Woodward Iron Co. v. Vines

• Decision Date: 29 March 1928
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 15
• Citation: 116 So. 514,217 Ala. 369
• Parties: WOODWARD IRON CO. v. VINES.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

116 So. 514

217 Ala. 369

WOODWARD IRON CO. v. VINES.

6 Div. 15

Supreme Court of Alabama

March 29, 1928

Certiorari to Circuit Court, Jefferson County; J.C.B. Gwin, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by A.W. Vines against the Woodward Iron Company to recover compensation for injury sustained in employment. Judgment awarding compensation, and the employer applies for certiorari and mandamus to the circuit court of Jefferson county, Bessemer division. Writ denied; judgment affirmed.

Huey &amp Welch and W.G. Stone, all of Bessemer, for appellant.

J.A Lipscomb and H.P. Lipscomb, Jr., both of Bessemer, for appellee.

THOMAS J.

This court has repeatedly construed the Workmen's Compensation Law (Code 1923, §§ 7534-7597), declared that the right of review provided therein is by certiorari, and defined the office of a bill of exceptions. Such rights are of statutory origin, and may have been denied altogether if the Legislature had so intended. City of Birmingham v. S.B.T & T. Co., 203 Ala. 251, 82 So. 519; Woodward Iron Co. v. Bradford, 206 Ala. 447, 90 So. 803; Ex parte Jagger Coal Co., 211 Ala. 11, 99 So. 99; Ex parte Sloss-Sheffield S. & I. Co. (Greek's Case), 207 Ala. 219, 92 So. 458.

That is to say, that in proceedings for compensation the same are reviewable by certiorari for errors apparent on the record, Ex parte Woodward Iron Co., 211 Ala. 74, 99 So. 97, and a bill of exceptions may be resorted to (1) when the insistence is that there was no evidence offered and admitted by the trial court that supports the judge's findings--statement of facts and conclusions as determined by him, and (2) when the facts recited in said statement or conclusions, as determined by the trial court, are too meager or omissive to fully inform in respects of the entire circumstances having relation to the point contested, Crescent Coal Co. v. Simmons (Ala.Sup.) 116 So. 512; Ex parte Sloss-Sheffield S. & I. Co. (Greek's Case), 207 Ala. 219, 92 So. 458; Ex parte Woodward Iron Co., 211 Ala. 74, 99 So. 97. And the findings of fact by the trial court, if supported by any legal evidence, are conclusive on certiorari. Paramount Coal Co. v. Williams, 214 Ala. 394, 108 So. 7. The review by certiorari is upon questions of law, and among these is whether there is any legal evidence to support the findings of fact by the court.

Mandamus will not do the office of an appeal in the instant proceeding; the statute provides for certiorari. Woodward Iron Co. v. Dean (Ala.Sup.) 117 So. 52. If the duty to be performed by the lower court is judicial, or involves the exercise of discretion on the part of a tribunal or officer, mandamus will lie for the purpose of setting judgment or discretion in motion, but not to direct the manner of its exercise. Henry v. State ex rel. Welch, 200 Ala. 475, 76 So. 417. If, however, judgment or discretion is abused, and the exercise is arbitrary and capricious, mandamus has been employed to compel a proper exercise thereof; or if, by reason of a mistaken view of the law, or otherwise, there has been in fact no actual and bona fide exercise of judgment and discretion, mandamus has been awarded. Mobile Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cleveland, 76 Ala. 321; Ex parte State ex rel. Ingram Land Co., 208 Ala. 28, 93 So. 820; Hagan v. State ex rel. Batchelor, 207 Ala. 514, 93 So. 600, State ex rel. Denson et al. v. Miller, 204 Ala. 234, 85 So. 700; State ex rel. City of Birmingham v. Board of Revenue, 201 Ala. 568, 78 So. 964; State ex rel. Mobile v. Board of R. & R. Com., 180 Ala. 489, 494, 61 So. 368; White v. Mayor & Council of Decatur, 119 Ala. 476, 23 So. 999.

Otherwise stated, the remedy by mandamus will be employed to prevent failure of justice or irreparable injury, when there is a clear legal right and no other adequate remedy. Ex parte Jackson, 212 Ala. 496, 103 So. 558. The motion to dismiss mandamus is granted; the Legislature has prescribed the method of review--by certiorari.

It should also be observed in the language of Central Iron & Coal Co. v. Coker (Ala.Sup.) 116 So. 794, that the very purpose and spirit of the statute is to provide compensation for the employee, if he survives, or to his dependents when it is most needed, without the necessary and usual delays incident to other action at law.

