Woodworth v. Woodworth

• Decision Date: 28 November 1930
• Citation: 173 N.E. 578,273 Mass. 402
• Parties: WOODWORTH v. WOODWORTH.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

273 Mass. 402

173 N.E. 578

WOODWORTH

v.WOODWORTH.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

Nov. 28, 1930.

Appeal from Probate Court, Middlesex County; John C. Leggat, Judge.

Petition for annulment of marriage by Gertrude S. Woodworth against James G. Woodworth. Decree for libelant, and libelee appeals.

Affirmed.

Ralph Woodworth, of Weston, for appellant.

G. Alpert and J. P. Feeney, both of Boston, for appellee.

RUGG, C. J.

This is a petition for the annulment of a marriage alleged to have occurred in form on June 6, 1925, but to have been invalid because of the insanity of the libellee. A previous decision in the case is reported in 171 N. E. 431. The vital part of the rescript then sent was in these words: ‘Decree to be reversed; case to stand for further hearing in the Probate Court.’ Pursuant to that mandate, the case came on for further hearing before the trial judge who had held the earlier hearing. This was proper procedure. Dittemore v. Dickey, 249 Mass. 95, 99, 100, 144 N. E. 57. The libellee contended in substance that there should be an entire new trial, and presented request for rulings to that effect. The judge denied these requests and ruled that the evidence already received and heard at the first trial would be considered as then and still evidence before him and that either party was at liberty to introduce further evidence, and that the case would finally be considered and decided upon all the evidence, both that heretofore received and such as might then be presented. The libellant offered in substance all the same evidence produced by her at the original hearing, but the offer was excluded on the ground that to receive it would be a useless expenditure of time and not required by the rescript. No further evidence was offered by either side. The soundness of the ruling as to the meaning and effect of the rescript presents the first question to be decided.

This proceeding was brought in the probate court. St. 1922, c. 532, § 7. In these circumstances the procedure in general accords with equity practice. Drew v. Drew, 250 Mass. 41, 43, 144 N. E. 763;Field v. Field, 264 Mass. 549, 550, 163 N. E. 177.

The mandate ‘decree reversed’ or ‘decree to be reversed’ contained in a rescript means that the decree previously entered is annulled and made of no effect. It is vacated and effaced, and no longer establishes rights of parties. When nothing more than this appears in a rescript, the case stands for disposition upon issues raised by the pleadings. It must be tried anew; the former trial has become of no effect. See Loanes v. Gast, 216 Mass. 197, 199, 103 N. E. 473. The words ‘decree reversed’ in a rescript in equity have in substance the same meaning as ‘exceptions sustained’ in an action at law. Those words standing alone import a wholly new trial upon all the issues open on the pleadings. Merrick v. Betts, 217 Mass. 502, 105 N. E. 384;Cheney v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 246 Mass. 502, 505, 141 N. E. 502. In equity, as at law, this court is empowered to give additional directions as to further proceedings to be had pursuant to the rescript. Bourbeau v. Whittaker, 265 Mass. 396, 164 N. E. 453;Simmons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 97 N. E. 102, Ann. Cas. 1912D, 588.

In the case at bar the rescript did not stop with the simple mandate that the decree be reversed, but it went on to say that the case was ‘to stand for further hearing.’ These words would have been superfluous if it had been intended that there should be a wholly new trial. That would have been accomplished merely by reversing the decree. The additional order that the case should stand for further hearing implies that some meaning was intended to be attributed to those words. It is fundamental in the jurisprudence of this commonwealth, in the interests alike of suitors and the public, that there be but one full and fair trial conducted upon correct principles, and that then trials cease. Boston Bar Association v. Casey, 227 Mass. 46, 48, 116 N. E. 541;Selectmen of Framingham v. Boston & Albany Railroad, 268 Mass. 93, 98, 167 N. E. 327;Lannin v. Buckley, 268 Mass. 106, 109, 167 N. E. 258. The case at bar had been tried according to equity practice before one of the two judges of probate for the county; the error in that trial, as disclosed in our previous decision, was that the judge refused to instruct himself correctly as to the burden of proof. That was an error which might readily be corrected without a complete new trial. In these circumstances, the words of the rescript mean that the further hearing was to be had before the...