Woods v. Carey

• Decision Date: 17 July 2013
• Docket Number: No. 09–16113.,09–16113.
• Citation: 722 F.3d 1177
• Parties: Earnest Cassell WOODS, II, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Tom L. CAREY, Warden; T. Dickenson, Defendants, and Santos Cervantes, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit

722 F.3d 1177

Earnest Cassell WOODS, II, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.Tom L. CAREY, Warden; T. Dickenson, Defendants,andSantos Cervantes, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 09–16113.

United States Court of Appeals,Ninth Circuit.

Argued and Submitted April 18, 2012.

Filed July 17, 2013.

Jeffrey T. Renz, Montana Defender Project, University of Montana School of Law, Missoula, MT, for Plaintiff–Appellee.

Jennifer Marquez, Longyear, O'Dea & Lavra, LLP, Sacramento, CA, for Defendant–Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Lawrence K. Karlton, Senior District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:04–cv–01225–LKK–GGH.

Before: STEPHEN REINHARDT, JOHN T. NOONAN, and MARY H. MURGUIA, Circuit Judges.

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

In civil rights cases, our normal rule provides for an award of appellate attorney's fees to a prevailing party who successfully defends a verdict won in the district court. Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693–98, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978); Corder v. Gates, 104 F.3d 247, 249 (9th Cir.1996). The plaintiff-appellee in this case, Earnest Cassell Woods II, qualifiesas a prevailing party who would ordinarily be entitled to an award of attorney's fees from a defendant who unsuccessfully appealed such a verdict. Because Woods is a prisoner, however, his award is subject to any applicable limiting provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d).

The defendant-appellant, Santos Cervantes, argues that Woods' request for attorney's fees is limited by § 1997e(d)(2) (hereinafter “ § (d)(2)”) of the PLRA. This provision imposes a cap on the amount of attorney's fees that a prisoner can recover from defendant prison officials in certain circumstances. The cap is 150 percent of the monetary judgment. The cap applies to attorney's fees incurred in conjunction with obtaining the award of a monetary judgment. We have held that it does not apply to attorney's fees incurred in obtaining injunctive (or other non-monetary) relief. Dannenberg v. Valadez, 338 F.3d 1070, 1074–75 (9th Cir.2003). In Dannenberg, we held that the fee cap applied only to “the portion of total fees that was incurred solely in order to obtain money damages.” Id. at 1074. Here, we follow Dannenberg and hold that the cap in § (d)(2) does not apply to fees incurred on appeal by a prisoner who successfully defends the verdict that he obtained in the district court. In other words, the § (d)(2) cap applies only to fees incurred in securing the judgment in the district court and not to fees incurred in defending the judgment on appeal.

BACKGROUND

Recently, we affirmed a jury verdict awarding Woods $1,500 in compensatory and punitive damages against Cervantes, an Appeals Coordinator at the California State Prison, Solano. The jury had found that Cervantes violated Woods' Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment by repeatedly screening out Woods' medical grievances, causing him to undergo pain and suffering for more than a year as the result of his inability to obtain dental care necessary to fix his broken partial dentures. Cervantes appealed, arguing that the district court had erred in denying him qualified immunity. Cervantes also asked this Court to set aside the $1,000 punitive damages award because it was “unsupported by a showing of evil motive or intent.” We rejected both of Cervantes' arguments and affirmed the judgment in a memorandum disposition. Woods v. Carey, 488 Fed.Appx. 194, 196 (9th Cir.2012).

Because Woods was pro se before the district court, no attorney's fees were sought in connection with the award of judgment. On appeal, Woods was represented by counsel. After we rejected Cervantes' challenge to the verdict, Woods filed a timely motion for attorney's fees on appeal under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). He requested $16,800 in attorney's fees and $521.09 in costs. ¹Section 1988(b) provides that, “[i]n any action or proceeding to enforcea provision of section[ ] [1983] ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party [ ] a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.” 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Cervantes concedes that Woods qualifies as a prevailing party. Cervantes argues, however, that he need pay only $2,250 (150 percent of the judgment) of Woods' attorney's fees because the PLRA fee cap provision applies to fees incurred defending a monetary judgment on appeal.²§ 1997e(d)(2).

The PLRA attorney's fees provisions provide, in relevant part:

(d) Attorney's fees

(1) In any action brought by a prisoner who is confined to any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, in which attorney's fees are authorized [ ], such fees shall not be awarded, except to the extent that—

(A) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in proving an actual violation of the plaintiff's rights protected by a statute pursuant to which a fee may be awarded under section 1988 of this title; and

(B)(i) the amount of the fee is proportionately related to the court ordered relief for the violation; or

(ii) the fee was directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief ordered for the violation.

