Wood v. Saul

• Decision Date: 21 April 2021
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-CV-00057-HBB
• Parties: ANGELA WOOD PLAINTIFF v. ANDREW SAUL, COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Kentucky

ANGELA WOOD PLAINTIFF v. ANDREW SAUL, COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION DEFENDANT

CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:20-CV-00057-HBB

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY OWENSBORO DIVISION

April 21, 2021

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BACKGROUND

Before the Court is the complaint (DN 1) of Angela Wood ("Plaintiff") seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Both Plaintiff (DN 16) and Defendant (DN 22) have filed a Fact and Law Summary. For the reasons that follow, the final decision of the Commissioner is REVERSED, and this matter is REMANDED, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), for further proceedings.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and FED. R. CIV. P. 73, the parties have consented to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge conducting all further proceedings in this case, including issuance of a memorandum opinion and entry of judgment, with direct review by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the event an appeal is filed (DN 14). By Order entered October 29, 2020 (DN 15), the parties were notified that oral arguments would not be held unless a written request therefor was filed and granted. No such request was filed.

FINDINGS OF FACT

Plaintiff protectively filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income Benefits on December 21, 2016 (Tr. 11, 257-59, 260-66, 267-74). Plaintiff alleges to have become disabled on August 30, 2016, as a result of spinal stenosis, lower back pain, high cholesterol, bulging disc, and arthritis (Tr. 11, 125, 139, 155, 169). These claims were initially denied on February 7, 2017, and the denial of the claims were affirmed upon reconsideration on May 2, 2017 (Tr. 11, 136-37, 150-51, 167, 181). Administrative Law Judge Lisa R. Hall ("ALJ") conducted a video hearing from Paducah, Kentucky on August 16, 2018 (Tr. 11, 102). Virtually present at the hearing from Owensboro, Kentucky was Plaintiff and her attorney Sara Martin Diaz (Id.). No vocational expert testified during the hearing.

At the first step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 30, 2016, the alleged onset date (Tr. 14). At the second step, the ALJ determined Plaintiff has the following severe impairments: degenerative disc disease and myalgia (Id.). The ALJ also found Plaintiff's major depressive disorder and cardiac disease to be nonsevere (Tr. 14-15). At the third step, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff does not have an impairment or combination of impairments that meets or medically equals the severity of one of the listed impairments in Appendix 1 (Tr. 15).

At the fourth step, the ALJ found that Plaintiff has the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except for the following limitations: Plaintiff is limited to lifting or carrying up to twenty pounds occasionally and lifting or carrying ten pounds frequently, as well as pushing and pulling as much as she can lift or carry; Plaintiff is limited to sitting, standing, or walking for approximately six hours pereight hour workday; Plaintiff can occasionally climb ladders; and Plaintiff must avoid concentrated exposure to vibration and hazards (Tr. 16). The ALJ found Plaintiff is unable to perform any past relevant work (Tr. 18). After this finding, the ALJ also considered Plaintiff's RFC, age, education, and past work experience to find that Plaintiff is able to perform other jobs that exist in the national economy in significant numbers (Tr. 19). Therefore, the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff has not been under a "disability," as defined in the Social Security Act, since August 30, 2016, the alleged onset date (Id.).

Plaintiff timely filed a request for the Appeals Council to review the ALJ's decision (Tr. 256). The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 1-3).

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Standard of Review

Review by the Court is limited to determining whether the findings set forth in the final decision of the Commissioner are supported by "substantial evidence," 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695 (6th Cir. 1993); Wyatt v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 974 F.2d 680, 683 (6th Cir. 1992), and whether the correct legal standards were applied. Landsaw v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). "Substantial evidence exists when a reasonable mind could accept the evidence as adequate to support the challenged conclusion, even if that evidence could support a decision the other way." Cotton, 2 F.3d at 695 (quoting Casey v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993)). In reviewing a case for substantial evidence, the Court "may not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility." Cohen v. Sec'y of Health & Human Servs., 964 F.2d 524, 528 (6th Cir. 1992) (quoting Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984)).

