Woogmaster v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 01 December 1942
• Citation: 45 N.E.2d 394,312 Mass. 479
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: WOOGMASTER v. LIVERPOOL & LONDON & GLOBE INS. CO., LTD. SAME v. GIRARD FIRE & MARINE INS. CO. SAME v. PHOENIX INS. CO.

312 Mass. 479

45 N.E.2d 394

WOOGMASTER

v.LIVERPOOL & LONDON & GLOBE INS. CO., LTD.

SAME

v.GIRARD FIRE & MARINE INS. CO.

SAME

v.PHOENIX INS. CO.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

Dec. 1, 1942.

Exceptions from Superior Court, Suffolk County; Dowd, Judge.

Separate actions by Aleck Woogmaster against Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Company, Ltd., the Girard Fire & Marine Insurance Company, and Phoenix Insurance Company on sprinkler leakage policies of insurance. There were judgments for the defendants and plaintiff brings exceptions.

Exceptions overruled.

Before FIELD, C. J., and DONAHUE, QUA, COX, and RONAN, JJ.

C. C. Worth, of Somerville, for plaintiff.

W. L. Came, of Boston, for defendants.

RONAN, Justice.

The plaintiff, a dealer in woolen and cotton rags, owned and occupied a four-story brick building in Chelsea. The hurricane of September 21, 1938, raised a portion of the roof of his building three feet, breaking certain pipes which were attached to the roof and comprised a part of the automatic sprinkler system, thereby permitting water to escape and damage the plaintiff's stock in trade which was valued at $18,500. At the time this damage was sustained, the plaintiff carried three sprinkler leakage policies of insurance one of which was issued by each of the defendants. The terms and provisions of these policies in so far as now material, were identical. The insuring clause covered ‘all Direct Loss And Damage By ‘Sprinkler Leakage,’ except as herein provided.' Sprinkler leakage was by the policies defined ‘to mean leakage or discharge of water or other substance from within the ‘Automatic Sprinkler System’ resulting in loss or damage to property described herein.' Under a clause entitled ‘Hazards not covered’ the policies provided that the company ‘shall not be liable for loss or damage caused directly or indirectly * * * by fire, lightning, cyclone, tornado, windstorm, earthquake, [or] explosion.’ The cases were heard in the Superior Court upon a statement of agreed facts, and the judge found for the defendants. The plaintiff excepted to the refusal of the judge to grant certain requests for rulings.

The immediate cause of the plaintiff's damage was the escape of water from the sprinkler system, but the escape of the water was directly attributable to the windstorm or hurricane of September 21, 1938. See Hoosac Tunnel & W. R. Co. v. New England Power Co., 311 Mass. 667, 42 N.E.2d 832;Krikorian v. Grafton Cooperative Bank, 312 Mass. 272, 44 N.E.2d 665. The policies covered all loss or damage from sprinkler leakage ‘except as herein provided’ which, it is clear, refers to the ‘Hazards not covered’ clause which exempts the companies from all loss or damage caused directly or indirectly by a large number of causes that are expressly enumerated and include a windstorm. The question presented for decision is whether the purport and effect of the ‘Hazards not covered’ clause are to exempt the insurer from loss and damage caused directly and solely by the hazards named and not from loss or damage from sprinkler leakage, however caused, as the plaintiff contends; or whether the clause is to be construed as limiting the insuring clause and excluding loss and damage arising from sprinkler leakage when the leakage was caused by any of the designated hazards, as the defendants contend.

Policies of insurance, like all other contracts, must be reasonably construed by giving to the words contained therein their usual and ordinary significance, unless it appears that they are to be given a peculiar or technical meaning, and by construing the various portions of the policy as parts of a single contract of insurance without according undue emphasis to any particular part over another; but if the terms of the policy are ambiguous then every doubt is to be resolved against the insurer. Rocci v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 222 Mass. 336, 110 N.E. 972, Ann.Cas.1918C, 529;Koshland v. Columbia Ins. Co., 237 Mass. 467, 130 N.E. 41;Estabrook v. Eastern Commercial Travelers Accident Association, 308 Mass. 439, 32 N.E.2d 250;Stankus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 312 Mass. 366, 44 N.E.2d 687.

In determining the risk covered by these policies it is necessary to read the insuring and the ‘Hazards not covered’ clauses together. The words ‘except as herein provided,’ which appear in the insuring clause, must be presumed to have been used for a specific purpose. They cannot be struck from the policies. Neither can they be ignored. Their apparent...