Wood v. State
| Decision Date | 17 December 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. CR–14–286,CR–14–286 |
| Citation | 478 S.W.3d 194 |
| Parties | Howard Wood, Appellant, v. State of Arkansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Prepared by Ken Kittler for Howard Wood, Jr., appellant pro se.
Leslie Rutledge, Att'y Gen., by: Vada Berger, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
Appellant, Howard Wood, entered a guilty plea to one count of sexual assault in the first degree and was sentenced to thirty years imprisonment. On October 7, 2013, pursuant to Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure (2013), Wood filed a petition for postconviction relief. On January 10, 2014, without holding a hearing, the circuit court denied Wood's petition.
From the circuit court's January 10, 2014 order denying his Rule 37.1 petition, Wood appeals.1 In his appeal, Wood contends that the circuit court erred in denying his petition because: (1) defense counsel was ineffective on seven separate grounds;2 and (2) the circuit court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing.
Our standard of review in Rule 37.1 petitions is that, Mason v. State, 2013 Ark. 492, at 1–2, 430 S.W.3d 759 (citations omitted).
When considering an appeal from a circuit court's denial of a Rule 37 petition, the question presented is whether, under the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), the circuit court clearly erred in holding that counsel's performance was not ineffective. Anderson v. State, 2011 Ark. 488, 385 S.W.3d 783. The rule for evaluating ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in cases involving guilty pleas appears in Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 106 S.Ct. 366, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985). In that case, the Supreme Court held that the "cause and prejudice" test of Strickland, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, applied to challenges to guilty pleas based on ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court further held that in order to show prejudice in the context of a guilty plea, the petitioner must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59, 106 S.Ct. 366. An appellant who has entered a guilty plea normally will have considerable difficulty in proving any prejudice, as the plea rests upon an admission in open court that the appellant did the act charged. Jamett v. State, 2010 Ark. 28, 358 S.W.3d 874. Further, a petitioner under Rule 37.1 must allege some direct correlation between counsel's deficient behavior and the decision to enter the plea. Scott v. State, 2012 Ark. 199, 8–9, 406 S.W.3d 1, 5–6 (2012).
Additionally, where a Rule 37 petition is denied without a hearing pursuant to Rule 37.3(a), we review the circuit court's written findings setting forth that the petition is wholly without merit or that it is conclusive on the face of the record that the petitioner is entitled to no relief for clear error. See Henington v. State, 2012 Ark. 181, at 9, 403 S.W.3d 55, 62.
With these standards in mind, we now turn to the issues raised by Wood. Wood asserts that the circuit court erred with regard to seven separate grounds of relief on his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel argument.
First, Wood asserts that the circuit court erred in denying Wood's Rule 37.1 petition because defense counsel was ineffective when she did not object to the charging information on the ground that Wood was charged with violating a statute, Ark.Code Ann. § 5–14–124(a)(3), which Wood alleges was not in effect when he committed the offense. The record demonstrates that the crime was alleged to have been committed on or around March 27, 2013. Wood alleges that the subsection he was charged under, Ark.Code Ann. § 5–14–124(a)(3), was not in effect because the legislature amended Ark.Code Ann. § 5–14–124 in Act 1044 of 2013.
Wood's argument fails because the substantive law in effect on the date the crime was committed controls. See Berry v. State, 278 Ark. 578, 582, 647 S.W.2d 453, 456 (1983). Here, the crime occurred on March 27, 2013, the amended legislation did not go into effect until August 2013. Thus, the amendment has no bearing on Wood's case. See Ark.Code Ann. § 5–14–124. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to make a meritless objection. Tubbs v. State, 2009 Ark. 249, 370 S.W.3d 157. Therefore, we affirm the circuit court on this first point.
For his second claim, Wood asserts that the circuit court erred when it denied his Rule 37.1 petition because his defense counsel failed to request a mental evaluation when she knew, or should have known, that Wood suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder
("PTSD"). Wood further asserts that the circuit court erred because it should have sua sponte ordered a mental evaluation.
