Wrenn v. Dist. of Columbia

• Decision Date: 18 May 2015
• Docket Number: 1:15–CV–162 (FJS)
• Citation: 107 F.Supp.3d 1
• Parties: Brian Wrenn, Joshua Akery, Tyler Whidby, and Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. District of Columbia and Cathy L. Lanier, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

107 F.Supp.3d 1

Brian Wrenn, Joshua Akery, Tyler Whidby, and Second Amendment Foundation, Inc., Plaintiffs,

v.District of Columbia and Cathy L. Lanier, Defendants.

1:15–CV–162 (FJS)

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

Signed May 18, 2015

Gura & Possessky, PLLC, of Counsel Alan Gura, Esq., 105 Oronoco Street, Suite 305, Alexandria, Virginia 22314, Attorneys for PlaintiffsOffice of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, of Counsel Andrew J. Saindon, Esq., 441 Fourth Street, N.W., Sixth Floor South, Washington, D.C. 20001–2714, Attorneys for Defendants

MEMORANDUM–DECISION AND ORDER

SCULLIN, Senior Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

Currently before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction.¹

II. BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed their complaint in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action on February 3, 2015. Three days later, on February 6, 2015, they filed a motion for a preliminary injunction.

Plaintiffs' complaint contains only one cause of action, in which they seek both injunctive and declaratory relief. Specifically, they request that the Court declare that D.C.Code § 22–4506(a)'s grant of discretion to the Police Chief to refuse the issuance of licenses to carry handguns and its "good reason"/"proper reason" requirement, as well as the requirements of D.C.Code § 72709.11 that the Police Chief issue rules to establish the criteria for "good reason" and "other proper reason" for carrying a handgun, including the minimum requirements set forth therein and 24 D.C.M.R. §§ 2333.1, 2333.2, 2333.3, 2333.4, and 2334.1 violate the Second Amendment to the United States Constitution on their face and as applied to the individual Plaintiffs and other law-abiding, responsible members of Plaintiff Second Amendment Foundation ("SAF"), who otherwise would qualify for a District of Columbia license to carry a handgun. See Complaint at ¶ 40. They also ask that the Court permanently enjoin Defendants from enforcing the same.

With regard to their instant motion for a preliminary injunction, the relief that Plaintiffs seek is limited to enjoining Defendants from applying the "good reason"/"proper reason" requirement of D.C.Code § 22–4506(a), including, but not limited to, the manner in which that requirement is defined in D.C.Code § 7–2509.11 and 24 D.C.M.R. §§ 2333.1, 2333.2, 2333.3, 2333.4 and 2334.1, to applicants who otherwise meet the requirements of D.C.Code § 22–4506(a) and all other current requirements for possessing and carrying of handguns under District of Columbia law.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Statutory scheme

Before analyzing Plaintiffs' motion, it is necessary to set forth the provisions of the District of Columbia's licensing mechanism with which Plaintiffs take issue. In response to this Court's July 24, 2014 Memorandum–Decision and Order in Palmer v. Dist. of Columbia, 59 F.Supp.3d 173 (D.D.C.2014), the Council of the District of Columbia ("Council"), on September 23, 2014, voted unanimously to pass Bill 20–926, the "License to Carry a Pistol Emergency Amendment Act of 2014" (the "Emergency Act"). This Act became effective when the Mayor signed it on October 9, 2014.

The Council also introduced permanent legislation, the "License to Carry a Pistol Amendment Act of 2014," Bill 20–930, which was referred to its Committee on the Judiciary and Public Safety. The Council conducted a public hearing on the permanent legislation on October 16, 2014, and the Committee mark-up occurred on November 25, 2014. The first and second readings on the permanent legislation occurred in December 2014. The permanent legislation was transmitted to Congress on March 6, 2015, and the projected law date is June 16, 2015. See http://lims.dccouncil.us/Legislation/B20–0930?FromSearchResults true (last visited on May 4, 2015).