(2) Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action described in paragraph (1), a portion of the judgment (not to exceed 25 percent) shall be applied to satisfy the amount of attorney's fees awarded against the defendant. If the award of attorney's fees is not greater than 150 percent of the judgment, the excess shall be paid by the defendant.

42 U.S.C. § 1997e(d)(1)-(2).

Although our prior decision in Dannenberg v. Valadez, explained that § (d)(2) was limited to those fees “incurred for the sole purpose of securing the monetary judgment,” 338 F.3d 1070, 1075 (9th Cir.2003), we have not previously decided whether attorney's fees on appeal incurred in order to preserve a district court's award of damages against a prison official are subject to the 150 percent statutory cap.

DISCUSSION

I.

Woods and Cervantes dispute whether § (d)(2) limits the amount that Woods may recover from the defendant for attorney's fees incurred in defending his judgment on appeal to 150 percent of the monetary relief awarded to him at trial.³ We begin our analysis as one of statutory interpretation. Even so, because this is not the first time our court has been asked to determine the scope of § (d)(2), our analysis must also take into account our prior decision in Dannenberg.

If “the statutory language provide[d] a clear answer,” our task would come to an end. United States v. Harrell, 637 F.3d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir.2011) (quoting Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 525 U.S. 432, 438, 119 S.Ct. 755, 142 L.Ed.2d 881 (1999)). “If the statute's terms are ambiguous, [however,] we may use canons of construction, legislative history, and the statute's overall purpose to illuminate Congress's intent.” Jonah R. v. Carmona, 446 F.3d 1000, 1005 (9th Cir.2006). “A statute is ambiguous if it ‘gives rise to more than one reasonable interpretation.’ ” DeGeorge v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 219 F.3d 930, 939 (9th Cir.2000) (quoting A–Z Int'l v. Phillips, 179 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir.1999)).

The language used in § (d)(2) is ambiguous with respect to the circumstances under which the fee cap is applicable. The section states: “Whenever a monetary judgment is awarded in an action [the fee cap shall be applicable].” This section could be interpreted to mean either (1) the fee cap applies to attorney's fees awarded only in conjunction with the obtaining of a monetary judgment—an award that occurs only once in the course of an action, following summary judgment or trial before the district court, or (2) the fee cap applies to any attorney's fees that are awarded for any reason during the course of an action in which a monetary judgment has been awarded by the district court. ⁴ Woods urges the former construction of the statute; Cervantes, the latter. Both are “reasonable interpretation[s]” of the statutory language. DeGeorge, 219 F.3d at 939 (citations omitted).

II.

In Dannenberg v. Valadez, we rejected the defendant's interpretations of § (d)(2)—that is, we rejected the application of the fee cap to fees awarded for any reason during the course of an action in which a monetary judgment has been awarded. 338 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir.2003). Instead, we limited the applicability of the fee cap to those fees awarded only in conjunction with the obtaining of a monetary judgment. Id. at 1074–75. We held that the fee cap does not apply to attorney's fees incurred in securing non-monetary relief when a prisoner is awarded both a monetary judgment and a declaratory judgment or an injunction in the same proceeding. Id.

In so holding, we looked to the whole of § 1997e(d) and construed § (d)(2) in a manner that would be consistent with § (d)(1). Id. at 1074 (citing United States v. Fiorillo, 186 F.3d 1136, 1153 (9th Cir.1999) (“statutes are to be interpreted as a whole” and “[o]ne provision of a statute should not be interpreted in a manner that renders other sections of the same statute ‘inconsistent, meaningless or superfluous.’ ”) (citation omitted)). We reasoned that in a case in which the court ordered both monetary and non-monetary relief, it would be inconsistent with § (d)(1), which provides for an amount of attorney's fees “proportionately related to the court-ordered relief,” to essentially ignore the attorney's efforts in pursuing the non-monetary relief by limiting the fee award to 150% of the monetary judgment. Dannenberg, 338 F.3d at 1074. Thus, we held that the fee cap applied only to those fees “incurred for the sole purpose of securing the monetary judgment.” Id. at 1075.

Our conclusion in Dannenberg, that § (d)(2) applies only to those fees “incurredfor the sole purpose of securing the monetary judgment,” is the proper interpretation of that provision and one we must follow here. Just as Dannenberg held that it would be inconsistent with § (d)(1) to apply the fee cap to attorney's...