Wood v. State
Decision Date | 27 May 1999 |
Docket Number | No. 91,333.,91,333. |
Citation | 750 So.2d 592 |
Parties | Robert Earl WOOD, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
Court | Florida Supreme Court |
Bruce S. Rogow and Beverly A. Pohl of Bruce S. Rogow, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, Florida, for Petitioner.
Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, James W. Rogers, Tallahassee Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Trisha E. Meggs, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida, for Respondent.
We have for review Wood v. State, 698 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997), wherein the district court certified conflict with Malcolm v. State, 605 So.2d 945 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We quash the Wood decision, although we approve of the reasoning contained therein as explained below.
Robert Earl Wood was arrested on October 5, 1987, and charged with reckless driving and possession of cocaine. He pled nolo contendere to the charges in 1988. The court withheld adjudication and placed him on probation, which he completed in March 1992. A federal trial court subsequently adjudicated him guilty of drug charges and imposed an enhanced sentence of concurrent 240- and 120-month terms because his 1988 plea counted as a prior offense under federal law.
In 1998 and while in federal prison, Wood filed a pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis in Florida circuit court, seeking to have his 1988 plea set aside. He asserted that his lawyer did not tell him at the time he entered the plea that it could be used against him in federal court as a "prior offense." Wood sought a writ of error coram nobis rather than relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 because he had completed his sentence for the 1988 convictions and no longer considered himself "in custody" as required under the rule.1 The circuit court found that Wood met the "in custody" requirement, considered the petition a motion under rule 3.850, and denied it as time-barred. The district court affirmed and certified conflict with Malcolm, wherein the court held that "[u]nlike the general two-year time limitation for filing a motion to vacate under rule 3.850 ... there is no express time limitation for filing a petition for writ of error coram nobis." 605 So.2d at 949. Wood sought review before this Court and we appointed counsel to represent him on the issue of whether writs of error coram nobis are subject to the time limitations contained in rule 3.850.
This Court in Hallman v. State, 371 So.2d 482 (Fla.1979), described the contours of the writ of error coram nobis, an ancient writ designed to correct judgments and sentences based on errors of fact:
Id. at 484-85 (citations and emphasis omitted).2
We subsequently held that rule 3.850 was patterned after the writ of error coram nobis and largely supplanted the writ for criminal defendants in custody:
Richardson v. State, 546 So.2d 1037, 1038-39 (Fla.1989) (citations and emphasis omitted).
The district court in the present case interpreted the above language in Richardson thusly:
In light of the supreme court's decision in [Richardson], virtually all claims formally [sic] cognizable by petition for writ of error coram nobis may now be presented only under rule 3.850, which contains a requirement that the motion be filed within two years after the judgment and sentence become final. The only apparent continuing application for the writ of error coram nobis is in the situation where the petitioner would have a viable claim under rule 3.850 but for the "in custody" requirement. A petition for a writ of error coram nobis therefore must satisfy the two-year limitation of rule 3.850. If the two-year time limitation were not applied to petitions for writs of error coram nobis, they could be used to circumvent the rule.
Wood, 698 So.2d at 293-94. The State contends that the district court was correct in concluding that unless the time limits contained in rule 3.850 are applied to petitions for writ of error coram nobis, the writ could be used to circumvent the rule. We agree with the district court's conclusion for the reasons set forth in this opinion.
As we explained in Richardson, the writ and rule are intended to serve the same purpose. The time limits for filing a rule 3.850 motion are as follows:
Fla. R.Crim. P. 3.850. Given the similarity of purpose between the rule and the writ, we conclude that the above time limits shall be applicable to petitions for writ of error coram nobis.
Limiting claims cognizable under coram nobis to the same time limit that is applied to rule 3.850 motions places both such claimants on equal footing and prevents unwarranted circumvention of the rule. We hasten to add that the discovery of facts giving rise to a coram nobis claim will continue to be governed by the due diligence standard, see Hallman, 371 So.2d at 485
("[I]t must appear that defendant or his counsel could not have known [of the alleged facts] by the use of diligence."), and that coram nobis claims cannot breath life into postconviction claims that have previously been held barred. See Vonia v. State, 680 So.2d 438, 439 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)("[T]he writ of error coram nobis cannot be used by a person no longer in custody to breathe life into a postconviction claim previously time barred.").
Wood's petition is not time-barred since this Court is only now applying this limitation period to writs of error coram nobis. However, this decision shall apply to all defendants adjudicated guilty after the date this decision is filed, while all defendants adjudicated prior to this opinion shall have two years from the filing date within which to file claims traditionally cognizable under coram nobis. Accordingly, we quash Wood and remand the case for further proceedings.3
Recognizing the similarity of the writ of error coram nobis and rule 3.850 relief, we hereby amend the rule by deleting the "in custody" requirement so that both custodial and noncustodial movants may rely on and be governed by the rule, thereby eliminating the need for the writ. By extending rule 3.850 relief to noncustodial claimants, we do not narrow in any way the relief heretofore available to defendants under coram nobis. All claims cognizable under the writ are now available to noncustodial movants under the rule.
Rule 3.850 is amended to...
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