206, MCA.

Wood argues that Sec. 41-5-206(3), MCA, is unconstitutional because the provision denies a youth, aged 16 years or older and who has allegedly committed or attempted to commit deliberate or mitigated deliberate homicide, the right to a hearing whereby a youth court considers mitigating factors in its determination of whether to transfer the youth to district court. In particular, Wood argues that Sec. 41-5-206(1), MCA, grants these youths a hearing to determine whether to transfer them to district court, but that Sec. 41-5-206(3), MCA, dictates the outcome of the hearing by mandating the youth court to grant the county attorney's motion to transfer these youths.

In asserting this argument, Wood relies upon a United States Supreme Court decision, Kent v. United States (1966), 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84. In Kent, a 16 year old youth from the District of Columbia was charged with housebreaking, robbery, and rape. Before transferring a youth aged 16 years or older from youth court to district court, the District of Columbia statute required a "full investigation." The youth court transferred jurisdiction of the youth to district court without a hearing or any investigation. Kent, 383 U.S. at 543-48, 86 S.Ct. at 1048-51, 16 L.Ed.2d at 87-90. The Supreme Court stated that the statute "assumes procedural regularity sufficient in the particular circumstances to satisfy the basic requirements of due process and fairness, as well as compliance with the statutory requirement of a 'full investigation.' " Kent, 383 U.S. at 553, 86 S.Ct. at 1053, 16 L.Ed.2d at 93. The Court therefore held that procedural due process is required by the Fourteenth Amendment when transferring a youth from youth court to district court. Kent, 383 U.S. at 557-63, 86 S.Ct. at 1055-58, 16 L.Ed.2d at 95-98.

The United States Supreme Court in Breed v. Jones (1975), 421 U.S. 519, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 44 L.Ed.2d 346, however, recognized that it has

never attempted to prescribe criteria for, or the nature and quantum of evidence that must support, a decision to transfer a juvenile for trial in adult court. We require only that, whatever the relevant criteria, and whatever the evidence demanded, a State determine whether it wants to treat a juvenile within the juvenile-court system before entering upon a proceeding that may result in an adjudication that he has violated a criminal law and in a substantial deprivation of liberty, rather than subject him to the expense, delay, strain, and embarrassment of two such proceedings. Breed, 421 U.S. at 537-38, 95 S.Ct. at 1790, 44 L.Ed.2d at 360.

Subsequent United States' Court of Appeals decisions have held that a state's treatment of youths outside of the criminal system is not an inherent right and may be redefined or restricted by state legislation, so long as no arbitrary or discriminatory classification is involved. Woodard v. Wainwright (5th Cir.1977), 556 F.2d 781, 785, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1088, 98 S.Ct. 1285, 55 L.Ed.2d 794 (1978); see also United States v. Quinones (1st Cir.1975), 516 F.2d 1309, 1311, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 852, 96 S.Ct. 97, 46 L.Ed.2d 76; Cox v. United States (4th Cir.1973), 473 F.2d 334, 336, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 869, 94 S.Ct. 183, 38 L.Ed.2d 116.

Wood recognizes that a youth's treatment outside of the criminal system may be redefined or restricted by the state legislature, but asserts that under Sec. 41-5-206(1), MCA, the legislature granted all youths a hearing before being transferred to district court and that Sec. 41-5-206(3), MCA, dictates the outcome of that hearing for youths aged 16 years or older and who have committed or attempted to commit deliberate or mitigated deliberate homicide. We disagree with Wood's basic assertion. Section 41-5-206(1)(a)(i), MCA, provides that youths, aged 12 years or older and who have committed sexual intercourse without consent or who have committed or attempted to commit deliberate or mitigated deliberate homicide, may be transferred, after a hearing, to district court by motion of the county attorney. Section 41-5-206(3), MCA, however, provides that youths aged 16 years or older who have allegedly committed or attempted to commit one of these offenses--deliberate or mitigated deliberate homicide--must be transferred to district court upon a motion by the county attorney.

This Court first recognizes that Sec. 41-5-206, MCA, is presumed constitutional and that the party attacking the statute, Wood, has a significant burden in proving its invalidity. T & W Chevrolet v. Darvial (1982), 196 Mont. 287, 292, 641 P.2d 1368, 1370. We hold that Wood failed to meet this burden. When interpreting statutes, this Court must adhere to the legislators' intent. State v. Hubbard (1982), 200 Mont. 106, 110-11, 649 P.2d 1331, 1333. Prior to 1987, Sec. 41-5-206, MCA, required a hearing for all youths before transferring them to district court. The legislature amended the statute in 1987 by enacting Sec. 41-5-206(3), MCA. This provision provides for automatic transfer of youths aged 16 years or older and who have allegedly committed or attempted to commit deliberate or mitigated deliberate homicide. The presumption exists that, by adopting an amendment to a statute, the legislature intended to make some change in existing law. Foster v. Kovich (1983), 207 Mont. 139, 144-45, 673 P.2d 1239, 1243. This Court must also, if possible, give effect to all of the provisions. Darby Spar, Ltd. v. Dept. of Revenue (1985), 217 Mont. 376, 705 P.2d 111, 113, 42 St.Rep. 1262, 1264-65. We therefore hold that Sec. 41-5-206(3), MCA, which applies to youths aged 16 years or older, has the effect of limiting Sec. 41-5-206(1), MCA, to youths aged 12 years or older but under the age of 16 years when the alleged offense is deliberate or mitigated deliberate homicide or the attempt of either. Section 41-5-206(3), MCA, therefore does not dictate...