Wright v. Adams Express Co.
| Decision Date | 20 March 1911 |
| Docket Number | 282 |
| Parties | Wright v. Adams Express Company, Appellant. Davidson v. Adams Express Company, Appellant. Blackburn v. Adams Express Company, Appellant |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
Argued January 12, 1911 [Copyrighted Material Omitted] [Copyrighted Material Omitted]
Appeal, No. 282, Jan. T., 1910, by defendant, from judgment of Superior Court, Oct. T., 1909, No. 192, affirming judgment of C.P. No. 2, Phila. Co., March T., 1908, No. 2,392, for plaintiff on case stated in suit of Daisy Wright v. Adams Express Company. Affirmed.
See 43 Pa.Super. 40.
Appeal, No. 283, Jan. T., 1910, by defendant, from judgment of Superior Court, Oct. T., 1909, No. 87, affirming judgment of C.P. No. 1, Phila. Co., March T., 1907, No. 1,701, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Abe Davidson, trading as Davidson & Son, v. Adams Express Company. Affirmed.
See 43 Pa.Super. 53.
Appeal, No. 284, Jan. T., 1910, by defendant, from judgment of Superior Court, Oct. T., 1909, No. 95, affirming judgment of C.P. Chester Co., Aug. T., 1907, No. 101, on verdict for plaintiffs in case of Ephraim Blackburn and Joseph S. Townsend, trading as Blackburn & Townsend, v. Adams Express Company. Affirmed.
See 43 Pa.Super. 276.
Appeals from Superior Court.
HENDERSON, J., filed the following opinion in Wright v. Adams Express Co.:
This appeal involves a consideration of the effect of the interstate commerce legislation on the liability of a common carrier for damages for negligence on a contract for the carriage of goods from Pennsylvania to the state of New York. The plaintiff sued to recover the value of a consignment of furs delivered to the defendant in Philadelphia for carriage to New York city. The bill of lading contained the following provision: The package was not delivered to the consignee nor accounted for and the court entered judgment on the case stated in favor of the plaintiff for $350, value of the goods, notwithstanding the limitation of liability in the contract. One of the facts agreed upon was that on November 18, 1907, and before and after that date the regular rate established and in force on defendant's line of transportation for carrying furs of the weight of those shipped from Philadelphia to New York was forty cents if their value was $50.00 or under and sixty cents if their value was $350. It was also agreed that when the plaintiff's servant delivered the package of furs to the defendant, the agent of the latter inquired what the value of the package was and the servant not knowing the value stated that he did not know; whereupon the agent stamped on the bill of lading delivered to the plaintiff's servant "Value asked and not given." The appellant contends, first, that the liability of a carrier for loss of goods shipped in interstate commerce under a contract containing an agreement as to the value of the goods should be determined by the law as announced in the decisions of the supreme court of the United States and not according to the rule adopted by the Supreme Court of this state, because of the provision of the interstate commerce legislation requiring a carrier to issue a receipt or bill of lading to the shipper and making such carrier liable to the holder of the receipt for loss or damage. It is conceded that it is the well-established law of this state that a common carrier cannot contract for exemption from or limitation of liability arising from his negligence or that of his servant. This doctrine has its foundation in considerations of public policy which hold that contracts permitting a common carrier to relieve himself from the obligation to take care of the property committed to his custody tend to encourage guilty negligence: Camden & Amboy R.R. Co. v. Baldauf, 16 Pa. 67; Cole v. Goodwin, 19 Wend. 251; Railroad Co. v. Lockwood, 84 U.S. 357. The nature of the carrier's undertaking imposes on him the obligation to exercise a high degree of care, and a contract which has the effect to protect him when he has committed a breach of duty and which disregards a well-defined rule of public policy cannot be enforced. There are many cases in this state which apply this doctrine as will be seen by examination of Powell v. R.R. Co., 32 Pa. 414; American Express Co. v. Sands, 55 Pa. 140; Penna. R.R. Co. v Raiordon, 119 Pa. 577; Buck v. Penna. R.R. Co., 150 Pa. 170; Willock v. R.R. Co., 166 Pa. 184; Eckert v. Penna. R.R. Co., 211 Pa. 267. And with reference to this rule no distinction has been made between transactions involving interstate carriage and those in which the transportation was wholly within the state. Grogan v. Adams Express Co., 114 Pa. 523; Willock v. R.R. Co., 166 Pa. 184; Hughes v. Penna. R.R. Co., 202 Pa. 222, and Eckert v. Penna. R.R. Co., 211 Pa. 267, were all cases in which shipments were made from one state to another. The decisions of the federal courts have