Worley v. State
| Decision Date | 06 March 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. S94A1553,S94A1553 |
| Citation | 454 S.E.2d 461,265 Ga. 251 |
| Parties | WORLEY v. The STATE. |
| Court | Georgia Supreme Court |
Robert Russell Worley, pro se.
Michael J. Bowers, Atty. Gen., Atlanta, Jack O. Partain III, Dist. Atty., Conasauga Judicial Circuit, Kermit N. McManus, Asst. Dist. Atty., Dalton, Paula K. Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Dept. of Law, Atlanta, for State.
Susan V. Boleyn, Senior Asst. Atty. Gen., Atlanta.
Worley was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to life in prison. 1 Acting pro se, Worley filed a petition for declaratory judgment in superior court, naming the State of Georgia as respondent, and seeking a declaration that his sentence is void. The State moved to dismiss. The superior court treated the matter as a petition to correct a void sentence. Finding the sentence valid, the superior court granted the State's motion to dismiss and denied the petition. Worley appeals, asserting the sentencing provision of the armed robbery statute, OCGA § 16-8-41(b), is unconstitutional on due process grounds. 2 We affirm.
1. OCGA § 17-10-1 authorizes a trial judge to sentence a defendant within limits prescribed by the applicable criminal statute. The sentencing limits of the armed robbery statute are set forth in OCGA § 16-8-41(b) as follows:
"A person convicted of the offense of armed robbery shall be punished by death or imprisonment for life or by imprisonment for not less than five nor more than 20 years ..."
The armed robbery statute clearly specifies that a person convicted of armed robbery can be sentenced to prison for life 3 or a determinate term between five and 20 years (see Williams v. State, 208 Ga.App. 716(1), 431 S.E.2d 469 (1993); Browner v. State, 206 Ga.App. 676, 426 S.E.2d 673 (1992)). Thus, a person convicted of armed robbery must be given a determinate sentence, unless he is sentenced to life. Browner v. State, supra.
The law which governed Worley's sentencing provided:
"Except in cases in which life imprisonment or the death penalty must be imposed ... the judge fixing the sentence shall prescribe a determinate sentence for a specific number of months or years, which shall be within the minimum and maximum prescribed by law as the punishment for the crime."
OCGA § 17-10-1(a) (Michie 1990) (emphasis supplied). If one were to focus only upon the emphasized statutory language, it would appear that Worley should have been given a determinate sentence because he was not sentenced as a recidivist and, therefore, the sentencing court was not required to impose a life sentence. See OCGA § 17-10-7. But that is not the case.
Prior to the enactment of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated, former Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2502 (Ga.L.1974, p. 354), the predecessor to OCGA § 17-10-1, provided:
"[T]he judge ... shall prescribe a determinate sentence for a specific number of years, which shall be within the minimum and maximum prescribed by law as the punishment for said crime, except in cases in which life imprisonment or capital punishment is imposed." (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, prior to the enactment of OCGA § 17-10-1, a sentencing court clearly had the option of imposing a determinate sentence or a life sentence whether or not the offender was a recidivist.
When the Official Code of Georgia Annotated was adopted in 1982, the "is imposed" language of Ga.Code Ann. § 27-2502 was altered to read "must be imposed." However, the enactment of the Official Code was intended as a recodification of state law; it was not intended to alter the substantive law in existence at that time. OCGA § 1-1-2; see Porter v. State, 168 Ga.App. 703, 704, 309 S.E.2d 919 (1983). Thus, even when read in conjunction with the version of OCGA § 17-10-1(a) which governed Worley's sentencing, the armed robbery statute must be construed as allowing for the imposition of a life sentence or a determinate sentence, whether or not the offender was sentenced as a recidivist. 4
2. Worley asserts that even if the armed robbery sentencing statute can be reconciled with OCGA § 17-10-1, it is unconstitutionally void for vagueness because it gives no clear guidelines for determining whether to impose life imprisonment or a determinate sentence. See Arnold v. State, 236 Ga. 534, 541, 224 S.E.2d 386 (1976) (). We cannot accept this assertion. The statute is straightforward and its guidelines are clear: A judge can impose a life sentence or a determinate sentence in the exercise of his or her discretion. 5 See Hambrick v. State, 256 Ga. 148, 149-150(3), 344 S.E.2d 639 (1986); Jefferson v. State, 209 Ga.App. 859, 863, 434 S.E.2d 814 (1993). It cannot be said that the statute is void simply because it requires a judge to exercise discretion in imposing an appropriate sentence. See generally Cottingham v. State, 206 Ga.App. 197, 199, 424 S.E.2d 794 (1992) ().
