Woody v. STERLING ALUMINUM PRODUCTS INCORPORATED

• Decision Date: 21 January 1965
• Docket Number: No. 63 C 345.,63 C 345.
• Citation: 244 F. Supp. 84
• Parties: John WOODY et al., Plaintiffs, v. STERLING ALUMINUM PRODUCTS INCORPORATED, a Missouri Corporation, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Missouri

244 F. Supp. 84

John WOODY et al., Plaintiffs, v. STERLING ALUMINUM PRODUCTS INCORPORATED, a Missouri Corporation, et al., Defendants.

No. 63 C 345.

United States District Court E. D. Missouri, E. D.

January 21, 1965.

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Jerome J. Duff, St. Louis, Mo., for plaintiffs.

Bartlett, Muldoon, Stix & Bartlett, Bartley & Siegel, Anderson, Gilbert, Wolfort, Allen, St. Louis, Mo., for defendants.

REGAN, District Judge.

The one hundred and ninety-three plaintiffs have brought their action in four counts. The named defendants are the plaintiffs' former employer, Sterling Aluminum Products Co., hereafter Defendant Sterling; International Association of Machinists, hereafter Defendant International; District Number 9, International Association of Machinists, hereafter Defendant District 9; Local Lodge 41 of the International Association of Machinists, hereafter Defendant Local; Larry Connors, individually, directing business representative of Defendant District 9, representing Defendants International, District 9 and Local; Russell Davis, individually, business representative of Defendant District 9, representing all three defendant labor organizations.

A plethora of motions have been directed to all counts.

We treat in this part the motions to dismiss of all defendants addressed to Count I and the motions to dismiss Count II of the three defendant labor organizations and the two individual defendants.

Paragraph 1 of Count I, which is realleged in every other count, asserts jurisdiction under the laws of the United States, the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution and more particularly under Title 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158, 159, 185, 501; § 301, L.M.R.A. 1947; § 501, L.M.R.D.A.1959. Plaintiffs allege that the three defendant labor organizations were their duly recognized and exclusive bargaining agents and as such engaged in labor negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement with Defendant Sterling by and through their agents and business representatives, Defendants Connors and Davis. Count I then sets out the duties owed by the various defendants to plaintiffs during the collective bargaining negotiations. The defendant labor organizations and the individual defendants are alleged to owe plaintiffs the duties of fair and just representation without collusion with defendant Sterling, to act in concert with defendant Sterling against the interest, welfare and instructions of plaintiffs. Defendant Sterling is alleged to be under a duty to plaintiffs "to not dominate or interfere with the administration and duties of the aforesaid Defendant labor organizations;" and "to not refuse to bargain collectively with the aforesaid representatives of it's (sic) employees;" and to not collude with defendant labor organizations and the individual defendants in the performance of the latter five defendants' duties to plaintiffs. It is then alleged that defendants breached these duties by: conspiring and colluding to omit from the collective bargaining agreement certain provisions demanded by and favorable to plaintiffs and to include certain provisions detrimental to plaintiffs and against their instructions; by conspiring to defraud plaintiffs of employment by misrepresenting the scope and terms of the collective bargaining agreement; by conspiring to permit defendant Sterling to cease operation of its St. Charles plant without paying severance and vacation pay to plaintiffs; by conspiring to deprive plaintiffs of representation at the bargaining table and to leave them without representation, remedy or help through their representatives when plaintiffs learned that defendant Sterling intended to close its St. Charles plant. Plaintiffs allege that as a direct and proximate result thereof, plaintiffs suffered loss of employment and wages for a minimum period of two years in the collective amount of $3,120,000 and loss of representation and organization in the St. Charles plant in the amount of $1,000,000; plaintiffs also seek punitive damages for willful breach of the National Labor laws in the amount of $12,360,000.

