Woodroffe v. Woodroffe
| Citation | 864 N.W.2d 553 (Table) |
| Decision Date | 08 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–2034.,13–2034. |
| Parties | Randolph W. WOODROFFE and Janice M. Woodroffe, Plaintiffs–Appellants, v. Elda H. WOODROFFE and Kerwin Woodroffe, Defendants–Appellees. Elda H. Woodroffe and Kerwin Woodroffe, Counterclaim Plaintiffs, v. Randolph W. Woodroffe and Janice M. Woodroffe, Counterclaim Defendants. |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Iowa |
Robert S. Hatala of Simmons, Perrine, Moyer & Bergman, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellants.
Timothy D. Roberts of Anderson, Roberts, Port, Wallace & Stewart, L.L.P., Burlington, for appellees.
Considered by POTTERFIELD, P.J., and SACKETT and EISENHAUER, S.J.*
The plaintiffs, Randolph H. Woodroffe and Janice M. Woodroffe, appeal from a district court's finding that the defendants, Elda H. and Kerwin Woodroffe, have an easement across plaintiffs' land for use of a septic system and dismissing plaintiffs' claims of trespass and damages. The defendants counterclaimed, and the district court dismissed their counterclaim in part but declared they had an easement by implication in a septic system located on the plaintiffs' property. We affirm.
BACKGROUND. The plaintiffs own a tract of land described in these proceedings as Tract A. There is a part of a septic system and a septic tank on Tract A. It services a home on the tract where Elda resides. She has a life estate in a tract described in this proceeding as a 2.1–acre tract of land adjoining Tract A.1 Kerwin holds the remainder interest in the 2.1–acre tract.
Both tracts, along with other land, were originally owned by Charles Woodroffe, the grandfather of Randolph and Kerwin.
In 1956, Elda and her deceased husband, Glenn, built a home on the 2.1–acre tract and installed the septic tank on Tract A. On November 18, 1959, Charles reserved a life estate in Tract A to himself, gave Glenn a life estate in the property, and gave the remainder interest in the property to Glenn and Elda's children.
Charles died in November 27, 1974. Glenn died on October 22, 2002. Following Glenn's death, a partition action was filed addressing the property in question and other family property. Apparently as a result of the partition action, there was a land auction. Elda, Kerwin, and Anita L. Erickson2 purchased the 2.1–acre tract subject to Elda's life estate. Randolph and his wife, Janice, purchased Tract A. At the time of this litigation in 2013, Elda continued to live in the residence on the 2.1–acre plat and she continued to utilize the septic system that was west of her residence and extended onto Tract A.
On November 22, 2013, the district court entered findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order that declared Elda and Kerwin had an easement by implication to the septic system, and that the plaintiffs' trespass claim was estopped by acquiescence. The district court order dismissed plaintiffs' petition at law and the defendants' remaining counterclaims with costs taxed to the plaintiffs.
On December 13, 2013, the plaintiffs filed a motion to correct the November 22, 2013 ruling, contending the issues of an easement by implication and estoppel by acquiescence were not raised by the defendants and the November 22, 2013 ruling should be amended. On December 20, the plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal from the November 22, 2013 ruling.
On December 23, 2013, after the notice of appeal was filed and served, the district court ruled on plaintiffs' motion, finding the facts of the case also supported a finding that defendants have a prescriptive easement for the septic system because Glenn and Elda expended significant labor or money on the system and relied on the consent of Charles Woodroffe in building it. The court also affirmed its earlier ruling that the defendants also have an easement by implication.
SCOPE OF REVIEW. The plaintiffs contend that our review is de novo. Whether the district court tried a proceeding in equity or at law is determinative of our scope of review on appeal. In re Mount Pleasant Bank & Trust Co., 426 N.W.2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1988). If the district court tried the case at law, our review is for correction of errors of law. Id. If tried in equity, our review is de novo. Iowa R.App. P. 6.907. If there is uncertainty about the nature of a case, an often-used litmus test is whether the trial court ruled on evidentiary objections. Citizens Sav. Bank v. Sac City State Bank, 315 N.W.2d 20, 24 (Iowa 1982). When a trial court does rule on objections, it is normally the hallmark of a law trial, not an equitable proceeding. Sille v. Shaffer, 297 N.W.2d 379, 380–81 (Iowa 1980).
