Woodall v. Com.
| Decision Date | 23 August 2001 |
| Docket Number | No. 1998-SC-0755-MR.,1998-SC-0755-MR. |
| Citation | 63 S.W.3d 104 |
| Parties | Robert Keith WOODALL, Appellant, v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Appellee. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
Thomas Ransdell, Assistant Public Advocate, Randall L. Wheeler, Assistant Public Advocate, Dept. of Public Advocacy, Frankfort, for appellant.
Albert B. Chandler III, Attorney General, N. Susan Roncarti, Assistant Attorney General, Gilbert Busby, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Appellate Division, Frankfort, for appellee.
Robert Keith Woodall appeals from a sentence of death for murder and life imprisonment for the rape and kidnapping of Sarah Hansen. Woodall entered a plea of guilty to capital murder, capital kidnapping, and first-degree rape. A jury sentencing trial was conducted July 14 through July 20, 1998. The prosecution called eleven witnesses, and the defense presented fourteen witnesses in mitigation of the crimes. Woodall did not testify at the penalty proceedings. The jury fixed a sentence of death for the capital murder and a sentence of two concurrent life terms for the kidnapping and rape.
The victim was a 16-year-old high school cheerleader, an honor student, a musician, a member of the National Honor Society and the Beta Club and a medalist in swimming and diving. On January 25, 1997, she had planned to watch a video with her boyfriend. She went to the local mini-mart to rent a movie, leaving her home between 7:30 p.m. and 8:00 p.m., never to be seen alive again by her family. At 10:42 p.m., two police officers were dispatched to search for the victim. Thereafter, they found the minivan that she had been driving in a ditch at Luzerne Lake, approximately 1.5 miles from the mini-mart. The officers followed a four to five hundred foot trail of blood on a gravel roadway from the van. The unclothed body of the victim was found floating in the water. Her throat had been slashed twice with each cut approximately 3.5 to 4 inches long. Her windpipe was totally severed. She actually died of drowning.
The police questioned Woodall when they learned that he had been in the minimart on Saturday night. He gave two conflicting statements about his activities on the night of the murder after he left work. The police observed that Woodall was wearing a brand of tennis shoe similar to the imprint on the pier next to where the body of the victim had been found. His fingerprints were on the van the victim was driving. Blood was found on his front door and muddy and wet clothing under his bed. Blood on his clothing and sweatshirt were consistent with the blood of the victim. The DNA on the vaginal swabs was consistent with his. His fingerprints were identified on the glass and door of the van as well as the interior doorjamb and handle. On March 18, 1997, the Muhlenberg County Grand Jury indicted him for murder, kidnapping and rape. One week later, the Commonwealth announced its intention to seek the death penalty. Venue for the prosecution was changed from Muhlenberg to Caldwell County because of massive publicity.
On appeal, Woodall raises 28 assignments of alleged error. We have carefully reviewed all the issues presented and this opinion will concentrate first on those issues that were orally argued. All the allegations presented will be discussed.
Woodall argues that he was denied due process, his right not to testify and a reliable sentence determination when the trial judge refused to instruct the jury to draw no adverse inference from the decision of Woodall not to testify during the penalty trial. Woodall pled guilty to all of the charged crimes as well as the aggravating circumstances. The no adverse inference instruction is used to protect a nontestifying defendant from seeming to be guilty to the jury because of a decision not to testify. That is not the situation presented here. The instruction contemplated by Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 101 S.Ct. 1112, 67 L.Ed.2d 241 (1981), could not have changed the outcome of a guilty determination that the defendant acknowledged by his admission of guilt. There was no reason or need for the jury to make any additional inferences of guilt.
There is no error in this respect. Any possible error would be nonprejudicial because the defendant admitted the crimes and the evidence of guilt is overwhelming. Woodall claims that Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 1866, 68 L.Ed.2d 359 (1981), extended Fifth Amendment protection and thus the Carter, supra, rule to the penalty phase of a trial. Estelle, supra, is not a jury instruction case, unlike Carter. Estelle does not cite to Carter or indicate that Carter has been extended. The factual situation in Estelle is different from that presented in this case because it involved the use of an out-of-court statement the defendant made to a government expert. The statement in that case was in regard to a psychological examination by the government prosecutors which was used against the defendant without warning in the penalty trial. Neither Carter nor Estelle involved a guilty plea. Here, Woodall admitted guilt to all charges and did not contest the facts. He was not compelled to testify so there were no words that could be used against him so as to implicate the Fifth Amendment privilege as in Estelle.
