Wright v. Adams Express Co.

• Decision Date: 20 July 1910
• Docket Number: 192-1909
• Citation: 43 Pa.Super. 40
• Parties: Wright v. Adams Express Company, Appellant
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

43 Pa.Super. 40

Wright v. Adams Express Company, Appellant

No. 192-1909

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

July 20, 1910

Argued October 21, 1909 [Syllabus Matter]

Appeal by defendant, from judgment of C.P. No. 2, Phila. Co.-1908 No. 2,392, for plaintiff on case stated in suit of Daisy Wright v. Adams Express Company.

Case stated to determine liability for loss of furs.

The case stated was as follows:

It is hereby agreed by and between the parties in the above-entitled action that the following case be stated for the opinion and decision of the court in the nature of a special verdict.

On November 18, 1907, plaintiff, a resident of Philadelphia, was the owner of a long fur coat and a muff made of brown " Japanese sable," which she had bought from O'Hara an importer, of New York City, for $ 350. Desiring to send the coat and muff to O'Hara for repairs, she packed them in a box, wrote on it the destination -- " O'Hara, 11 East 48th Street, New York City" -- and gave it to James Nelson, her chauffeur, giving him no instructions except that he was to send it to the addressee by express. Nelson did not know the value of the contents of the box.

Nelson took the box and its contents to the office of the defendant at 1413 Chestnut street, Philadelphia, and there delivered it to one Stivers, defendant's receiving clerk. Stivers, who was ignorant of the value of the shipment, asked Nelson its value, and Nelson said he did not know the value. Thereupon Stivers stamped " Value asked and not given" in red ink on a bill of lading, filled in the other blanks, signed it and gave it to Nelson, who paid forty cents, the express charges demanded. A copy of the bill of lading marked exhibit " A" is attached hereto and made a part hereof. Nelson subsequently gave said receipt to the plaintiff. She did not know at the time the amount charged by the defendant in this case.

Defendant has never delivered the box to O'Hara or returned it to plaintiff.

Plaintiff made proper claim and demand upon defendant for the loss of the furs.

On November 18, 1907, and before and after that date the regular rate established and in force on defendant's line of transportation for carrying furs of the weight of those shipped from Philadelphia to New York was forty cents if their value was $ 50.00 or under, and sixty cents if their value was $ 350.

These rates were included in the schedules filed by defendant with the Interstate Commerce Commission at Washington and printed and posted at the office of the defendant at 1413 Chestnut street, Philadelphia, in accordance with the provisions of the United States statute entitled, an act to regulate commerce, approved February 4, 1887, and its amendments and supplements. But neither the plaintiff nor Nelson had actual knowledge that the defendant had a published schedule of rates, or what the defendant's actual rates were, but she did know that the express charges were based on the value and that more was charged if the shipment was valued. Plaintiff and Nelson had often shipped packages by defendant company, but neither of them knew the provisions of the bill of lading.

On November 18, 1907, and before and after that date a shipment valued at over $ 50.00 was handled differently by defendant from one not so valued, in the following respects, to wit: the value was written on the face of such shipment and on the waybill which accompanied it; such a shipment was handled both at the initial office and at the delivering office in a special department called the " valuable room" ; from its receipt by defendant until its delivery to consignee, it was at all times under the personal custody of a particular employee; each employee who handled such a shipment gave a receipt to the person from whom he received it and took a receipt from the person to whom he gave it; none of which things was done in the case of a shipment not so valued. This method of handling was adopted solely for additional security and for the purpose of giving to a shipment of particular value the care which its value warranted.

If the court be of opinion that plaintiff is entitled to recover from defendant the full value of the said furs, then judgment shall be entered in her favor for $ 350 with interest from November 18, 1907, and costs. If the court be of opinion that the recovery should be limited to $ 50.00, then judgment shall be entered for plaintiff for that amount without costs. If the court be of opinion that the judgment should be for defendant, a judgment for defendant shall be entered and costs assessed.

The judgment of the court shall be subject to review by either party hereto by appeal or by writ of error.

The court entered judgment for plaintiff for $ 350 on the case stated.

Error assigned was in entering judgment for plaintiff.

John Lewis Evans, with him Thomas DeWitt Cuyler, for appellant.

