Wood v. Broadley

• Decision Date: 31 October 1882
• Citation: 76 Mo. 23
• Parties: WOOD et al., Appellants, v. BROADLEY.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

76 Mo. 23

WOOD et al., Appellants,

v.BROADLEY.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

October Term, 1882.

Appeal from Ralls Circuit Court.--HON. JOHN T. REDD, Judge.

AFFIRMED.

Thomas H. Bacon for appellants.

1. John O. Wood was a necessary party co-plaintiff, ( Edmonson v. Phillips, 73 Mo. 60,) and as such party he was a competent witness. Steffen v. Bauer, 70 Mo. 399, p. 404. He had a substantial interest as a party litigating for a tenancy by the curtesy initiate, ( Haerle v. Kreihn, 65 Mo. 202; Joice v. Branson, 73 Mo. 28,) and the court erred in excluding him from the witness stand. Fugate v. Pierce, 49 Mo. 441.

2. At law a husband's deed or gift to his wife is void, ( Frissell v. Rozier, 19 Mo. 448; 1 Washb. Real Prop., (4 Ed.) 333; 1 Bish. Marr. Wom., (1 Ed.) p. 604, § 35; Wm.'s Real Prop., (3 Am. Ed.) p. 322, side 208,) and it is sustained only in equity, but equity will sustain such gift only to the extent of a reasonable provision for the wife, ( Beard v. Beard, 3 Atk. 72,) and equity will not sustain a husband's gift of all his property to his wife, but will hold such deed inoperative. 2 Story Eq., (8 Am. Ed.) § 1374.

3. The grantor was what is known as a feeble-minded person. Bennet v. Vade, 2 Atk. 324; Bigelow on Estoppel, 284. As to plaintiffs, the execution of the deeds was conducted with strategic secrecy. Rider v. Miller, 86 N. Y. 510, 511. The grantor shortly afterward, unconscious that he had conveyed it, discoursed about the property as then and to continue his own. Rider v. Miller, supra. The declarations of the grantor pending the previous five years imported no intention of bestowing all upon his wife, and under these circumstances with the testimony of domestics, ( Haydock v. Haydock, 33 N. J. Eq. 494,) proving the absolute control maintained by the wife, such as that exercised by a nurse over a child; (Lord Hardwicke in Bennet v.Vade, 2 Atk. 326;) the grantee's contrivance in repressing parental association, ( Boyse v. Rossborough, 6 H. L. Ca. 2., pp. 48, 49;) her numerous assertions that the plaintiff should not have any of the property, ( Boyse v. Rossborough, supra;) her extreme hostility to plaintiff contrasted with the grantor's sustained instances of affection for his daughter, and the grantee's announcement to the grantor “that she would and was determined to have the property deeded to her;” (6 H. L. Ca., supra, p. 51;) the wife's undue influence may be inferred from the nature of the transaction alone, ( Drake's Appeal, 45 Conn. 12,) and the deed must be held the product of undue influence on the part of the grantee, although no obvious deception or coercion was used at the time of the grant. Taylor v. Wilburn, 20 Mo. 306.

4. The recital of only a valuable consideration estops the grantee from setting up or availing herself of the consideration of love and affection in support of a deed to her, impeached for her alleged undue influence. ( Clarkson v. Hanway, 2 P. Wms. 203; Henderson v. Henderson, 13 Mo. 152,) and even though the grantor himself inserted the fictitious consideration, such deed will be set aside. Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sr. 627; Gibson v. Russell, 2 Younge & Coll. 104; Willan v. Willan, 2 Dow 274; Dent v. Bennett, 4 Mylne & Cr. 269; Huguenin v. Basely, 14 Ves. Jr. 301; Cadwallader v. West, 48 Mo. 498. One reason for this rule is, that without it no conveyance between relatives could ever be impeached for want of consideration. Willan v. Willan, 2 Dow 274. The main object of this rule is to provide a penalty for the opportunity afforded to the grantee to sell to innocent purchasers without notice. Uppington v. Bullen, 2 Drury & Warren 187.

5. A husband's deed to his wife is void at law, and can be supported only in equity, ( Frissell v. Rozier, 19 Mo. 448; Chouteau v. Magenis, 28 Mo. 187, p. 191,) but equity will not support a deed of gift, reciting solely a valuable consideration, which confessedly never existed, ( Cadwallader v. West, 48 Mo. 498; Bridgman v. Green, 2 Ves. Sr. 627, and a deed thus supported by neither law nor equity, cannot take effect unless supported in some way; and if it can be supported at all, the burden of proof to support it is, therefore, devolved on the femme covert grantee.

Chas. A. Winslow for respondents.