It is asserted in briefs that this is the initial case in this court, under the Workmen's Compensation Act, where the right of compensation is rested upon inguinal hernia. The pertinent provision of the statute is:

"In all claims for compensation for hernia resulting from injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, it must be definitely proved to the satisfaction of the court:

"1. That there was an injury resulting in hernia.

"2. That the hernia appeared suddenly.

"3. That it was accompanied by pain.

"4. That the hernia immediately followed an accident.

"5. That the hernia did not exist prior to the accident for which compensation is claimed." Code of 1923, § 7551, subsec. (f) 1.

Thus is prescribed necessities of proof in claims for compensation for hernia resulting from injury by an accident arising out of and in the course of employment. The burden of proof upon plaintiff in any compensation case is to reasonably satisfy the court that the accident was within the provisions of the statute, and the injury resulting was such as that the rational mind be able to trace and fix upon it as the resultant personal injury to said proximate cause set in motion by the employment, and not caused by some other agency. Ex parte Ala. Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Co., 213 Ala. 88, 104 So. 251, and authorities; Ex parte Coleman, 211 Ala. 248, 100 So. 114. In dealing with an injury, condition, or disease arising out of natural causes, as well as accidents, it was deemed necessary by the Legislature to require the foregoing elements of proof that the employment and accident therein caused the injury.

And the Legislature recognizing in hernia a disease or condition that may arise out of natural as well as accidental causes, prescribed that the plaintiff resting his claim to compensation for hernia must "definitely prove to the satisfaction of the court": (1) "That there was an injury" by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment, "resulting in hernia"; (2) that it "appeared suddenly"; (3) "accompanied by pain"; (4) "immediately following an accident"; and (5) that the condition and disease "did not exist prior to the accident."

The rule stated in 1 Schneider's Work. Comp.L., p. 383, as to proof of hernia, is that a claimant for such physical injury must offer some evidence that the employment caused, or could have caused, such injury. Robbins v. Original Gas Engine Co., 191 Mich. 122, 157 N.W. 437; Alpert v. J.C. & W.E. Powers, 223 N.Y. 97, 119 N.E. 229. There must be some proximate connection of accidental means to the injurious result. In this requirement the statute makes definite the elements to be shown, or the general rule of evidence entering into such a case or claim, specifically indicated in subsection (f) 1, Code of 1923, vol. 3, p. 713. It is sufficient evidence to support the finding of the court, when the proof is such as to reasonably satisfy the court, that plaintiff received physical injury arising out of and in the course of his employment by and with defendant, of which the latter had knowledge or notice, that the injury resulted in (1) hernia, (2) that the hernia appeared suddenly and following the accident, (3) was accompanied by pain, and (4) that said hernia did not exist prior to said accident and injury. And just here it may be well to set out the facts supporting the foregoing findings by the court, stated as follows:

"The complainant was working for the defendant in its coal mines, earning an average of $32.42 per week, and testified that he was pushing a car upgrade, assisted by his helper, and, when his helper reached to scotch the car, plaintiff's foot slipped in his effort to hold car, he fell upon the car and was ruptured. He discovered a knot in his groin before walking 50 yards. He lay upon the ground for two hours, went home on train, remained in bed all night, sent for doctor next morning, came in afternoon, sent me to Dr. Nichols, chief surgeon for defendant, who told me I should go to hospital for operation, but company would not give compensation for rupture, and I refused to go without compensation. I had been operated upon for appendicitis in May, 1924. I am drawing $40 per month compensation from federal government.

"Dr. Nichols testified that plaintiff now has big rings in both groins, had them all his life, right side now protrudes. Any doctor could discover it. Plaintiff has inguinal hernia. I operated on him for appendicitis 1924, and observed no hernia then. The blow he received didn't cause hernia. He reported to me for operation, offered to operate without charge, except for hospital fee to be taken out of wages when he returned to work. He said he could not lose the time.

"Employment card dated October 6, 1924, showed no deformities of plaintiff when examined at that time by Dr. Wright, physician for defendant. Dr. McEniry for defendant testified they accepted no one for employment that had rupture, if discovered on examination."

"S.O. Crumpton testified for defendant that plaintiff said he was hurt, and they quit work about 12 o'clock that day; that plaintiff had been complaining to him of a rupture for more than a year. He didn't see plaintiff fall; if he was scotching car probably couldn't have seen him if he fell."

In Ex parte Sloss-Sheffield S. & I. Co., 207 Ala. 219, 92 So. 458 it is said the conclusions of fact must be based upon legal evidence; that, "where there is any legal evidence to support the finding, such...