The plaintiffs filed their petition at law and asked for a jury trial, which was subsequently waived. The district court recognized in its ruling that the case was tried at law. Furthermore, objections were ruled on at trial. We consider the case to be at law and review for correction of errors at law. In a law action, the district court's findings of fact are binding upon us if those facts are supported by substantial evidence. Iowa R.App. P. 6.904(3)(a). Evidence is substantial if reasonable minds could accept it as adequate to reach the same findings. Tim O'Neill Chevrolet, Inc. v. Forristall, 551 N.W.2d 611, 614 (Iowa 1996).
ISSUES ON APPEAL. The plaintiffs contend there was no easement by implication or estoppel by acquiescence. They request damages for trespass, contending that the continued presence and use of the septic tank on their property amounts to a trespass and they are entitled to money damages. They further ask that defendants be required to remove that part of the system on their land.
The plaintiffs contend that the district court incorrectly held that they were estopped from bringing their trespass claim because this action was not filed until nine years and 363 days after Glenn's death on August 3, 2004. Although the doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence bears an “estoppel” label, it is, in reality, a waiver theory. Markey v. Carney, 705 N.W.2d 13, 21 (Iowa 2005). This doctrine applies “where a person knows or ought to know that he is entitled to enforce his right ... and neglects to do so for such a length of time as would imply that he intended to waive or abandon his right.” Humboldt Livestock Auction, Inc. v. B & H Cattle Co., 155 N.W.2d 478, 487 (Iowa 1967). “Estoppel by acquiescence is based on an examination of the ... actions [of the individual] who holds the right in order to determine whether the right has been waived.” Davidson v. Van Lengen, 266 N.W.2d 436, 439 (Iowa 1978). Under Iowa law, it is not necessary to prove prejudice to establish estoppel by acquiescence. See id. In contrast, the doctrine of equitable estoppel requires proof that the party alleging an estoppel relied on a false representation or concealment of material fact “to his prejudice and injury.” Fencl v. City of Harpers Ferry, 620 N.W.2d 808, 815 (Iowa 2000). The doctrine of estoppel by acquiescence is more akin to waiver than to equitable estoppel due to the absence of the justifiable reliance and prejudice elements. Westfield Ins. Cos. v. Econ. Fire & Cas. Co., 623 N.W.2d 871, 880 (Iowa 2001).
Considering all the facts, we do not believe the district court erred in finding estoppel by acquiescence. The district court found, and we agree, that Randolph was well aware of the presence of the septic tank on Tract A. Furthermore, Randolph had knowledge of the system's presence when he purchased Tract A. He had held an interest in the property by virtue of his grandfather's transfer, his grandfather's death, and then his father's death. Furthermore, Randolph's own testimony was that the septic tank could remain there until his mother's death or vacation of the residence on the 2.1 acre tract.
The plaintiffs also argue that the district court erred in not recognizing that even though he had a remainder interest in the property since it was transferred to Charles's grandchildren in November 1959, the period of possession to support his position did not begin to run until he had full title to the property because as a joint remainderperson, he was not required to establish his rights until he had title and possession. There is some support for his position. See 3 Am.Jur.2d Adverse Possession § 221 (2d ed .) (“The statute of limitations never runs against a remainderman or reversioner during the existence of the life estate for the reason that no cause or compelling right of action is in the remainderman or reversioner during the life estate.”). However, we do not accept that argument here. The septic tank was constructed in about 1956. At the time Charles held title to the land that is designated as Tract A. Though there is no written record of the grant of an easement, obviously there was some kind of agreement or permission between Charles and his son, Glenn, that Glenn could install the septic tank on what was then Charles's land. The record does not illustrate what the agreement was, but there is no evidence that at any time during Charles's life time he sought to have Glenn remove the septic tank from Tract A, nor was there any evidence that removal was sought during Glenn's lifetime. The prior owners of the real estate recognized and acquiesced in the placement of the septic tank more than half a century ago. See Tewes v. Pine Farms Inc., 522 N.W.2d 801, 806 (Iowa 1994) ().
Because the defendants proved the defense of estoppel by acquiescence, the plaintiffs trespass claim fails. Accordingly, their claim for damages for the septic tank being located on their property fails.
We believe that defendants have also shown they have an easement by prescription. We recognize the district court attempted to amend its order to also conclude that defendants had a prescriptive easement after the notice of appeal was...
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