As previously mentioned, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review of the ALJ's decision (Tr. 1-3). At that point, the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.955(b), 404.981, 422.210(a); see 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) (finality of the Commissioner's decision). Thus, the Court will be reviewing the decision of the ALJ, not the Appeals Council, and the evidence that was in the administrative record when the ALJ rendered the decision. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); 20 C.F.R. § 404.981; Cline v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 96 F.3d 146, 148 (6th Cir. 1996); Cotton v. Sullivan, 2 F.3d 692, 695-696 (6th Cir. 1993).

The Commissioner's Sequential Evaluation Process

The Social Security Act authorizes payment of Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income to persons with disabilities. 42 U.S.C. §§ 401 et seq. (Title II Disability Insurance Benefits), 1381 et seq. (Title XVI Supplemental Security Income). The term "disability" is defined as an

[I]nability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve (12) months.

42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A) (Title II), 1382c(a)(3)(A) (Title XVI); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1505(a), 416.905(a); Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 214 (2002); Abbott v. Sullivan, 905 F.2d 918, 923 (6th Cir. 1990).

The Commissioner has promulgated regulations setting forth a five-step sequential evaluation process for evaluating a disability claim. See "Evaluation of disability in general," 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. In summary, the evaluation proceeds as follows:

1) Is the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?

2) Does the claimant have a medically determinable impairment or combination of impairments that satisfies the duration requirement and significantly limits his or her ability to do basic work activities?

3) Does the claimant have an impairment that meets or medically equals the criteria of a listed impairment within Appendix 1?

4) Does the claimant have the residual functional capacity to return to his or her past relevant work?

5) Does the claimant's residual functional capacity, age, education, and past work experience allow him or her to perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy?

Here, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim at the fifth step.

Clear Error

At the forefront, the Court will begin with Plaintiff's repeated use of the "clear error" standard in her argument (see e.g. DN 16-1 PageID 1231, 1235, 1238, 1244, 1250-51). The "clear error" standard applies when a district judge reviews a magistrate judge's report and recommendation to which no timely objection has been filed. See FED. R. CIV. P. 72 Advisory Committee Note Subdivision (b) ("When no timely objection is filed, the court need only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation."); Mitchum v. Saul, No. 2:19-CV-02533-JPM-dkv, 2020 WL 1493482, at *1 (W.D. Tenn. March 27, 2020); Samona v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 15-CV-11713, 2018 WL 2159893, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May 10, 2018). The "clear error" standard also applies when a party moves a district court to alter or amend its judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 59(e). See Moore v Berryhill, No. 4:17-CV-00091-HBB, 2018 WL 2197974, at *1 (W.D. Ky. May 14, 2018). Neither situation exists here.

Instead, Plaintiff is utilizing the "clear error" standard in her challenge of the final decision of the Commissioner. But the Court is limited to determining whether the findings set forth in the final decision of the Commissioner are supported by "substantial evidence" and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Gayheart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 710 F.3d 365, 374 (6th Cir. 2013); Cole v. Astrue, 661 F.3d 931, 937 (6th Cir. 2011)). Thus, the Court declines Plaintiff's invitation to apply the "clear error" standard.

Challenge to the ALJ's Non-Use of a Vocational Expert

1. Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff argues that the ALJ erred when assessing whether a significant number of jobs exist in the national economy that Plaintiff may do, when the determination was made without the assistance or testimony of a vocational expert (DN 16-1 PageID 1231). In a situation where a claimant's RFC could fall into more than one category of exertional levels, then an Administrative Law Judge may consult with a vocational expert and their "specialized knowledge" (Id. at PageID 1232) (citing Blackburn v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 748 F. App'x 45 (6th Cir. 2018)). However, "when a claimant has a combination of exertional and non-exertional limitations or restrictions and an [Administrative Law Judge] does not have a clear understanding of the effects of the additional limitations on the job base, the services of a Vocational Specialist will be necessary" (Id. citing Social Security...