Woods v. City of Reno
| Decision Date | 21 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:16-cv-00494-MMD-DJA |
| Parties | CATHY WOODS (a/k/a ANITA CARTER), by and through her Personal Representative, LINDA WADE, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF RENO, NEVADA, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nevada |
Plaintiff Cathy Woods served 35 years in prison for a murder conviction that was vacated due to DNA evidence. Woods claims that Defendants caused her to be wrongfully imprisoned. Before the Court are three substantive motions: (1) Defendants City of Reno and Lawrence C. Dennison's (collectively, "Reno Defendants") motion for summary judgment ("Reno Defendants' Motion") (ECF No. 206); (2) Defendants Clarence "Jackie" Lewis and Donald W. Ashley's (collectively, "Louisiana Defendants") motion for summary judgment ("Louisiana Defendants' Motion") (ECF No. 216); and (3) Plaintiff's motion for leave to file sur-reply on the summary judgment motions ("Sur-reply Motion") (ECF No. 262).1 For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies the Sur-Reply Motion and grants in part and denies in part the summary judgment motions.
The following facts are undisputed unless noted otherwise.
Cathy Woods (also known as Anita Carter) lived in Reno, Nevada from 1969 to1977, working as a bartender and manager for various bars in the area. (ECF No. 206-2 at 50, 51, 54, 147.) While in Reno, a friend named Melody Lounsberry that Plaintiff knew from work died of a drug overdose. (ECF No. 206-2 at 151-152.)
On February 24, 1976, the car of Michelle Mitchell, a 19-year-old University of Nevada student, broke down near the Reno campus. (ECF No. 208-1 at 2-3.) She used a pay phone to call her mother to come pick her up. (Id.) When her mother arrived, Mitchell was not there. (Id.) Mitchell's body was subsequently found in the garage of a house near the campus, with her hands tied behind her and her throat slashed. (Id. at 33-34; ECF No. 224-20 at 26, 28.)
The following year, Plaintiff moved to Shreveport, Louisiana, and lived with her mother Elenora Carter. (ECF No. 206-2 at 56, 58.) In February 1979, Plaintiff was involuntarily committed in connection with a drug overdose at the Louisiana State University Medical Center in Shreveport, Louisiana ("LSU Medical Center"). (ECF No. 218-1 at 44; ECF No. 215-4 at 21.) While at LSU Medical Center, Plaintiff was diagnosed with chronic schizophrenia. (ECF No. 215-4 at 21.)
Plaintiff told Linda Whatley, a nurse at LSU Medical Center, that she had killed someone. (ECF No. 215-4 at 36; ECF No. 224-21 at 19, 47.) Carol Moloney (formerly named Sherman), an institutional counselor at LSU Medical Center, documented that Plaintiff "told several staff members about a crime she says she committed 3 yr [sic] ago," and Douglas Burks, a medical student, documented that Plaintiff "spoke of a grave act she committed while in Nevada." (ECF No. 215-4 at 37-38.) Dr. Flemenbaum, an attending psychiatrist at LSU Medical Center, told Moloney to "check this out." (Id. at 37; ECF No. 206-12 at 8, 19; ECF No. 218-1 at 104-105.) Moloney contacted Shreveport police detective Donald Ashley. (ECF No. 215-4 at 37.) Ashley then contacted the Reno Police Department ("RPD"), who told him that there was an unsolved homicide that fit "that general information." (ECF No. 206-22 at 160.)
Dennison, an RPD officer, traveled to Louisiana to interview Plaintiff. (ECF No. 206-17 at 67.) On March 7, 1979, Dennison interviewed Plaintiff in a room at LSU MedicalCenter with only Ashley and Burks present. (ECF No. 206-16 at 4.) Plaintiff was not given Miranda2 warnings before the interview. (ECF No. 235-16 at 89.) During this interview, Plaintiff told Dennison that the knife she used to kill a woman in Reno with was at her home in Shreveport. (ECF No. 243-4 at 13.)3 Dennison, with assistance from Ashley, dictated a report describing that interview ("Investigation Report"). (ECF No. 206-21; ECF No. 224-24 at 9.) Dennison also prepared another report containing additional details about the interview ("Specific Information Report"). (ECF No. 224-11.)
