Woods v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.

• Decision Date: 17 December 1998
• Docket Number: No. 98AP-425.,98AP-425.
• Citation: 130 Ohio App.3d 742,721 NE 2d 143
• Parties: WOODS, Appellant, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION, Appellee, et al.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

130 Ohio App.3d 742

721 NE 2d 143

WOODS, Appellant, v. OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION, Appellee, et al.^*

No. 98AP-425.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

Decided December 17, 1998.

Swope & Swope and Richard F. Swope, for appellant.

Betty D. Montgomery, Attorney General, and Stephanie D. Pestello-Sharf, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.

MASON, Judge.

This cause was initiated in the Ohio Court of Claims on July 14, 1995, by plaintiff-appellant, Ronald Lee Woods, for injuries sustained while appellant was incarcerated by defendant-appellee, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction. The incident occurred on July 15, 1993, while appellant was being transported from the Ohio State University Hospital in a van operated by Corrections Officer Wendell Boston.

Officer Boston and appellant were traveling in a 1991 Ford van equipped with a steel barrier directly behind the driver and front passenger seats and with two parallel benches, one along each side of the van. Appellant was seated in the rear passenger side of the van, restrained with belly bands, leg irons, and handcuffs. The benches were not equipped with seat belts. While the van was proceeding down Neil Avenue in the middle southbound lane, a vehicle from the middle turn lane darted into the van's lane of travel. Officer Boston immediately applied the brakes and steered the van into the right southbound lane. As a result of the sudden braking and steering, appellant was thrown forward, striking his head and shoulders on the steel barrier behind the driver's compartment. Officer Boston stopped the van, and appellant positioned himself back onto the seat. When questioned by Officer Boston, appellant answered that he was all right. Thereafter, Officer Boston proceeded to Orient Correctional Institution, where appellant was examined at the infirmary.

Appellant filed a complaint against appellee, alleging negligence. The Court of Claims rendered judgment in appellee's favor on October 2, 1997. The court found that appellee was not negligent in failing to equip its van with restraining devices and that that failure was not in contravention of its reasonable duty of care owed to appellant. The court further found that the lack of seatbelts was for safety reasons, and, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, the court found that appellee's failure to provide seatbelts for inmates was reasonable because of security concerns associated with inmates in transit. Woods v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr. (1997), 91 Ohio Misc.2d 195, 698 N.E.2d 514.

On appeal, appellant assigns two errors for review: "Assignment of Error No. 1

"The trial court erred and abused its discretion when it failed to provide the plaintiff-appellant with findings of fact and conclusions of law as requested pursuant to Civ.R. 52, Ohio Rules of Civil Procedure.

"Assignment of Error No. 2

"The trial court erred and abused its discretion by failing to find the defendant-appellant's sic, Department of Rehabilitation and Correction, were sic negligent in placing plaintiff in handcuffs, belly bands and leg irons in the back of the van which provided no restraints of any type to prevent the inmate from being thrown in and about the van upon the driver being required to make emergency turns or stops."

We will address appellant's assignments of error out of order. In his second assignment of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by not finding appellee negligent for failing to provide safety restraints to inmates who are restrained with handcuffs, belly bands, and leg irons. In a claim predicated on negligence, plaintiff bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that defendant breached a duty owed to him and that this breach proximately caused the injury. Strother v. Hutchinson (1981), 67 Ohio St.2d 282, 285, 21 O.O.3d 177, 179, 423 N.E.2d 467, 469-470. In the context of a custodial relationship between the state and its prisoners, the state owes a common-law duty of reasonable care and protection from unreasonable risks. McCoy v. Engle (1987), 42 Ohio App.3d 204, 207, 537 N.E.2d 665, 668-669.

A determination of what degree of care defendant owed to plaintiff must center on the foreseeability of plaintiff's injuries. Jeffers v. Olexo (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 140, 539 N.E.2d 614. The extent of the duty will also vary with the circumstances. Clemets v. Heston (1985), 20 Ohio App.3d 132, 20 OBR 166, 485 N.E.2d 287. However, the state is not an insurer of inmate safety and owes the duty of ordinary care only to inmates who are foreseeably at risk. McAfee v. Overberg (1977), 51 Ohio Misc. 86, 5 O.O.3d 345, 367 N.E.2d 942. Reasonable or ordinary care is that degree of caution and...