Under the current legislation, D.C.Code § 22–4506(a) provides as follows:

The Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department ("Chief") may, upon the application of any person having a bona fide residence or place of business within the District of Columbia, or of a person having a bona fide residence or place of business within the United States and a license to carry a pistol concealed upon his or her person issued by the lawful authorities of any State or subdivision of the United States, issue a license to such person to carry a pistol concealed upon his or her person within the District of Columbia for not more than 2 years from the date of issue, if it appears that the applicant has good reason to fear injury to his or her person or property or has any other proper reason for carrying a pistol, and that he or she is a suitable person to be so licensed. (emphasis added)

In addition, "[t]he Chief of [the Metropolitan Police Department] shall issue rules to implement the provisions of the License to Carry a Pistol Amendment Act of 2014," including the following rules:

(1) To establish criteria for determining when an applicant has, pursuant to section 6 of the Pistols and Other Dangerous Weapons Act:

(A) Demonstrated a good reason to fear injury to his or her person, which shall at a minimum require a showing of a special need for self-protection distinguishable from the general community as supported by evidence of specific threats or previous attacks that demonstrate a special danger to the applicant's life;

(B) Demonstrated any other proper reason for carrying a concealed pistol, which shall at a minimum include types of employment that require the handling of cash or other valuable objects that may be transported upon the applicant's person;....

Furthermore, Defendant Lanier, as Chief of the Metropolitan Police Department, has adopted various regulations regarding the licensing of individuals to carry concealed handguns, including the following:

A person shall demonstrate a good reason to fear injury to his or her person by showing a special need for self-protection distinguishable from the general community as supported by evidence of specific threats or previous attacks which demonstrate a special danger to the applicant's life. 24 D.C.M.R. § 2333.1

For the purposes of satisfying the specifications of § 2333.1, a person shall allege, in writing, serious threats of death or serious bodily harm, any attacks on his or her person, or any theft of property from his or her person. The person shall also allege that the threats are of a nature that the legal possession of a pistol is necessary as a reasonable precaution against the apprehended danger. 24 D.C.M.R. § 2333.2

The person shall provide all evidence of contemporaneous reports to the police of such threats or attacks, and disclose whether or not the applicant has made a sworn complaint to the police or the courts of the District of Columbia concerning any threat or attack. 24 D.C.M.R. § 2333.3

The fact that a person resides in or is employed in a high crime area shall not by itself establish a good reason to fear injury to person or property for the issuance of a concealed carry license. 24 D.C.M.R. § 2333.4

A person may allege any other proper reason that the Chief may accept for obtaining a concealed carry license which may include:

(a) Employment of a type that requires the handling of large amounts of cash or other highly valuable objects that must be transported upon the applicant's person; or

(b) The need for a parent, son, daughter, sibling, or other adult member of the immediate family to provide protection of a family member who is physically or mentally incapacitated to a point where he or she cannot act in defense of himself or herself, and the family member who is physically or mentally incapacitated can demonstrate a good reason to fear injury to his or her person by showing a special need for self-protection distinguishable from the general community as supported by evidence of specific threats or previous attacks which demonstrate a special danger to the applicant's life in the manner described in § 2333. 24 D.C.M.R. § 2334.1

B. Standard for reviewing a motion for a preliminary injunction

As stated, currently before the Court is Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction to enjoin Defendants from applying the "good reason"/"proper reason" requirement of D.C.Code § 224506(a), including, but not limited to, the manner in which that requirement is defined in D.C.Code § 7–2509.11 and 24 D.C.M.R. §§ 2333.1, 2333.2, 2333.3, 2333.4 and 2334.1, to applicants who otherwise meet the requirements of D.C.Code § 22–4506(a) and all other current requirements for possessing and carrying of handguns under District of Columbia law.

A party seeking a preliminary injunction must demonstrate " ‘(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, (2) that it would suffer irreparable injury if the injunction were not granted, (3) that an injunction would not substantially injure other interested parties, and (4) that the public interest would be furthered by the injunction.’ " Davis v. Billington, No. 10–0036, 76 F.Supp.3d 59, 63–64, 2014 WL 7204782, *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 19, 2014) (quoting Chaplaincy of Full Gospel Churches v. England , 454 F.3d 290, 297 (D.C.Cir.2006) ). When evaluating these factors, the District of Columbia Circuit uses a " ‘sliding-scale approach.’ " Id. (citation and footnote omitted). Under this approach, " ‘[i]f the movant makes an unusually strong showing on one of the factors, then it does not necessarily have to make as strong a showing on another factor.’ " Id. (quoting Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1291–92 (D.C.Cir.2009) ).²

Since " ‘a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy,... the [party] seeking to invoke such stringent relief is obliged to establish a clear and compelling legal right thereto based upon undisputed facts.’ " Id. at *3 (quoting In re Navy Chaplaincy, 928 F.Supp.2d 26, 36 (D.D.C.) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted), aff'd, 738 F.3d 425 (D.C.Cir.2013) ). Moreover, "[a] party who seeks a mandatory injunction to change (rather than preserve) the status quo ‘must meet a higher...