Woods v. State

• Citation: 15 Ala.App. 251,73 So. 129
• Decision Date: 14 November 1916
• Docket Number: 1 Div. 189
• Parties: WOODS v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

73 So. 129

15 Ala.App. 251

WOODS v. STATE.

1 Div. 189

Court of Appeals of Alabama

November 14, 1916

Appeal from City Court of Mobile; O.J. Semmes, Judge.

Roscoe Woods was convicted of injuring the property of another by the operation of a motor vehicle and failing to stop and give his number, etc., and he appeals. Affirmed.

Boyles & Kohn, of Mobile, for appellant.

W.L Martin, Atty. Gen., and Harry H. Smith, of Mobile, for the State.

EVANS J.

The plea of former jeopardy was not well pleaded: The offense under the ordinance of reckless driving set up by the plea and that of the complaint under the statute for not stopping for purposes of identification were not the same; to have the effect of a good plea of autrefois acquit, the offenses must be substantially the same, both in law and fact. Gordon's Case, 71 Ala. 315; Code 1907, § 1222. The demurrers were properly sustained.

Appellant challenges as unconstitutional the following requirement of section 28 of the act regulating the use of motor vehicles upon public highways, to wit:

"Any person operating a motor vehicle, who, knowing that injury has been caused to a person or property, due to the culpability of the said operator, or to accident, leaves the place of said injury or accident, without stopping and giving his name and residence, and operator's license, number to the injured party or to some officer or to some person in the vicinity thereof shall be guilty of a misdemeanor," etc. General Acts 1911, p. 645.

The contention is made that this requirement is violative of the Bill of Rights, in that it compels one to furnish evidence that might tend to incriminate himself. Const. § 6. This same question has been ably discussed recently, both in New York and Missouri, where acts almost identical with our own were under consideration, and in California, where the act, though variant in verbiage, had the same requirements as our act. In these states, the acts have been upheld and declared to be not violative of the constitutional guaranty against self-incrimination. People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y 115, 102 N.E. 530, 46 L.R.A. (N.S.) 977 Ann.Cas.1915A, 161; Ex parte Kneedler, 243 Mo. 632, 147 S.W. 983, 40 L.R.A. (N.S.) 622, Ann.Cas.1913C, 923; People v. Diller, 24 Cal.App. 799, 142 P. 797. We quote with approval from Kneedler's Case, supra:

"The statute is a simple police regulation. It does not make the accident a crime. If a crime is involved, it arises from some other statute. It does not attempt in terms to authorize the admission of the information as evidence in a criminal proceeding. The mere fact that the driver discloses his identity is no evidence of guilt, but rather of innocence. State v. Davis, 108 Mo. 667 [[18 S.W. 894, 32 Am.St.Rep. 640]. On the contrary, flight is regarded as evidence of guilt. In the large majority of cases such accidents are free from culpability. If this objection to the statute is valid, it may as well be urged against the other provisions, which require the owner and chauffeur to register their names and number, and to display the number of the vehicle in a conspicuous place thereon, thus giving evidence of identity, which is the obvious purpose of the provisions. St. Louis v. Williams,

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