Dennison submitted a signed affidavit to obtain a search warrant to search Plaintiff's mother's home ("Search Warrant Affidavit"). (ECF No. 224-8.) Washoe County District Attorney Calvin Dunlap and RPD Detective John Kimpton also arrived to assist with the investigation. (ECF No. 206-17 at 23-24; ECF No. 224-15 at 26-27.) Dennison, Ashley, Dunlap, Kimpton, and Lewis (a Shreveport officer), attended the search of Plaintiff's mother's home on March 8, 1979. (ECF No. 224-13 at 6.) Ashley and Lewis both drafted reports describing the search (respectively "Ashley's March 8 Report" and "Lewis' March 8 Report"). (ECF Nos. 224-6, 224-7.) After the search, Plaintiff stated that she wanted an attorney. (ECF No. 206-19 at 41-43.) The following day, Lewis and Kimpton returned to the house to question Plaintiff's mother about Plaintiff's activities in Reno and photographed a butcher knife from the kitchen—Lewis drafted a report describing these activities ("Lewis' March 9 Report"). (ECF No. 224-12.)
Dennison later drafted an affidavit for an arrest warrant and criminal complaint against Plaintiff ("Arrest Warrant Affidavit"). (ECF No. 224-15 at 19-29.) Plaintiff was extradited to Reno. (Id. at 54.) In 1980, she was tried and convicted for the murder of Mitchell and sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. (ECF No. 236-5.) This conviction was subsequently overturned. (Id.) In 1985, Plaintiff was then tried andconvicted a second time for the murder of Mitchell and again sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole. (Id.)
Ultimately, nearly 30 years later, Plaintiff's conviction was vacated as a result of DNA evidence that linked a man named Rodney Halbower to the crime. (ECF No. 236-6 at 10-12; ECF No. 236-9.) The remaining charges against Plaintiff were later dismissed at the request of the State of Nevada, and the State publicly declared that Plaintiff did not commit the crime. (ECF No. 236-7; ECF No. 236-5.)
Plaintiff initiated this action through her personal representative Linda Wade. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff asserts five claims for violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) involuntary confession in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) federal malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; (4) failure to intervene; and (5) conspiracy to deprive constitutional rights. (ECF No. 170 at 30-38.) She also asserts five claims for violations of Nevada laws: (1) abuse of process; (2) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"); (3) civil conspiracy; (4) respondeat superior; and (5) indemnification. (Id. at 38-41.)4
"The purpose of summary judgment is to avoid unnecessary trials when there is no dispute as to the facts before the court." Nw. Motorcycle Ass'n v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 18 F.3d 1468, 1471 (9th Cir. 1994). Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). An issue is "genuine" if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis on which a reasonable fact-finder could find for the nonmoving party and a dispute is "material" if it could affect the outcome of thesuit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). Where reasonable minds could differ on the material facts at issue, however, summary judgment is not appropriate. See id. at 250-51. "The amount of evidence necessary to raise a genuine issue of material fact is enough 'to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'" Aydin Corp. v. Loral Corp., 718 F.2d 897, 902 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 288-89 (1968)). In evaluating a summary judgment motion, a court views all facts and draws all inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Kaiser Cement Corp. v. Fishbach & Moore, Inc., 793 F.2d 1100, 1103 (9th Cir. 1986).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Zoslaw v. MCA Distrib. Corp., 693 F.2d 870, 883 (9th Cir. 1982). Once the moving party satisfies Rule 56's requirements, the burden shifts to the party resisting the motion to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. The nonmoving party "may not rely on denials in the pleadings but must produce specific evidence, through affidavits or admissible discovery material, to show that the dispute exists," Bhan v. NME Hosps., Inc., 929 F.2d 1404, 1409 (9th Cir. 1991), and "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 783 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986)). "The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Plaintiff requests leave to file a sur-reply, asserting that Reno and Louisiana Defendants argue for the first time in their replies that the Court should not consider any of Plaintiff's testimony, and that Louisiana Defendants' reply raises new arguments on Plaintiff's Fifth Amendment claims. (ECF No. 262 at 3.)
"Courts in this district routinely interpret Local Rule 7-2 to allow filing of surreplies only by leave of court, and only to address new matters raised in a reply to which a partywould otherwise be unable to respond." FNBN-RESCON I LLC v. Ritter, No. 2:11-CV-1867-JAD-VCF, 2014 WL 979930, at *6 (D. Nev. Mar. 12, 2014) (citation omitted). Plaintiff's motion does...
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