Wooldridge v. Hull
| Decision Date | 08 July 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. SD 36218,SD 36218 |
| Citation | 604 S.W.3d 364 |
| Parties | In re Romona WOOLDRIDGE Durable Power of Attorney, Roberta Hull, Respondent, v. Matthew HULL, Trustee, Appellant, David Yancey, Personal Representative of the Estate of Romona Wooldridge, Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Appellant's attorneys: Aaron K. Kirkland, John M. Challis, St. Louis, Emily J. Kembell & Catherine E. Moore.
Respondent Roberta Hull's attorney: Bryan O. Wade & Shelly A. Rosenfelder, Springfield.
Respondent David Yancey's attorney: Jeffrey C. Goodnight, Springfield.
Determining that the appellant lacks standing to appeal the trial court's challenged order, the appeal is dismissed.
Robert and Romona Wooldridge initially executed trust agreements in 2005 for the benefit of their descendants. Trust revisions followed, culminating in 2017, when both Robert and Romona1 executed trust documents that purported to abandon all previous versions of their trusts and restate them in their entirety ("the 2017 Restatements").
The 2017 Restatements provided that, upon the death of Robert and Romona, the remaining trust principal would be distributed to their descendants, defined as children and grandchildren. As of the execution of the 2017 Restatements, Robert and Romona had three descendants as so defined—their daughter, Roberta Hull; their son, Robert Wooldridge, Jr.; and their grandson, Matthew Hull. The 2017 Restatements named Matthew as the successor trustee of the trusts (if Robert or Romona could not serve as trustee) and directed that the trustee disburse from the principal of the trusts "such amounts as Trustee deems advisable" to provide for the health, education, and support of each descendant.2 The 2017 Restatements also provided that if any descendant died before the complete distribution of his or her share, the remainder would be distributed among the descendant's then-living descendants. This manner of principal distribution was a change from the manner of distribution provided in preceding versions of the trusts.
Following Robert's death in 2018, Roberta commenced this action alleging that because her parents, beginning in 2011, exhibited symptoms of dementia, they lacked capacity and were subjected to undue influence when they executed various legal documents, including the 2017 Restatements. Her petition sought declaratory judgments that the 2017 Restatements are invalid, various accountings, the removal of Matthew as trustee of the trusts, and, as pertinent here, an interlocutory determination under section 456.4-4203 of the Missouri Uniform Trust Code ("MUTC") that identical in terrorem clauses in the 2017 Restatements that purport to disinherit any beneficiary who contests the trusts’ provisions ("the no-contest clause") are not enforceable as to the other claims asserted in her petition.4 The named parties in the petition included, among others, Robert Jr., as a beneficiary of the trusts, and Matthew, both in his individual capacity, as a beneficiary of the trusts, and in his fiduciary capacity as trustee of the trusts ("Trustee").5
Before proceeding on any other claims in the petition, the trial court first addressed Roberta's request for an interlocutory determination that the no-contest clause was not enforceable against the other claims asserted by her in the petition.6 After receiving oral argument and written suggestions by the parties, the trial court issued an order by docket entry declaring the no-contest clause as not enforceable against the remaining claims asserted in the petition ("the order").7
Trustee pursued this interlocutory appeal under section 456.4-420.3.8 On appeal, Trustee raises a single point contending that the trial court "erred in finding that the no-contest clause is not enforceable against [Roberta]’s claims[.]" For the reasons set forth hereafter, however, we determine that Trustee has no appellate standing to challenge the order, and dismiss the appeal.
"The right to appeal is purely statutory, and where a statute provides no right to appeal, none exists." Aldridge v. First Financial Ins. Co. , 828 S.W.2d 734, 735 (Mo.App. 1992). Where a statute provides for an appeal, In re Estate of Scott , 913 S.W.2d 104, 105 (Mo.App. 1995).
