Worth v. Daniel

• Decision Date: 11 January 1907
• Docket Number: (No. 6.)
• Citation: 1 Ga.App. 15,57 S.E. 898
• Parties: WORTH v. DANIEL.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

57 S.E. 898

1 Ga.App. 15

WORTH

v.DANIEL.

(No. 6.)

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

Jan. 11, 1907.

1. Contracts—Validity.

There was no error in refusing to strike the plaintiff's petition, and the judgment complained of was demanded by the evidence.

2. Same—Consideration.

The affection and sense of duty which should naturally exist on the part of a child towards an aged and dependent parent is a good consideration to support a contract making provision for her support.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig.

vol. 11, Contracts, § 287.]

3. Same—Unilateral Contract.

The signing of a mutual undertaking to perform a specific common object does not necessarily render a contract unilateral. Civil Code 1895, § 3661; Wilson v. First Presbyterian Church, 56 Ga. 554.

[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent. Dig. vol. 45, Subscriptions, §§ 6, 7.]

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error from City Court of Douglas; Roan,

Judge.

Action by Araminta Daniel against Bettie Worth. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant brings error. Affirmed.

Lank-ford & Dickerson, for plaintiff in error.

Rogers & Heath, for defendant In error.

RUSSELL, J. Daniel brought suit against Worth In the city court of Douglas, on the written agreement or contract which follows: "State of Georgia, Coffee County. This is to certify that we, the children of Araminta Daniel, have agreed that each of us pay one & 50/100 ($1.50) dollars per month, on the first of each month, for the support of our mother, as long as she lives. This is to be paid to either one of her children, where it is agreed upon she stay, wherever she may stay from her own choice. [Signed] Bettie Worth, Mark Lott, T. H. Daniel, M. Hargraves, Delila Peterson. Witness: Mark Lott." The defendant at first contented herself with a denial of all the paragraphs of plaintiff's petition, and a plea of nunquam indebitatus, which was later amplified, on the trial, by an amendment which admitted the execution of the contract sued on, but contended that the contract was void. Before the introduction of testimony the defendant made a motion to dismiss the petition, which was overruled by the court. The case, by agreement of parties, was submitted to the judge without the intervention of a jury. He entered up a judgment in favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant excepted.

As there was no conflict in the evidence, and the judgment rendered in the case was, under the subsequent testimony, inevitable, unless some of the grounds of the motion to strike had been sustained, the merits of the present writ of error can be settled by determining whether or not the trial judge erred in refusing to dismiss plaintiff's cause of action. After a careful review we think his judgment clearly right. Defendant moved to dismiss the petition (1) because plaintiff's petition alleges no cause of action; (2) because the contract sued on is void, and no recovery can be had thereon; (3) because the contract sued on is an effort of the children of Araminta Daniel to contract with themselves, and for this reason, having only one party, os void; (4) because the contract sued on os unilateral, and for this reason void and of no effect; (5) because the contract sued on is for the payment of money, and It does not appear therein sufficiently to whom said money is to be paid. The exception to the court's disposition of this motion to dismiss is the only assignment of error necessary to be considered. If we are right in our conclusion that the court below should have overruled it, then the judgment should stand. If not, it should be set aside.

Passing first to the grounds in which the pleader attempts to give reasons for the faith that is in him, it Is insisted that the contract is an effort of the children of Araminta Daniel to contract with themselves, and is void; that It has only one party; that the contract is unilateral; and that the contract, being for the payment of money, does not show to whom It is to be paid. We do not think the paper in question is subject to any of these attacks. It sets forth that It is signed by children for benefit of a parent —a mutual subscription in behalf of such parent. The amount to be paid by each is stated, as is the time of payment and the duration. The party to whom payment is made is to be determined by parol, and the relation stated in the contract supplies a good consideration, founded, not only on natural human affection, but resting also on one of the strongest moral obligations—that of properly caring for their mother. To our mind the paper under consideration contains all the essentials prescribed in section 3637 of the Civil Code of 1895. It is true it is an executory contract—one in which something remains to be done by such one of her children as she might select to stay with and who should be a party to the contract. According to the petition then sought to be dismissed, the mother had selected the plaintiff, T. H. Daniel. And if he complied with his part of the agreement—if his mother stayed at his house and he took care of her—this performance on his part would bind all other signers of this mutual undertaking.

In the brief of the defendant in error a ruling of this court is invoked as to the construction of the words "natural duty and affection, " in Civ. Code 1895, § 3658, as applied to the obligation resting upon...