G. W. Pepper, with him W. B. Bodine, Jr., for appellee.

Before Rice, P. J., Henderson, Morrison, Orlady, Head, Beaver and Porter, JJ.

OPINION

HENDERSON, J.

This appeal involves a consideration of the effect of the interstate commerce legislation on the liability of a common carrier for damages for negligence on a contract for the carriage of goods from Pennsylvania to the state of New York. The plaintiff sued to recover the value of a consignment of furs delivered to the defendant in Philadelphia for carriage to New York City. The bill of lading contained the following provision: " 1. In consideration of the rate charged for carrying said property, which is regulated by the value thereof and is based upon a valuation of not exceeding fifty dollars unless a greater value is declared, the shipper agrees that the value of said property is not more than fifty dollars, unless a greater value is stated herein, and that the company shall not be liable in any event for more than the value so stated, nor for more than fifty dollars if no value is stated herein." The package was not delivered to the consignee nor accounted for and the court entered judgment on the case stated in favor of the plaintiff for $ 350, the value of the goods, notwithstanding the limitation of liability in the contract. One of the facts agreed upon was that on November 18, 1907, and before and after that date the regular rate established and in force on defendant's line of transportation for carrying furs of the weight of those shipped from Philadelphia to New York was forty cents if their value was $ 50.00 or under and sixty cents if their value was $ 350. It was also agreed that when the plaintiff's servant delivered the package of furs to the defendant, the agent of the latter inquired what the value of the package was and the servant not knowing the value stated that he did not know; whereupon the agent stamped on the bill of lading delivered to the plaintiff's servant, " Value asked and not given." The appellant contends (1) that the liability of a carrier for loss of goods shipped in interstate commerce under a contract containing an agreement as to the value of the goods should be determined by the law as announced in the decisions of the supreme court of the United States and not according to the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of this state, because of the provision of the interstate commerce legislation requiring a carrier to issue a receipt or bill of lading to the shipper and making such carrier liable to the holder of the receipt for loss or damage. It is conceded that it is the well established law of this state that a common carrier cannot contract for exemption from, or limitation of, liability arising from his negligence or that of his servant. This doctrine has its foundation in considerations of public policy which hold that contracts permitting a common carrier to relieve himself from the obligation to take care of the property committed to his custody tend to encourage guilty negligence: Camden & Amboy R. R. Co. v. Baldauf, 16 Pa. 67; Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251; R. R. Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357, 21 L.Ed. 627. The nature of the carrier's undertaking imposes on him the obligation to exercise a high degree of care and a contract which has the effect to protect him when he has committed a breach of duty and which disregards a well-defined rule of public policy cannot be enforced. There are many cases in this state which apply this doctrine as will be seen by an examination of Powell v. R. R. Co., 32 Pa. 414; American Express Co. v. Sands, 55 Pa. 140; Penna. R. R. Co. v. Raiordon, 119 Pa. 577, 13 A. 324; Buck v. Penna. R. R. Co., 150 Pa. 170, 24 A. 678; Willock v. R. R. Co., 166 Pa. 184, 30 A. 948; Eckert v. Penna. R. R. Co., 211 Pa. 267, 60 A. 781. And with reference to this rule no distinction has been made between transactions involving interstate carriage and those in which the transportation was wholly within the state. Grogan v. Adams Express Co., 114 Pa. 523, 7 A. 134; Willock v. R. R. Co., 166 Pa. 184, 30 A. 948; Hughes v. Penna. R. R., 202 Pa. 222, 51 A. 990, and Eckert v. Penna. R. R. Co., 211 Pa. 267, 60 A. 781, were all cases in which shipments were made from one state to another. The decisions of the federal courts have applied a different rule. They sustain the doctrine of the common law that a carrier may not contract for exemption from liability for his own negligence but hold valid an agreement with the shipper limiting his liability to the agreed valuation in consideration of a lower rate for carriage, the shipper at the same time to have the privilege to insist upon the carrier's liability for the full value of the property on payment of the price of transportation charged according to such value: Hart v. R. R. Co., 112 U.S. 331, 28 L.Ed. 717, 5 S.Ct. 151; such limitation of liability being regarded as a lawful...