Worley v. Beckley Mechanical, Inc.

• Decision Date: 17 May 2007
• Docket Number: No. 33190.,33190.
• Citation: 648 S.E.2d 620
• Court: West Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Michael WORLEY and Cynthia Worley, His Wife, Plaintiffs Below, Appellants v. BECKLEY MECHANICAL, INC., et al., Defendants Below, Appellees.

648 S.E.2d 620

Michael WORLEY and Cynthia Worley, His Wife, Plaintiffs Below, Appellants v. BECKLEY MECHANICAL, INC., et al., Defendants Below, Appellees.

No. 33190.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted: March 13, 2007.

Decided: May 17, 2007.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Davis June 22, 2007.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Starcher June 12, 2007.

Dissenting Opinion of Justice Benjamin July 27, 2007.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court made after a bench trial, a two-pronged deferential standard of review is applied. The final order and the ultimate disposition are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, and the circuit court's underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review." Syllabus Point 1, Public Citizen, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank, 198 W.Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d 538 (1996).

2. The plain meaning of a statute is normally controlling, except in the rare case in which literal application of a statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intentions of the drafters. In such case, it is the legislative intent, rather than the strict language, that controls.

3. The general purpose of W.Va.Code § 55-2-15 (1923) is to toll the commencement of the running of the statute of limitations so that the legal rights of infants and the mentally ill may be protected.

4. In order for mental illness to toll the commencement of the running of the statute of limitations pursuant to W.Va.Code § 55-2-15 (1923), the plaintiff must show that the interval between the tortious act and the resulting mental illness was so brief that the plaintiff, acting with diligence, could not reasonably have taken steps to enforce his or her legal rights during such interval.

5. "The ultimate purpose of statutes of limitations is to require the institution of a cause of action within a reasonable time." Syllabus Point 2, Perdue v. Hess, 199 W.Va. 299, 484 S.E.2d 182 (1997).

Guy R. Bucci, Esq., Bucci Bailey & Javins, LC, Charleston, Pamela A. Lambert, Esq., Pamela A. Lambert & Associates, Gilbert, for Michael and Cynthia Worley.

Kermit J. Moore, Esq., Brewster, Morhous, Cameron, Mullins, Caruth, Moore, Kersey & Stafford, PLLC, Bluefield, for Beckley Mechanical, Inc.

Christopher A. Brumley, Esq., Nathaniel K. Tawney, Esq., Shannon N. Akers, Esq., Flaherty Sensabaugh & Bonasso, PLLC, Charleston, for West Virginia Sprinkler, Inc.

Justin C. Taylor, Esq., Bailey & Wyant, PLLC, Charleston, for Riddleberger Brothers, Inc.

Scott L. Summers, Esq., Robert H. Akers, Esq., Offut, Fisher & Nord, Charleston, for Nielsen Builders, Inc. and Klockner Pentaplast of America, Inc.

MAYNARD, Justice.

The Appellants, Michael and Cynthia Worley, appeal the December 13, 2005, order of the Circuit Court of Raleigh County that dismissed with prejudice their complaint based on the court's finding that the complaint was not filed within the applicable statute of limitations. For the reasons set forth below, we reverse the circuit court's order and remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. FACTS

On the morning of Sunday, May 28, 2000, Michael Worley, Appellant and Plaintiff below, was working as a pipe fitter for Appellees, Beckley Mechanical, Inc., and West Virginia Sprinkler, Inc., on a construction project. Mr. Worley was rotating a valve when the valve exploded under pressure. The valve forcefully struck Mr. Worley in the abdomen, knocking him off a scissor lift and onto the concrete floor approximately thirty feet below.

Mr. Worley was transported by ambulance to Raleigh General Hospital where he remained hospitalized until July 10, 2000.¹ The evidence shows that Mr. Worley suffered no brain trauma from the accident. Several days after Mr. Worley's admission to the hospital, he experienced medical complications including an infected central venous line and a perforated liver incurred during the insertion of a chest tube. As a result, he developed sepsis and became seriously ill. Subsequently, Mr. Worley's level of mental functioning varied for significant periods of his hospitalization.