applied a different rule. They sustain the doctrine of the common law that a carrier may not contract for exemption from liability for his own negligence, but hold valid an agreement with the shipper limiting his liability to the agreed valuation in consideration of a lower rate for carriage, the shipper at the same time to have the privilege to insist upon the carrier's liability for the full value of the property on payment of the price of transportation charged according to such value: Hart v. R.R. Co., 112 U.S. 331. Such limitation of liability being regarded as a lawful means of protection to the carrier against excessive valuation and a proper method of securing a due proportion between the amount for which the carrier is responsible and the freight paid. And it is this rule which the appellant asks to have applied here. It is conceded that the law on the subject as announced by the supreme court of the United States is not binding on the courts of this state unless congress has legislated on the subject in the act of June 29, 1906, 34 Statutes at Large, 584. Prior to that enactment it had been decided by the supreme court of the United States that a statute of a state or rule of law established by the courts of a state declaring void any contract of a common carrier exempting him from, or limiting his liability for, negligence was not in conflict with the legislation of congress on the subject of interstate commerce: Penna. R.R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U.S. 477. Such a statute or rule of law had for its object the protection of people of the state in the enjoyment of their rights of property and to secure for them adequate redress for wrongs done within the state, and this is clearly within the authority of the state. Common carriers like other persons doing business within the territorial jurisdiction of the state are subject to its law. And in each of the states there are to be found statutes and judicial decisions defining the rights and duties of such carriers and declaring the means by which persons injured by their failure to perform their obligation may be compensated in damages. It was accordingly held in Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Solan, 169 U.S. 133, that a carrier exercising his calling within a particular state although engaged in the business of interstate commerce is answerable according to the laws of the state for acts of nonfeasance or misfeasance committed within its limits and that on failure to deliver goods at the time and place the right of action is given by the local law. That was a case in which a limited liability contract was set up by the railroad company in an action for personal injury received by the plaintiff while engaged in transporting cattle on the defendant's railroad; a statute of the state of Iowa declaring that no contract, receipt, rule or regulation shall exempt any corporation engaged in transporting persons or property by railway from the liability of a common carrier or carrier of passengers which would exist had no contract, receipt, rule or regulation been made or entered into. To the same effect are Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465; New York, N.H. & H.R.R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628; Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465; Hughes v. Penna. R.R. Co., 202 Pa. 222. The conclusion of these cases was reached in accordance with the doctrine that the regulation of the rights and duties of all persons under the jurisdiction of the state belongs in the first instance to the state because of its reserved power to provide for the safety of the persons and property within its territory and that this right is not taken away from it because of the exclusive right of congress to regulate interstate commerce except in cases where the attempted exercise of authority in a state is in conflict with an act of congress or is an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. In Martin v. R.R. Co., 203 U.S. 284, Mr. Justice WHITE after reviewing some of the federal cases bearing on the subject said, "The result of the previous rulings was to recognize in the absence of action by Congress the power of the states to legislate and of course this power involved the authority to regulate as the state might deem best for the public good without reference to whether the effect of the legislation might be to limit or broaden the responsibility of the carrier." These are not in themselves regulations of interstate commerce although they...
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Windolph v. Adams Express Co.
...contention in the case of Wright v. Adams Express Co., 43 Pa.Super. 40, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court in an opinion reported in 230 Pa. 635. They suggest, however, that that case is pending in the United States supreme court on writ of error, and they propound the question whether......