Woodhead v. Ridener
| Decision Date | 08 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 5: 21-189-DCR |
| Parties | JAMES WOODHEAD, Plaintiff, v. LEXINGTON POLICE OFFICER ZAKARY S. RIDENER INDIVIDUALLY, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Kentucky |
During the summer of 2020, Lexington-like many cities throughout the nation-was faced with waves of public protests.[1] While participating in one of these protests, Plaintiff James Woodhead was arrested by the defendants in this action Lexington police officers Zakary Ridener and Keith McKinney. Woodhead subsequently filed suit, alleging that the arrest violated his constitutional rights under the First, Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution as well as various provisions of Kentucky state law. [Record No. 1, pp. 5-12]
The defendants have filed a motion for partial judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Woodhead has failed to state a viable claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, and that he has further failed to allege a viable claim for declaratory relief. [Record No. 7, p. 1] The defendants' motion will be granted because the First and Fourth Amendments control plaintiff's federal claims, and because declaratory relief is inappropriate in these circumstances.
On July 11, 2020, James Woodhead and a group of other demonstrators were engaged in a public protest in the vicinity of the LFUCG Division of Police Headquarters building in downtown Lexington, Kentucky. [Record No. 1, ¶ 16] Woodhead was moving through the crowd while the protest was occurring using a black sharpie to mark other protestors' arms with a number to call in case of arrest. [Id., ¶ 17] The plaintiff was confronted around this time by Lexington police officers Zakary Ridener and Keith McKinney, who attempted to place him under arrest. [Id.]
Ridener allegedly grabbed Woodhead's upper chest and shoulders while unsuccessfully attempting to use his leg to take Woodhead to the ground. [Id., ¶ 18] The plaintiff began to withdraw from the officers, prompting Ridener to wrap his arm around Woodhead's to stop his retreat. [Id., ¶ 19] At this point, McKinney grabbed Woodhead's upper body, using his own body as a lever to take Woodhead to the ground. [Id., ¶ 20] Once taken to the ground, Ridener and McKinney handcuffed the plaintiff and placed him under arrest. [Id., ¶ 21] Following the arrest, Woodhead was moved to the rear of police headquarters, searched, and placed in the Fayette County Detention Center for holding. [Id., ¶ 22]
The plaintiff subsequently filed this action on July 9, 2021, asserting a host of claims relating to his arrest. [See generally id.] He alleges that his arrest was affected without probable cause and using excessive force, in violation of the Fourth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Id., pp. 5-7] Woodhead also claims that the arrest violated his First and/or Fourteenth Amendment right to engage in protected speech. [Id.] Finally, he asserts state law claims for false arrest, false imprisonment, and battery. [Id., pp. 9-12] Woodhead seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as well as a declaratory judgment that Ridener and McKinney's actions violated his rights. [Id., pp. 8-9, 11-12, 13- 14]
“After the pleadings are closed-but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(c). Such motions are evaluated under the same standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which challenges the sufficiency of a complaint. Ziegler v. IBP Hog Market, Inc., 249 F.3d 509, 511-12 (6th Cir. 2001).
A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). At this stage, Woodhead's “well-pleaded factual allegations” are accepted as true, and the Court must “determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). A complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter . . . to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Id. (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). By contrast, a complaint that merely “offers ‘labels and conclusions' or ‘a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.'” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Eidson v. Tenn. Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631, 634 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual allegations will not suffice.”).
Woodhead's Complaint raises claims sounding in arrest without probable cause, excessive force, and freedom of speech. [Record No. 1, pp. 5-7] The defendants argue that the Court should dismiss these claims to the extent that Woodhead seeks to assert them independently under the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than under the First and Fourth Amendments. [Record No. 7, pp. 3-4] Because Woodhead's claims are governed by specific constitutional provisions, his Fourteenth Amendment claims will be dismissed.
“Where a particular Amendment ‘provides an explicit textual source of constitutional protection' against a particular sort of government behavior, ‘that Amendment not the more generalized notion of substantive due process, must be the guide for analyzing these claims.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 273 (1994) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). A plaintiff must pursue relief under the appropriate constitutional guarantee, just as a court must apply the appropriate legal standard. Gregory v. City of Louisville, 444 F.3d 725, 750 (6th Cir. 2006). Accordingly, resolution of Woodhead's claims centers on whether the Fourteenth Amendment provides the appropriate constitutional protection.
First, Woodhead asserts a claim for arrest without probable cause under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Record No. 1, pp. 5-7] However, when the gravamen of a complaint is for arrest or detention without probable cause, the claim cannot be pursued under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jackson v. Cty. of Washtenaw, 310 Fed.Appx. 6, 7-8 (6th Cir. 2009) (). Instead, such a claim must be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 7 (citing Gregory, 444 F.3d at 750). Thus, even accepting all of Woodhead's factual allegations as true, he cannot recover for this claim under a Fourteenth Amendment theory. His ability to do so has been foreclosed by binding Sixth Circuit precedent. See, e.g., Gregory, 444 F.3d at 748-50. Thus, to the extent Woodhead asserts a claim for arrest without probable cause under the Fourteenth Amendment, that claim will be dismissed.
Next, Woodhead asserts a claim for excessive force in relation to his arrest, again apparently under both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. [Record No. 1, ¶ 32] The Sixth Circuit has established a bright-line rule for deciding whether Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment standards govern the use of force in a given context. Aldini v. Johnson, 609 F.3d 858, 864-67 (6th Cir. 2010). The Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard governs from the time of arrest until the date of a probable cause hearing and not the Fourteenth Amendment's “shocks-the-conscience” standard. Id. Indeed, when the facts suggest no excessive force outside the context of an arrest, a claim under the Fourteenth Amendment is not facially plausible. See, e.g., Boguslavaskaya v. O'Neill, No. 09-6064, 2010 WL 2650420, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 2010) (); Btesh v. Maitland, No. 6:10-CV-71-ORL-19DAB, 2010 WL 883642, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2010) (); McClelland v. City of Modesto, No. 09-1031, 2009 WL 2941480, at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2009) (the plaintiff's claim arising in context of seizure, either as a detention during a search or as an arrest, was improperly pleaded under the 14th Amendment).
Here, the only alleged use of force was during the initial arrest. [See Record No. 1, pp. 4-5] As a result, any claim under the Fourteenth Amendment is facially implausible. Aldini, 609 F.3d at 864-67; see also Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 679 ). Thus, to the extent that Woodhead seeks to bring his excessive force claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, such claim will be dismissed.
The authority the plaintiff relies on to support an alternative outcome, Darrah v. City of Oak Park, 255 F.3d 301 (6th Cir. 2001), is distinguishable. In Darrah, the plaintiff alleged that she was struck in the mouth by an officer while the officer was engaged with another subject. 255 F.3d at 304. Unlike Woodhead, the Darrah plaintiff was not arrested at the scene of the incident. Id. at 305. Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit declined to determine whether the plaintiff was subjected to a Fourth Amendment seizure and examined the use of force under both Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment standards. Id. at 305-07. In the present case, it is undisputed that Officers Ridener and McKinney seized Woodhead during his arrest. Torres v. Madrid, 141 S.Ct. 989, 996 (2021) (“[A]rrests are seizures of a person.”). Therefore, the Fourth Amendment controls, and any Fourteenth Amendment claim will be dismissed. See Aldini, 609 F.3d at 864-67.
Finally Woodhead brings a claim sounding in freedom of speech, asserting it ostensibly under both the First and Fourteenth...
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