Wood presented his mental-health arguments to the circuit court in his Rule 37.1 petition, and in its January 10, 2014, order the circuit court denied his claims and held:
The fourth argument by the Defendant is that his attorney failed to inquire about his mental capacity. This allegation is without merit.... During acceptance of the plea agreement, the Defendant was specifically asked whether he was under any mental disability
or impairment. After the Defendant replied in the affirmative, the Defendant was asked whether it was anything that would keep him from understanding what we are doing today. His reply was "No, your honor." He was then asked whether he was under in influence of any medicine or anything that would cause him to be foggy or cause any problems at all. His reply was "No, your honor." ... As a follow up, the Court ... asked the Defendant; "On the impairment, and I hate to get personal, but I need to know what is it?" The Defendant replied; "Post traumatic stress disorder, combat related." The Court then inquired, "Okay, so that would not affect your thought process for today?" The Defendant's reply was "No sir."
On appeal, Wood presents several arguments regarding his mental health and that he suffers from PTSD—but none of the arguments are meritorious. First, with regard to the requisite culpable intent, violation of Ark.Code Ann. § 5–14–124 does not require a requisite intent. See Martin v. State, 2015 Ark. 147, at 1, 460 S.W.3d 289, 290. Although Wood asserts the circuit court should have sua sponte suspended the guilty plea proceeding and he is entitled to relief, at the guilty plea hearing, Wood stated that the PTSD he claimed to suffer from did not affect his thought processes. Second, a petitioner is presumed to be competent to enter a guilty plea and Wood has failed to point to specific evidence that he was not. Sullivan v. State, 255 Ark. 376, 377, 500 S.W.2d 380, 381 (1973).
Additionally, the record does not demonstrate that the circuit court erred, because Wood did not allege that, but for defense counsel's alleged errors, he would not have entered a guilty plea. As previously noted, in this situation, Wood must allege some direct correlation between counsel's deficient performance and the decision to enter the plea, or Wood is procedurally barred from postconviction relief. See Polivka v. State, 2010 Ark. 152, 362 S.W.3d 918. Wood has failed to meet the standard, and we affirm the circuit court.
Third, Wood asserts that the circuit court erred in denying Wood's Rule 37.1 petition because the prosecutor engaged in prosecutorial misconduct in violation of his due-process rights. Wood asserts that the prosecutor threatened to charge him with four additional counts and this threat infected the trial with unfairness and injustice.
Camacho v. State, 2011 Ark. 235, at 2, 2011 WL 2062328, held that "direct challenges such as ... prosecutorial misconduct are not cognizable in Rule 37.1 proceedings." Additionally, a plea of guilty that is induced by the possibility of a more severe sentence does not amount to coercion. Akin v. State, 2011 Ark. 477, at 3, 2011 WL 5437536. Therefore, we do not find error and affirm the circuit court.
For his fourth claim, Wood asserts that the circuit court erred in denying Wood's Rule 37.1 petition because the sentencing order is facially invalid because the date on the order is incorrect, thus rendering the order facially invalid. Wood contends that the error in the date evidences that his counsel entered a plea agreement without his knowledge, and the sentencing order is facially flawed.
The record demonstrates that the sentencing order indicates a date of July 2, 2013, which was the original date scheduled for the pretrial hearings. The circuit court's order explained that on that date, the presiding judge, Judge Ramey, was in the hospital. Judge Tom Cooper sat as a special judge and continued the matter until July 16, 2013. However, as was customary, the sentencing order and other plea documents were drafted in anticipation of the July 2, 2013 hearing. Then on July 16, 2013, Judge Ramey accepted Wood's plea. Judge Ramey utilized the previously prepared documents, indicating the July 2, 2013 date. Based on these facts and our review of the record, the date error was a...
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