On July 10, 2002, Mr. Worley and his wife filed their complaint in which they alleged various theories of recovery against the Appellees including Beckley Mechanical, Inc., West Virginia Sprinkler, Inc.,² Klockner Pentaplast of America, Inc., Riddle Brothers, Inc., and Nielsen Builders, Inc. The complaint also included a loss of consortium claim by Mrs. Worley. The filing of the complaint was approximately six weeks beyond the two-year statute of limitations.

The Appellees subsequently filed motions to dismiss the complaint for a number of reasons including that the complaint was not timely filed. The circuit court converted the motions to dismiss into motions for summary judgment and denied the motions on the basis that a question of fact existed as to whether Mr. Worley had suffered a disability that tolled the statute of limitations. The court ultimately held a bench trial on the specific question of whether Mr. Worley was "insane" so as to toll the running of the statute of limitations pursuant to W.Va.Code § 55-2-15 (1923), which provides:

If any person to whom the right accrues to bring any such personal action, suit or scire facias, or any such bill to repeal a grant, shall be, at the time the same accrues, an infant or insane, the same may be brought within the like number of years after his becoming of full age or sane that is allowed to a person having no such impediment to bring the same after the right accrues, or after such acknowledgment as is mentioned in section eight [§ 55-2-8] of this article, except that it shall in no case be brought after twenty years from the time when the right accrues.

After hearing the evidence and considering the arguments of the parties, the circuit court ruled that Mr. Worley was not "insane" at the time the cause of action accrued so as to toll the statute of limitations. Specifically, the court reasoned:

It must be noted, however, that the running of the statute of limitations is suspended if he is insane "at the time the [cause of action] accrues." ...

The statute does not provide for the situation where a person is sane at the moment the cause of action accrues but becomes insane afterward. The sole question presented by the statue (sic) is whether he was insane at the time the cause of action accrues. The evidence supports the conclusion that he was sane at that moment, and that he continued to be sane for a few days thereafter. The evidence would present more difficulty if the question is whether he was insane on any given day following the date that the cause of action accrued. There may have been days that he was and days that he was not. But the statute does not work that way, and so that is not the question.

There is no claim that the Plaintiff was insane immediately prior to or at the time of the injury. This question of fact focuses on the time immediately following the injury. It is Plaintiff's contention that he was instantly rendered insane by the injury, and that he did not recover from that insanity, for the purposes of the statute of limitation, until his discharge from the hospital on July 10, 2000. If he was instantly rendered insane by the injury, the onset of insanity would be simultaneous with the injurious event....

In the present matter, however, it is the court's finding of fact, upon the evidence summarized herein, that the Plaintiff was not insane at the moment of injury, nor was he instantly rendered insane by the injury, nor did he become insane immediately thereafter. (Emphasis in original).

Because the circuit court found that the Appellant was not under a disability that tolled the statute of limitations, the court dismissed the Appellants' complaint as untimely filed. The Appellants now appeal that ruling.³

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

In this case, we are asked to review findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the circuit court after a bench trial. This Court has held,

In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit court made after a bench trial, a two-pronged deferential standard of review is applied. The final order and the ultimate disposition are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard, and the circuit court's underlying factual findings are reviewed under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo review.

Syllabus Point 1, Public Citizen, Inc. v. First Nat. Bank, 198 W.Va. 329, 480 S.E.2d 538 (1996).

III. DISCUSSION

The primary issue in this case is whether, under W.Va.Code § 55-2-15, mental illness⁴ must occur at the same time the cause of action accrues in order to toll the commencement of the running of the statute of limitations.⁵ The Appellants assert that the circuit court erred in construing W.Va. Code § 55-2-15 to require that the appellant be mentally ill at the same time that his cause of action accrues in order to toll the statute of limitations. The Appellees counter that the circuit court properly applied the statute according to its plain and unambiguous terms.

When determining the meaning of statutory language, this Court is mindful that "[w]here the language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted without resorting to the rules of interpretation." Syllabus Point 2, State v. Elder, 152 W.Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968). The pertinent language of the statute at issue provides that "[i]f any person to whom the right accrues to bring any such personal action . . . shall be, at the time the same accrues . . . insane, the same may be brought within the like number of years after his becoming . . . sane that is allowed to a person having no such impediment to bring the same after the right accrues." Generally, "the right to bring an action for personal injuries accrues ......