Count II of the complaint asserted against only the three defendant labor organizations and the two individual defendant business representatives, involves the same subject matter of Count I. It alleges that defendants failed and refused to bargain for a run-away clause, failed to disclose that they had agreed to a clause limiting recognition of the defendant labor organizations for the St. Charles plant of Defendant Sterling and to a clause permitting Defendant Sterling to close the St. Charles plant, and executed the collective bargaining agreement, all against the instructions of Plaintiffs. Further averments are that defendants misrepresented the contract proposals; misrepresented Defendant Sterling's intention to permanently close the St. Charles plant; failed and refused to follow plaintiffs' instructions given when the terms of the collective bargaining agreement became known to plaintiffs to re-open negotiations or to give notice to Defendant Sterling to cancel the agreement; failed to bargain collectively concerning plaintiffs' employment by refusing to represent and up hold plaintiffs' position on contract proposals with and on grievances against Defendant Sterling. Plaintiffs seek money damages in the total amount of $1,375,000 for loss of their employment bargaining position and strength with their employer, loss of their union dues for which they received no benefit or consideration, loss of wages by Defendants' refusal to process grievances, unjust enrichment of Defendant Sterling to plaintiffs' detriment, loss of seniority rights, pension rights and privileges, welfare rights and privileges and punitive damages of $1,000,000 for willful violation of the Labor Laws of the United States.

The similarity of the two counts permits their consideration together in relation to the jurisdictional questions raised on the motions to dismiss.

Neither count in substance alleges a breach of a collective bargaining agreement between a labor organization and an employer or between labor organizations in an industry affecting commerce. Hence jurisdiction cannot be predicated on 29 U.S.C.A. § 185. Matters concerning an employee benefit and welfare plan are not contained in either count. Hence jurisdiction cannot rest on 29 U.S.C.A. § 301. Both counts fairly may be construed to allege interference with activities protected by 29 U.S.C.A. § 157 and conduct prohibited by 29 U.S. C.A. § 158. However, jurisdiction over these matters is committed in the first instance to the National Labor Relations Board and not to this Court. San Diego Building Trades Council et al. v. Garmon et al., 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L. Ed.2d 775; Local 100, United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 83 S.Ct. 1423, 10 L.Ed.2d 638; Local No. 207, etc. v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701, 83 S.Ct. 1429, 10 L.Ed.2d 646; Barunica v. United Hatters, etc., Local Number 55, 8 Cir., 321 F.2d 764 (1963); Portland Web Pressmen's Union v. Oregonian Pub. Co., 9 Cir., 286 F.2d 4; Adams v. International Broter. of Boilermakers, etc., 10 Cir., 262 F.2d 835; Giba v. International Union of Electrical, R. & M. Wkrs., D.C., 205 F. Supp. 553 (1962). A right of action for one injured by reason of a specific unfair labor practice is granted under 29 U.S.C. § 187 but the allegations of this complaint do not come within those provisions. Insofar as plaintiffs allege a federal question basing their action on a federal right granted under 29 U.S.C.A. § 159, they have not alleged facts bringing them within the one class of cases, beginning with and typified by Syres v. Oil Workers International Union, Local No. 23, et al., 350 U.S. 892, 76 S.Ct. 152, 100 L.Ed. 785, which recognizes the federal right when hostile discrimination is alleged. No discrimination is asserted here, hostile or otherwise.

Jurisdiction is also alleged under 29 U.S.C. § 501(b). That section provides for an action by a member of a labor organization against any officer, agent, shop steward or representative of any labor organization alleged to have violated the fiduciary duty imposed by 29 U.S.C. § 501(a). While that statute is not limited to pecuniary responsibilities of officers and representatives of labor organizations, Johnson v. Nelson, 8 Cir., 325 F.2d 646 (1963), nonetheless proceedings in this court are conditioned on the refusal or failure of the labor organization to seek damages or an accounting and are to be brought for the benefit of the labor organization. 29 U.S.C.A. § 501(b) further provides that "No such proceeding shall be brought except upon leave of the court obtained upon verified application and for good cause shown, which application may be made ex parte." Plaintiffs have not complied with these provisions. Addison v. Grand Lodge of International Association of Machinists, 9 Cir., 318 F.2d 504 (1963). Further, the statute expressly provides for an action against officers, agents, shop stewards or other representatives of labor organizations. It does not furnish a jurisdictional ground for actions against labor organizations and employers.

Most recently plaintiffs, by leave, have amended their complaint to state further statutory jurisdictional grounds under 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 402, 411, 412, 414, 415 but the speculation required to find that the factual averments may contain a fragment of an allegation that the specific rights there secured have been violated is too great to permit consideration of these alleged grounds of jurisdiction. Further, it appears that the provisions of 29 U.S.C.A. § 401 et seq. apply only to inner union rights. See Rinker v. Local Union No. 24 of Amal. Lithographers, D.C., 201 F.Supp. 204 (1962), dismissed as then nonappealable 313 F.2d 956. See also Tomko v. Hilbert, 3 Cir., 288 F.2d 625 (1961), Horn v. Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry. & M. C. Emp., D.C., ...