Woodall contends that Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 119 S.Ct. 1307, 143 L.Ed.2d 424 (1999), permits a guilty plea which does not waive the privilege against self-incrimination at the sentencing phase. Mitchell, supra, does not apply here. In Mitchell, the defendant pled guilty to federal charges of conspiring to distribute five or more kilograms of cocaine and of distributing cocaine within 1000 feet of a school or playground. She reserved the right to contest the amount of the cocaine at the penalty phase. The amount of the cocaine would determine the range of penalties. She only admitted that she had done "some or the conduct charged. She did not testify. Three other codefendants did testify as to the amount of cocaine she had sold. Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that it would not permit a negative inference to be drawn about her guilt with regard to the factual determination respecting the circumstances and details of the crime. Here, Woodall did not contest any of the facts or aggravating circumstances surrounding the crimes.
The decision of the trial court not to give an adverse inference instruction does not amount to constitutional error so as to require reversal. There is no violation of any section of the United States or Kentucky Constitution.
Woodall contends that the trial judge placed excessive and unfair restrictions on his ability to develop information about jurors on voir dire and as a result, his right to exercise peremptory challenges intelligently and his guarantee of a fair and impartial jury were violated. He claims that the trial judge repeatedly and severely curtailed his ability to question jurors during voir dire. There can be no question that an adequate voir dire examination is essential to the seating of a fair and impartial jury. This is particularly true in a death penalty case where an adequate voir dire process has been held to be mandatory. Morris v. Commonwealth, Ky., 766 S.W.2d 58 (1989).
A) It was not an abuse of discretion by the trial judge to restrict the voir dire of Woodall concerning specific mitigation evidence which he planned to present. The trial judge permitted Woodall to ask general mitigation questions, but prohibited questions about specific mitigating factors such as the low I.Q. attributed to Woodall. Federal courts have recognized that denying a defendant the right to voir dire jurors on specific mitigating factors is not an abuse of discretion. See U.S. v. Tipton, 90 F.3d 861 (4th Cir.1996); U.S. v. McVeigh, 153 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir.1998).
As in Tipton, supra, Woodall sought to question the jury about specific mitigating circumstances rather than a generalized inquiry as allowed by the trial judge. Here, the trial judge had asked jurors on individual voir dire whether they were willing to consider the entire range of penalties and had also asked them if they were willing to consider mitigating evidence. The judge permitted Woodall to question jurors extensively regarding mitigating circumstances so long as the questions were general and did not inquire into specific mitigation. The trial judge has broad discretion in the area of questioning on voir dire. Ward v. Commonwealth, Ky., 695 S.W.2d 404 (1985). Questions are not competent when their evident purpose is to have jurors indicate in advance or to commit themselves to certain ideas and views upon final submission of the case to them. Ward, supra. The mere fact that more detailed questioning might have somehow helped the accused in exercising peremptory challenges does not suffice to show abuse of the discretion in conducting the examination. See Tipton, supra; see also, Annotation, "Propriety and Effect of Asking Prospective Jurors Hypothetical Questions, on Voir Dire, as to How They Would Decide Issues of the Case." 99 A.L.R.2d 7; see also Commonwealth v. Moon, 389 Pa. 304, 132 A.2d 224 (1957), cert. dismissed, 355 U.S. 908, 78 S.Ct. 335, 2 L.Ed.2d 270; Commonwealth v. Everett, 262 Pa.Super. 61, 396 A.2d 645 (1978).
Woodall was trying to get jurors to indicate in advance what their views were regarding his I.Q. of 74. He was seeking to oblige jurors to commit themselves by either accepting a specific mitigator or rejecting it before any evidence was heard. The trial judge was attempting to protect against such danger...
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