World Oil Co. v. Hicks

• Decision Date: 14 April 1937
• Docket Number: No. 1671-6827.,1671-6827.
• Citation: 103 S.W.2d 962
• Parties: WORLD OIL CO., Inc., v. HICKS.
• Court: Texas Supreme Court

Page 962

103 S.W.2d 962

WORLD OIL CO., Inc., v. HICKS.

No. 1671-6827.

Commission of Appeals of Texas, Section B.

April 14, 1937.

Certified Questions from Court of Civil Appeals of Second Supreme Judicial District.

Action by L. R. Hicks, Jr., against the World Oil Company, Inc., and another, in which Mrs. Catherine Hicks and another were substituted as plaintiff. From an adverse judgment, the named defendant appeals to the Court of Civil Appeals [75 S.W.(2d) 905] which certified question to the Supreme Court.

Question answered.

W. L. Dean, Boykin & Ray, and Perkins & Culbertson, all of Fort Worth, for appellant.

Clay Cooke, of Fort Worth, and Walter D. Nicholson, of Jacksboro, for appellee.

MARTIN, Commissioner.

Judgment was entered in a libel suit. The Fort Worth Court of Civil Appeals determined that no error existed in the trial of the case, unless the action of the trial court was such in entering judgment after remittitur, as shown hereafter. That court certified to us the above question, its certificate reading in part as follows:

"In the above-entitled cause the World Oil Company, Inc., defendant in the trial court, has prosecuted an appeal from a judgment against it in favor of John C. Hicks, independent executor of the estate of L. R. Hicks, deceased, and Mrs. Catherine Hicks, his surviving wife, for damages for libelous statements concerning the character of L. R. Hicks during his life, which were embodied in a letter written by Chester R. Bunker as president of the defendant corporation.

"The verdict of the jury shows findings sustaining plaintiff's allegations of libel and of liability of the defendant corporation therefor, all of which are supported by the evidence introduced and assessed damages sustained by L. R. Hicks as a result of the libel as follows: $50,000.00 actual and $15,000.00 exemplary.

"One of the grounds urged by defendant in the trial court for a new trial was that the verdict was excessive and to such extent as to show that the amount allowed was the result of passion and prejudice against the defendant, which vitiated the verdict in its entirety. Upon a hearing of the motion the trial judge announced that it would be sustained and a new trial ordered unless plaintiffs would file a remittitur of all the exemplary damages and $38,000.00 of actual damages allowed by the jury. Thereupon, counsel for plaintiffs filed the remittitur suggested but stating therein that it was filed at the suggestion of the trial court and without admitting that the verdict was excessive. The trial court reduced the amount of judgment already rendered for the full amount of damages allowed by the jury to the sum of $12,000.00 for actual damages, and overruled the motion for new trial to which defendant excepted and gave notice of appeal.

"On a former day this court overruled all of appellant's assignments of error except the one complaining of the action of the trial judge in refusing a new trial after he had found that the verdict was excessive in the amount stated. In our original opinion that assignment was sustained and the cause was ordered remanded for another trial. * * *

"We have reached the conclusion that the evidence was sufficient to show liability of appellant for the libel made the basis of the suit. But we are unable to sustain the contention of appellant that $12,000.00, the amount for which judgment was finally rendered, was so excessive that this court should require a further remittitur under the provisions of Art. 1862. Nor can we say, as insisted by appellant, that the evidence was insufficient to support the conclusion reached by the trial judge that the amount of damages remitted was sufficient to eliminate from the verdict the taint of bias and prejudice. * * *

"By reason of what appears to us an uncertainty in our decisions on the question, we deem it advisable to submit for determination by your Honorable Court whether or not the trial court erred in rendering judgment for the sum of $12,000.00 after the remittitur was filed by the plaintiffs instead of setting aside the verdict in its entirety and granting a new trial?"

The real question in the mind of that court is best illustrated by the following quotation from its opinion in 75 S.W. (2d) 905, at page 909:

"We have all agreed that the assignment of error to the action of the court in rendering judgment for $12,000 after the trial court had found that the damages allowed by the jury were excessive to the extent of $53,000 and plaintiff had filed a remittitur of such excess, should be sustained, since there is no evidence in the record which would enable the trial court to determine with certainty that plaintiff was entitled to recover $12,000, at all events. In the absence of such proof, the undertaking by the court to fix the amount of damages would be an invasion of the province of the jury. Nor can this court say from the evidence to what extent the bias of the jury affected the amount of damages awarded, and therefore is in no position to suggest a further remittitur to be filed by the appellee to avoid a remand of the case for another trial. This conclusion seems to have abundant support in the following authorities and decisions therein cited: General Accident Fire & Life Ins. Corp. v. Bundren (Tex.Com. App.) 283 S.W. 491; Bower v. Lively (Tex.Civ.App.) 11 S.W.(2d) 556; Galveston, H. & S. A. Ry. Co. v. Craighead (Tex.Civ.App.) 175 S.W. 453; Chicago, R. I. & G. Ry. Co. v. Johnson (Tex.Civ. App.) 224 S.W. 277. And for this error the judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the cause is remanded."

The above question is too general to be answered by an unequivocal Yes or No. We waive its apparent insufficiency, but are compelled to call attention to component parts of the general question, each of which must be noticed, before an appropriate answer can be made to the question asked.

The trial court in this case went no further than requiring a remittitur as a condition of overruling a motion for new trial. This is not a case of an affirmative showing of jury misconduct or of bias and prejudice, except as same may be inferred from the so-called excessive verdict.

The question, as presented, includes within it a determination of these questions, viz.:

1. The right of a trial court to enter judgment after remittitur, where as here the damages are unliquidated, no measure of recovery being fixed by law than the discretion of the jury guided by its sense of right and justice.

2. Its right to thus act, if the excessive verdict be so large as to suggest passion and prejudice.

3. As a necessary corollary of the...