1. The main question is, whether the finding of the court was right on the facts. The instructions given by the court are only material as showing the standard by which the court judged the facts. An examination of those instructions will show that the court applied the correct theory to the facts, and the judgment cannot be held erroneous on that ground. The preponderance of the evidence is with defendants. Moore v. Moore, 67 Mo. 192; McKinney v. Hensley, 74 Mo. 326; Doggett v. Lane, 12 Mo. 220.

2. The petition nowhere alleges that the conveyance of this land by Broadley to his wife was an unreasonable provision for her, so as to bring it within the rule invoked by appellants. The allegation is that it was made without a valuable consideration, produced by undue influence, executed under an insane delusion, and by a man lacking sufficient mental capacity. There is no evidence that it was not a reasonable provision; there was evidence tending to show that he had previously given plaintiffs all he thought they were entitled to; that they had left him years before, and that defendants took care of him in his old age and misfortunes. He had helped Mrs. Wood at an early day, and intended this deed as a provision for the defendants. The record suggests no reason why it should not be sustained in equity. Hollocher v. Hollocher, 62 Mo. 267; Smith v. Smith, 50 Mo. 262; Walker v. Walker, 25 Mo. 367. The burden of showing that the provision was unreasonable rested on plaintiffs. They were not dependent on the grantor for support, and have no right to complain. Shepard v. Shepard, 7 Johns. Ch. 57; Hannan v. Oxley, 23 Wis. 519; Hunt v. Johnson, 44 N. Y. 27; Sims v. Rickets, 35 Ind. 181, and cases; Dale v. Lincoln, 62 Ill. 22; Jones v. Obenchain, 10 Grat. 259; Crooks v. Crooks, 34 Ohio St. 610; Horder v. Horder, 23 Kas. 391; Majors v. Everton, 89 Ill. 5

3. The wife was the substantial party; the cause of action was in her, and her husband had only an interest in the result. He was not competent as a witness. Paul v. Leavitt, 53 Mo. 595; Joice v. Branson, 73 Mo. 28; Haerle v. Kreihn, 65 Mo. 202.

HENRY, J.

The plaintiff, Elizabeth, is the daughter of Nicholas D. Broadley, deceased, and her co-plaintiff is her husband. On the 25th day of February, 1875, said Nicholas by deed conveyed to his wife, defendant Elizabeth, all the lands he owned, about 300 acres, for the expressed consideration of $2,000, which was never paid by her, and which it was not the intention of said Nicholas that she should pay. The grantee was his second wife, and the plaintiff, Elizabeth, is the only living child of the first marriage. His second marriage occurred in 1849, and his death in 1876. The defendant Virginia is the only child of the last marriage. The object of this suit is to set aside said deed, on the ground that Nicholas Broadley, when it was executed and delivered, was old and infirm and had not mental capacity to make the deed; that he had insane delusions that he was in immediate danger of pecuniary ruin from litigation, when there was no ground for such apprehension, and that he had previously made ample provision for the plaintiff, Elizabeth, when in fact he had given her no property and had made no provision for her whatever; that the defendant Elizabeth had acquired an undue influence over the mind and volition of her husband, and that she unduly and improperly exerted the same to procure the execution and delivery of the deed. The answer denied all the allegations of the petition charging undue influence, mental incapacity and insane delusions, and alleged, with respect to the consideration, that Nicholas Broadley was desirous and intended to make provision for his wife, by giving to her the said land, and for that purpose, and with that intention, executed and delivered to her said deed, as a deed of gift, in consideration of love and affection, and only expressed the money consideration under an impression on his part that it was necessary in order to render the deed valid. On a trial of the cause defendants obtained a judgment, from which plaintiffs appeal.

The testimony is voluminous. Twenty-one witnesses were introduced by plaintiffs, and nineteen for the defense, and while the testimony is contradictory, we are not prepared to say that it did not warrant the finding of the trial court. Issues were submitted to the jury, and the court, by way of charge, instructed them as follows:

1. There is no sufficient evidence to prove that the deed referred to in plaintiffs' petition, was caused to be made by any undue or improper influence exercised over the mind of Nicholas D. Broadley by the defendant, or any other person; and the issue on that subject is withdrawn from the jury, and they will not consider the same in making up the verdict.

2. The issue submitted to the jury is, whether on the 25th day of February, 1875, at the time said Nicholas Broadley executed said deed, he, said Broadley, was or not of sufficient sound mind to render him capable of making said deed.

3. The jury in their verdict should state that said Broadley at the time said deed was made by him, was or was not (as the jury may determine from the evidence) of a sufficient sound mind to render him capable of making said deed.

4. There is no sufficient evidence in the case tending to prove that N. D. Broadley at the time he made the deed in question was possessed of an insane delusion that he was in danger of being ruined by litigation then pending, or by other means, and that thereby he would be deprived of his property, and there is no sufficient evidence tending to prove that the making of said deed was caused or induced by such delusion, or delusion on any other subject, and they should...