Woodbury v. Whitmire

Decision Date17 September 1980
Docket NumberNo. 36314,36314
Citation271 S.E.2d 491,246 Ga. 349
PartiesWOODBURY et al. v. WHITMIRE et al.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

Charles H. Ivy, William L. Bost, Jr., R. Peter Catlin, III, Atlanta, for appellants.

Michael J. Gorby, Atlanta, for appellees.

JORDAN, Presiding Justice.

We granted certiorari to review Divisions 1, 4 and 5 of the Court of Appeals' opinion in Whitmire v. Woodbury, 154 Ga.App. 159, 267 S.E.2d 783 (1980).

The facts, not discussed by the Court of Appeals, are briefly as follows: Petitioner John Woodbury took his car to Global Imports for repairs. His car was not ready when promised. He returned one week later to pick it up and paid for it by check. Woodbury felt that the problem with the car had not been corrected and returned it to Global. It was delivered to him again, and feeling that the car was still not repaired, he returned it once more to Global. He stopped payment on the check he had given to Global.

After refusing to have further work done on the car at additional expense, Woodbury drove it home. On the evening of June 10, 1977, six employees of Global drove over to the Woodburys' home. Though the exact nature of their visit was in dispute, there was testimony that these employees raced up and down the Woodburys' street in two cars and walked onto their front lawn and doorstep with beer bottles in their hands. When one employee saw Woodbury's car in his backyard, they climbed over a gate to get to it, damaging the gate. Woodbury and his wife testified that the employees threatened to beat him up, and a neighbor's son was allegedly threatened as well if he tried to interfere further. One neighbor was told by one of the defendants that John Woodbury wrote bad checks and did not pay his debts.

After a policeman arrived, the employees left. Mrs. Woodbury was hysterical as a result of the evening's events.

The Woodburys sued William Whitmire, doing business as Global Imports, and the six employees for trespass, assault, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. They also asked for attorney fees. After a trial, the jury returned a verdict awarding the Woodburys $15,000 for trespass, $25,000 for assault, invasion of privacy and the intentional infliction of emotional distress, $10,000 punitive damages, and $13,598.01 for attorney fees.

The Court of Appeals reversed on three grounds. In Division 1, the Court of Appeals found reversible error in the trial judge's failure to charge on proximate cause. In Division 4, the court found the $15,000 for trespass verdict excessive, and in Division 5, the court held that the $10,000 punitive damage award, in addition to the award of $25,000 as compensatory damages, amounted to a double recovery. Whitmire v. Woodbury, supra, at 159-161, 267 S.E.2d 783. We will consider these divisions in order.

1. Woodbury contends that proximate causation was not an issue at trial, and that the trial court could have found its existence as a matter of law since there is no disputed fact concerning causation which would mandate the need for the jury's decision.

"The question of proximate cause is one for a jury except in palpable, clear, and indisputable cases." Lankford v. Trust Co. Bank, 141 Ga.App. 639, 641, 234 S.E.2d 179, 182 (1977). Our application of this rule of law expressed in Lankford to the facts of this case in no way tarnishes the holding in Cline v. Kehs, 146 Ga.App. 350, 352(6), 246 S.E.2d 329 (1978), cited by the Court of Appeals in this case. Since the facts of this case, coupled with the defendants' failure to raise an issue concerning proximate cause or to even adequately request the court to charge on it, place it squarely within the exception noted in Lankford, supra, we reverse Division 1 of the Court of Appeals opinion.

2. We agree with the Court of Appeals' holding in Division 4 that the compensatory damages for trespass awarded by the jury ($15,000) were excessive because only $40 actual pecuniary loss, resulting from the broken gate, was involved.

However, we do not feel that this excessiveness necessarily requires reversal of the trial court's judgment on the verdict nor does it require retrial of the case. Woodbury may elect to voluntarily reduce the amount of the judgment he received to $40 for the trespass. Where a definite and readily ascertainable portion of a verdict should not have been awarded to the plaintiff, a court can as a matter of law condition the denial of...

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22 cases
  • Ford Motor Co. v. Stubblefield
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • June 13, 1984
    ...damages to either compensate for wounded feelings or to deter the defendant from similar, wrongful conduct." Woodbury v. Whitmire, 246 Ga. 349, 351(3), 271 S.E.2d 491 (1980). "In such cases the award is not measured as compensation, but is fixed in an amount necessary to deter future acts. ......
  • George v. Hercules Real Estate Servs., Inc.
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • November 18, 2016
    ...that this is a "clear and indisputable case" that removes the issue of causation from the jury's purview. See Woodbury v. Whitmire , 246 Ga. 349, 350 (1), 271 S.E.2d 491 (1980). Accordingly, the majority's conclusion that summary judgment is proper on this ground as to George's claims for n......
  • Thompson v. John L. Williams Co., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Georgia
    • May 9, 1988
    ...Inc., 549 F.Supp. 635, 643, quoting Whitmire v. Woodbury, 154 Ga. App. 159, 159, 267 S.E.2d 783, 784, rev'd on other grounds, 246 Ga. 349, 271 S.E.2d 491 (1980). 11. To prevail upon a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, plaintiff must establish the above elements by a pre......
  • Atlanta Affordable Housing Fund v. Brown
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • January 15, 2002
    ...is one for the jury except in palpable, clear, and indisputable cases." (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Woodbury v. Whitmire, 246 Ga. 349, 350(1), 271 S.E.2d 491 (1980). [P]roximate cause is always to be determined on the facts of each case upon mixed considerations of logic, common sen......
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