Wood v. Sympson

• Decision Date: 30 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 69360,69360
• Citation: 1992 OK 90,833 P.2d 1239
• Parties: James O. WOOD, III, Mark David Wood, Melinda Wood Hankins, James Randolph Hubbard and Paul Huntleigh Hubbard, Appellants, v. Robert Butler SYMPSON, Jr., Cuma Oil Co., Inc., Phillips Petroleum Company, W.J. Coffman, L.E. Lookabaugh, Amoco Production Company, Jack B. Smith, and Mack Oil Company, Appellees.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

Page 1239

833 P.2d 1239

1992 OK 90

James O. WOOD, III, Mark David Wood, Melinda Wood Hankins James Randolph Hubbard and Paul Huntleigh Hubbard Appellants, v. Robert Butler SYMPSON, Jr., Cuma Oil Co., Inc., Phillips Petroleum Company, W.J. Coffman, L.E. Lookabaugh Amoco Production Company, Jack B. Smith and Mack Oil Company, Appellees.

No. 69360.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

June 30, 1992.

Certiorari to the Court of Appeals, Division II, Appeal from the District Court of Grady County; James R. Winchester, Trial Judge.

Appellants sought to quiet title to a 40 acre mineral interest in Grady County. Appellee, Robert Butler Sympson, Jr., moved for summary judgment based on the after-acquired title doctrine. Summary judgment was granted to Sympson to a 10 acre mineral interest. The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on the res judicata effect of a 1932 mortgage foreclosure judgment. Held: The trial court did not err in applying the after-acquired title doctrine and in rejecting the doctrine of res judicata. Further, no applicable statute of limitation barred Sympson's claim nor did appellants present a genuine dispute as to any material fact which precluded summary judgment based on adverse possession.

CERTIORARI PREVIOUSLY GRANTED; COURT OF APPEALS OPINION VACATED; JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT AFFIRMED.

Richard L. Allen, Chickasha, for appellants,

Tom Frailey, Chickasha, for appellee, Robert Butler Sympson, Jr.

William G. Paul, John L. Williford, Galen E. Ward, Jim Hamilton, Oklahoma City, for appellee, Phillips Petroleum Co.

LAVENDER, Justice.

Appellants sought to quiet title to an undivided 1/4 mineral interest (40 acres) in the NW/4 of Section 9, Township 3 North, Range 5 West, Indian Meridian, Grady County, Oklahoma. They sued numerous defendants, including appellee, Robert Butler Sympson, Jr. (Sympson). ¹ Sympson sought summary judgment claiming ownership of an undivided 1/16 mineral interest (10 acres) in the NW/4 by a quit claim deed from Alma Lee Ball Sympson (Alma), who he asserted acquired her interest by the after-acquired title doctrine. Summary judgment was granted to Sympson. ² The Court of Appeals reversed, relying on the res judicata effect of a 1932 mortgage foreclosure judgment. We now vacate the decision of the Court of Appeals and affirm the trial court.

Appellants present four propositions in support of their appeal: 1) the res judicata argument, 2) the statute of limitations found at 12 O.S.1981, § 93(1) or (4) and/or certain provisions of the Oklahoma Simplification of Land Titles Act, 16 O.S.1981, § 61 et seq. and Marketable Record Title Act, 16 O.S.1981, § 71 et seq., bar Sympson's claim, ³ 3) a claim of adverse possession, and 4) the trial court erred in not applying the after-acquired title doctrine to certain deeds made by Sympson's predecessor in interest. In our view, each argument is unavailing. ⁴

FACTS

The trial court was presented with an abstract of title covering the NW/4, the original court record in Mary Leota Heill v. R.L. Bowyer, et al., Case no. 13080, District Court of Grady County, Oklahoma (the earlier foreclosure action) and certain other materials in support of the parties' positions. Appellants did not dispute Sympson's factual assertions, but argued the facts showed Sympson was barred from claiming an interest in the minerals by virtue of the legal defenses set out above.

The pertinent facts shown by the record follow. ⁵ An allotment patent was issued to Mary I. Choate in February 1907. Choate sold the property to R.L. Bowyer and Zelma Ball in April 1923 and in the same month they granted a mortgage to Fidelity Land Credit Company, which was later assigned to Mary Leota Heill. In July 1923 Bowyer and Zelma Ball conveyed a 1/64 mineral interest to L.L. Laws. In March 1924 Bowyer and Zelma Ball conveyed an undivided 1/4 mineral interest to Hoy Garber Oil Company. In March 1926 Hoy Garber Oil Company conveyed a 1/4 mineral interest to Alma, Sympson's predecessor in interest. In the same month Alma conveyed her 1/4 interest to K.S. Woolery, who in turn conveyed it to Magnolia Petroleum Company. None of the conveyances of this 1/4 mineral interest excepted the mortgage from the warranties contained therein.