Judgment affirmed.
All the Justices concur.
BENHAM, P.J., not participating.
The majority opinion's conclusion that even after the adoption of OCGA § 17-10-1 a sentencing court clearly could impose either a life sentence or a determinate sentence is supported and further bolstered by a review of the act of the General Assembly adopting the Official Code of Georgia Annotated. Ga.L., August-September, 1981, Extraordinary Session, p. 8. The act recited the 1977 creation of the Code Revision Commission and that Commission's 1978 contract with the publisher for the "recodification and publication of Georgia laws in a new official Code of Georgia Annotated." The act further recited that the statutory portion of the new Code as prepared by the Code Revision Commission was on file in the Office of the Secretary of State. The act then provided:
The statutory portion of the codification is contained in 24 volumes entitled "Code of Georgia 1981 Legislative Edition" plus one volume entitled "Code of Georgia 1981 Legislative Edition Supplement." The material contained in such supplement consists of acts and resolutions of the General Assembly enacted in the 1981 regular session. The material contained in such supplement shall supersede correspondingly numbered material in the other 24 volumes....
(Emphasis supplied.) Thus, the intention of the legislature was to adopt the "Code" as set forth in the 24 volumes on file in the Secretary of State's Office as superseded by any changes the legislature made during its regular 1981 session. The language of OCGA § 17-10-1 in effect at the time Worley was sentenced was that contained within the 24 volumes of the "Code of Georgia 1981 Legislative Edition" which, of course, obviously was prepared prior to the 1981 regular session of the General Assembly. At that session, the General Assembly amended Code § 27-2502, the predecessor to OCGA § 17-10-1, by renumbering the existing Code section as section (a) and adding a new subsection (b) dealing with parole. The 1981 act then provided
that when so amended Code Section 27-2502 shall read as follows:
27-2502. Determinate sentences. (a) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty in any case involving a misdemeanor or felony the judge fixing such sentence shall prescribe a determinate sentence for...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Williams v. State
...(1991). 7. Thompson v. State, 266 Ga. 526, 468 S.E.2d 28 (1996); Smith v. State, 266 Ga. 208, 467 S.E.2d 510 (1996); Worley v. State, 265 Ga. 251, 454 S.E.2d 461 (1995); Crumbley, 261 Ga. at 611, 409 S.E.2d 517; Wade, 231 Ga. at 133-134, 200 S.E.2d 271; Heard, 204 Ga. 261, 49 S.E.2d 656; Je......
-
Issa v. State
...are unambiguous).63 Mack v. State, 323 Ga. App. 821, 823, 748 S.E.2d 299 (2013) (punctuation omitted); see Worley v. State, 265 Ga. 251, 252 (1), 454 S.E.2d 461 (1995) ("[T]he armed robbery statute clearly specifies that a person convicted of armed robbery can be sentenced to prison for lif......
-
Shelton v. the State.
...§§ 16–5–21(b)(2007); 16–5–40(b)(1)(2007). Since Shelton's sentence fell within the statutory range, it was not void. See Worley v. State, 265 Ga. 251, 252(1), 454 S.E.2d 461 (1995) (“OCGA § 17–10–1 authorizes a trial judge to sentence a defendant within limits prescribed by the applicable c......
-
Hicks v. Florida State Bd. of Admin., A04A0562.
...643, 423 S.E.2d 653 (1992) (Michie Code only intended as a recodification and modernization of the old Code). Accord Worley v. State, 265 Ga. 251, 253, 454 S.E.2d 461 (1995); Newsome v. Dept. of Human Resources, 199 Ga.App. 419(1), 405 S.E.2d 61 Charter Med. Information Svcs. v. Collins, 26......