Worth County v. Crisp County

• Decision Date: 11 December 1912
• Citation: 139 Ga. 117,76 S.E. 747
• Parties: WORTH COUNTY. v. CRISP COUNTY.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

76 S.E. 747

139 Ga. 117

WORTH COUNTY.

v.CRISP COUNTY.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Dec. 11, 1912.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

1. Statutes (§ 76^*)—General and Special Daws—Applicability of General Law. Civil Code 1910, §§ 468 to 471, inclusive, contain provisions of general law for the change of boundary, including dividing lines, between counties.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 77 1/2 78 1/2; Dec. Dig. § 76.*]

2. Statutes (§§ 76, 94*)—General and Special Laws — Applicability of General Laws—Changing County Lines.

The act approved on the 19th day of August, 1911 (Acts 1911, p. 183), provides, in substance, that where there are two contiguous counties, and according to the United States census one of them has a population of not less than 16, 422 nor more than 16, 424, and the other has a population of not less than 19, 146 nor more than 19, 148, the dividing line between them may be changed in the manner pointed out in the act. According to the last United States census, at the time of the adoption of the act, only the counties of Worth and Crisp had such population as would render the act applicable to them. Held, that the possibility of other counties having such population by any subsequent census is too remote to form a basis for a reasonable classification on the subject of territorial generality of the act; and in passing on its constitutionality the act will be construed as applying only to the two counties named.

(a) The act is more restricted, relative to the generality of its application, than the acts involved in the case of Thomas v. Austin, 103 Ga. 701, 30 S. E. 627, and cases following it.

(b) So construed, the act is a special enactment, and violative of article 1. § 4, par. 1, of the Constitution of this state (Civil Code 1910, § 6391), which, among other things, prohibits the enactment of special laws "for which provision has been made by an existing general law." See Futrell v. George, 135 Ga. 265. 69 S. E. 182. It is also violative of article 11, § 1. par. 3, of the Constitution (Civil Code, § 6596), which declares that county lines shall not be changed unless under the operation of a general law for that purpose.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Statutes, Cent. Dig. §§ 77 1/2, 78 1/2, 103, 104; Dec. Dig. §§ 76, 94.*]

3. Statutes (§ 63*)—Effect of Total Invalidity.

The provisions of the act of 1911 (Acts 1911, p. 183), supra, purporting to confer authority for the change of county lines, being unconstitutional, proceedings thereunder for the purpose of producing a change of county lines are void, and no estoppel will arise against the county authorities of one of the counties, out of which certain territory has been carved by reason of the change in the county lines, to complain of the exercise of dominion over territory so taken away from it by the other county.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Statutes, Dec. Dig. § 63;* Constitutional Law, Cent. Dig. § 47.]

4. Parties (§ 68*)—Designation — Sufficiency.

The petition was not subject to demurrer on the ground that the "county of Crisp was not properly named as a party defendant"; the defendant being designated in one part of the petition as "Crisp county, " and in another part as the "county of Crisp."

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Parties, Cent. Dig. § 111; Dec. Dig. § 68.*]

5. Counties (§ 219*)—Actions—Service of Process.

The petition was against the county of Crisp, "through its duly authorized officers and agents, " and prayed, among other things, "that the defendant, said county of Crisp, and the board of commissioners of roads and revenues of Crisp county, viz., J. M. Tomlinson. S. C. Byrd, and M. J. Mikael, and their successorsin office, be restrained, " etc.; also that "Crisp county, by and through its tax collector, W. J. Musselwhite, and his successors in office, be restrained, " etc.; and, further, that process issue, etc. Service was made on the county, by serving the petition and process personally on the three county commissioners designated, and also on the tax collector. Held, that it afforded the county of Crisp no ground for a motion to dismiss the action that service was made in the manner above indicated.

[Ed. Note.—For other cases, see Counties, Cent. Dig. § 352; Dec. Dig. § 219.^2-*]

6. Exceptions. Bill of (§ 58*)—Service-Dismissal—Grounds.

It appearing from an examination of the...