In April 1926 C.E. Costello and C.E. McCaughey purchased an undivided 1/64 mineral interest from L.L. Laws. Later that month Costello and McCaughey conveyed an undivided 1/16 mineral interest to H.S. Clarke. In September 1928 Costello conveyed an undivided 1/16 mineral interest to John Warren Royalties Corporation. In November 1929 Costello conveyed an undivided 1/16 mineral interest to Alma. ⁶ It contained a warranty clause, but at the time of said deed Costello owned no right, title or interest in the subject property, having previously conveyed any interest he had in it.

In 1931 Heill filed a petition in Grady County (Case No. 13080) to foreclose the outstanding mortgage granted in April 1923. Alma was named a defendant, along with other individuals and entities, she was served with process and failed to appear in the action. A judgment of foreclosure was entered in March 1932 determining, among other things, Heill's mortgage interest was superior to that of any defendant, Alma and certain other defendants were found to be in default, the mortgage should be foreclosed, the property should be sold at sheriff's sale and forever barring Alma and certain other defendants from claiming any interest or estate adverse to the title conveyed at the sheriff's sale. ⁷

The judgment also granted a money judgment to Clarke, a defendant in the suit, on his cross-petition against Costello and McCaughey for breach of warranty because their deed to him was an over-conveyance and it did not except Heill's prior mortgage. Another defendant, Ohio Fuel Supply Company was granted a money judgment on its cross-petition against McCaughey for breach of warranty on the basis a conveyance made by him to its predecessor in interest of a 1/16 mineral interest did not except Heill's prior mortgage.

In October 1932 the entire 160 acres, surface and minerals, were sold to Costello at sheriff's sale. The sheriff's sale was confirmed in November 1932. The part of the March 1932 judgment awarding a money judgment to Clarke was vacated in January 1933, apparently on the basis there had been some settlement of the matter between the parties (i.e. Clarke, Costello and McCaughey) prior to the judgment to the effect Clarke would accept a 1/16 mineral interest from Costello if Costello purchased the property at the sheriff's sale. In April 1933 Clarke's cross-petition was dismissed with prejudice on motion of Clarke on the basis an unexplained settlement had been reached by the parties.

In April 1934 Costello conveyed an undivided 1/2 interest in the property to Ethel M. Ball. In November 1935 Costello conveyed an undivided 1/2 interest to Roy Hodge. Later in November 1935 Hodge conveyed an undivided 1/2 interest to Thelma Wood. In November 1936 Wood conveyed a 1/16 mineral interest to McCaughey, who in turn, in February 1937, conveyed a 1/16 mineral interest to Ohio Fuel Supply Company. In October 1942 Wood conveyed away her interest in the surface. In August 1979 Wood conveyed away a 1/4 mineral interest in bundles of a 1/20 mineral interest each to five grandchildren, four of whom are appellants. The fifth appellant, Melinda Wood Hankins, is apparently the daughter of James O. Wood, Jr., one of the five grandchildren conveyed a 1/20 mineral interest in August 1979. James O. Wood, Jr. apparently conveyed his interest to Hankins upon her reaching majority. Thus, appellants derive their interests from Costello, through Hodge and then Thelma Wood or James O. Wood, Jr. in the case of Hankins.

The record also shows Thelma Wood entered into oil and gas leases on the property in 1944 and 1974. Her affidavit also says when she purchased her interest in the property in 1935 Alma and all other individuals were of the opinion they had no interest in it. The record does not conclusively show for what period of time minerals were produced from the property, although statements were made by counsel at the summary judgment hearing that a producing well was drilled on the property two or three years prior to the instant action being filed. Finally, Alma quitclaimed her interest in the property, if any, to Sympson in 1982.

PART I. THE AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE DOCTRINE IS SUPERIOR TO THE

DEFENSE OF RES JUDICATA ON THE FACTS DISCLOSED BY

THIS RECORD

The doctrine of after-acquired title or estoppel by deed, although of common law origin, is part of our statutory law found at 16 O.S.1991, § 17. Lucas v. Cowan, 357 P.2d 976, 978 (Okl.1960). Section 17 provides:

All rights of a mortgagor or grantor in and to the premises described in the instrument and existing at the time or subsequently accruing, shall accrue to the benefit of the mortgagee or grantee, and be covered by his mortgage or conveyed by his deed, as the case may be.

The doctrine precludes one party to a deed and his privies from asserting against the other party and his privies any right or title in derogation of the deed or from denying the truth of material facts asserted in the deed. Lucas, supra at 978. Where a grantor conveys by warranty deed an interest he does not then own, but thereafter acquires, the reacquired interest inures to the benefit of the grantee. Campbell v. Butler, 770 P.2d 7, 11 (Okl.1988). The vesting of title in the grantee, upon his grantor's reentry into the chain of title, passes by operation of law without any intervention of any court. Lucas, supra at 979; United Oklahoma Bank v. Moss, 793 P.2d 1359, 1362 (Okl.1990). The initial conveyance from a grantor who does not then own an interest in the property vests in the grantee equitable title to the interest purportedly conveyed in the warranty deed, so that when the grantor later acquires legal title it will instantly and immediately pass to the grantee. Id. The...