WRH Mortgage, Inc. v. Butler, 96-0181
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
| Citation | 684 So.2d 325 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-0181,96-0181 |
| Parties | 22 Fla. L. Weekly D129 WRH MORTGAGE, INC., et al., Appellant, v. Michael B. BUTLER, et al., Appellee. Fifth District |
| Decision Date | 20 December 1996 |
Page 325
v.
Michael B. BUTLER, et al., Appellee.
Page 326
David F. Wilsey of Fisher and Wilsey, P.A., St. Petersburg, for Appellant WRH Mortgage, Inc.
Judith A. English, Alfred A. Colby, John A. Greco of Ketchey Horan, Tampa, for Appellant Castleton Capital Corporation, LLC.
Berry J. Walker, Jr. of Walker and Associates, Attorneys, P.A., Maitland, for Appellees Michael B. Butler, M. Jean Butler and Michael B. Butler, M.D., P.A.
Robert W. Anthony, John A. Taylor of Warlick, Fassett & Anthony P.A., Orlando, for Appellee Evelyn Denson.
ANTOON, Judge.
WRH Mortgage, Inc. (WRH), appeals a summary final judgment in favor of Michael and Jean Butler in this mortgage foreclosure action. The trial court ruled that section95.281, Florida Statutes (1995), extinguished WRH's right to foreclose on the Butler's mortgage five years after the debt secured by the mortgage became due. We reverse because 12 U.S.C. § 1821 (1995) preempts section 95.281 and grants WRH, an assignee of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), six years within which to institute suit in a foreclosure matter.
RTC assigned a note and mortgage to WRH. The mortgage encumbered real property owned by the Butlers. The note provided that, "[n]otwithstanding anything to the contrary contained herein, the entire remaining principal balance, together with all accrued interest thereon, shall be due and payable [on] February 25, 1990". The Butlers failed to timely pay the balance. On April 6, 1995, more than five years after the debt became due, WRH sued the Butler's for foreclosure.
In defending against WRH's motion for summary judgment, the Butlers raised section 95.281 as a statute of limitations defense. 1 Simply stated, the Butler's argument was that the statute operated to terminate WRH's right to foreclose the mortgage on February 24, 1995, five years after the maturity of the debt. WRH responded by arguing that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(14)(A) authorizes a six-year period within which the RTC and its assignees are entitled to institute suit on claims derived from insolvent banks and which cannot be shortened by state statute. 2
In its articulate ruling, the trial court first acknowledged that when Congress created the RTC, it established a six-year statute of limitations during which RTC could enforce contracts. Citing Cadle Company II, Inc., v. Stamm, 633 So.2d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994), the trial court properly concluded that the six-year statute of limitations applies to assignees of RTC and thus, to WRH. The trial court ruled however that WRH was barred from foreclosing on the Butlers' mortgage because the Butlers' mortgage automatically terminated on February 24, 1995, more than one month prior to the date WRH filed its complaint for foreclosure. In so ruling, the trial court reasoned that section 95.218 operated as a statute of repose, which automatically extinguished the Butlers' mortgage lien on February 24, 1995, and thus, there was no lien to enforce when WRH filed suit in April of 1995.
Page 327
A statute of limitations is a procedural statute which bars enforcement of an accrued cause of action. In this regard, statutes of limitation establish the time period within which a cause of action must be commenced. The limitation period is directly related to the date on which the cause of action accrued. In contrast, a statute of repose is a substantive statute which not only bars enforcement of an accrued cause of action but may also prevent the accrual of a cause of action where the final element necessary for its creation occurs beyond the time period established by the statute. The period of time established by a statute of repose commences on the date of an event specified in the statute. At the end of that time period, the cause of action ceases to exist. Importantly, a statute of repose operates without regard to when the cause of action accrued. Kush v. Lloyd, 616 So.2d 415 (Fla.1992); Universal Engineering Corp., v. Perez, 451 So.2d 463 (Fla.1984). See...
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...conflict with any federal law. See Blinn v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 781 So.2d 1103 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000); WRH Mortgage, Inc. v. Butler, 684 So.2d 325 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). Thus I believe that section 768.73 is generally applicable to § 1983 actions brought in Florida...
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...action: Stonehedge/Fasa–Texas–JDC v. Miller, No. 96–10037, 1997 WL 119899 (5th Cir. March 10, 1997), and WRH Mortgage, Inc. v. Butler, 684 So.2d 325 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1996). Although the FDIC more explicitly raises the preemption doctrine on appeal than it did before the district court, its ......
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