Prior to addressing the merits of a claim on appeal, we "must determine whether [the] issues present a justiciable controversy." Schweich v. Nixon , 408 S.W.3d 769, 773 (Mo. banc 2013). "Justiciability is a ‘prudential’ rather than a jurisdictional doctrine." Id. "A justiciable controversy exists where [1] the plaintiff has a legally protectable interest at stake, [2] a substantial controversy exists between parties with genuinely adverse interests, and [3] that controversy is ripe for judicial determination." Id. (). "The first two elements of justiciability are encompassed jointly by the concept of ‘standing.’ " Id. at 774. "Prudential principles of justiciability, to which this Court has long adhered, require that a party have standing to bring an action." Id. (). "Standing requires that a party have a personal stake arising from a threatened or actual injury." Id. (quoting Williams , 722 S.W.2d at 298 ). "Courts have a duty to determine if a party has standing prior to addressing the substantive issues of the case." CACH, LLC v. Askew , 358 S.W.3d 58, 61 (Mo. banc 2012) (internal citation omitted).
In Interest of M.B.F. , 528 S.W.3d 480, 483–84 (Mo.App. 2017). Lack of standing cannot be waived, and this Court may consider the issue sua sponte. State ex rel. Mathewson v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs of St. Louis County , 841 S.W.2d 633, 634 (Mo. banc 1992).
After this Court received the parties’ briefs in this appeal, we, sua sponte , issued an order raising the issue of Trustee's standing to bring this appeal. In that order, we observed that, generally, "[a] party is ‘aggrieved’ when the judgment operates prejudicially and directly on his personal or property rights or interest and such is an immediate and not merely a possible remote consequence." Stockman v. Safe-Skin, Corp. , 36 S.W.3d 447, 449 (Mo.App. 2001). We also compared holdings from In re Knichel , 347 S.W.3d 127, 130 (Mo.App. 2011) (), with Matter of T.R. Potter, Jr. Exempt Tr. , 593 S.W.3d 556, 562 (Mo.App. 2019) (). Further, the order permitted the parties to file written suggestions on the issue of Trustee's standing to pursue this appeal.
Trustee, by way of his written suggestions, presents alternative arguments supporting his standing to appeal the order. He asserts, first, that there is no requirement that he, in his capacity as trustee, be aggrieved by the order to pursue this appeal under section 456.4-420.3. His second and alternative argument has two prongs. Trustee asserts, on one hand, that he is aggrieved by the order and, on the other hand, that he has standing on behalf of some trust beneficiaries who themselves are aggrieved. None of Trustee's arguments have merit.
"In general, our courts have held that an executor, administrator or trustee is not aggrieved by a decree or judgment determining his duty and the rights of the beneficiaries, or both, and so has no such interest as will support an appeal, inasmuch as he is protected by the decree." Matter of Heisserer , 797 S.W.2d 864, 869 (Mo.App. 1990) ; see also Krause v. Tullo , 835 S.W.2d 488, 491 (Mo.App. 1992) ().
As discussed and explained by the Eastern District of our Court in Knichel , nothing in Missouri's adoption of the MUTC, effective January 1, 2005, changed that requirement. Knichel , 347 S.W.3d at 130. "Trusts ... are governed by chapter 456, the Missouri Uniform Trust Code (MUTC), which does not address appellate standing, so any right of appeal must lie in the general appeals statute, section 512.020." Id. The Knichel court then proceeded to determine that the trustee appellant there was not aggrieved by the trial court judgment being appealed, as required by section 512.020, and therefore, did not have standing to appeal that judgment. Id. at 130-32.
Trustee here argues that he is not required to be aggrieved by the order to have standing to appeal the order. This argument is premised on Trustee's narrow reading of section 456.4-420, the statute that was adopted by the legislature in 2014, effective August 28, 2014, and relied on by Roberta in challenging the enforceability of the no-contest clause.
Our Supreme Court recently summarized the procedure under this statute as follows:
The statute provides "for an interlocutory determination whether a particular ... petition ... by the interested person would trigger application of the no-contest clause or would otherwise trigger a forfeiture that is enforceable under applicable law and public policy." Section 456.4-420.1. Upon consideration of the language of the clause, the relationship of the clause to the trust instrument, and the facts of the petition, the circuit court makes a determination that "result[s] in the no-contest clause being enforceable to the extent of the court's ruling." Section 456.4-420.4. This determination is subject to appeal. Section...
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