Wright v. Holland Furnace Company, Inc.

Decision Date03 June 1932
Docket Number28,816,28,848,28,849,28,850
Citation243 N.W. 387,186 Minn. 265
PartiesEDITH A. WRIGHT AND OTHERS v. HOLLAND FURNACE COMPANY, INC
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

Four actions in the district court for Ramsey county, consolidated for trial and heard together on appeal, to recover damages for property loss from fire alleged to be the result of defendant's negligent installation of a hot air furnace in a residence belonging to the plaintiff Edith A. Wright. The case was tried before McNally, J. and a jury. There was a verdict for the plaintiff in each case -- one for $472 in favor of Maurice Wright; one for $4,684.25 in favor of Francis L. Wright; one for $4,500 in favor of Edith A Wright; and one for $463.25 in favor of Paul Wright. From an order in each case denying its alternative motion for judgment or a new trial defendant appealed. Affirmed.

SYLLABUS

Negligence -- installation of smoke-pipe in furnace -- proximate cause of burning of dwelling.

1. In an action to recover damages for the burning of a dwelling evidence for plaintiffs made it a question of fact whether defendant's installation of the smoke-pipe leading from furnace to chimney was negligent, and, if so, whether the negligence was the proximate cause of the loss.

Negligence -- liability of manufacturer for loss to others than contracting party.

2. Three members of the family of the owner of the dwelling cannot be denied recovery for loss of personal property simply because they were not parties to the contract between the owner and defendant under which the latter installed the furnace.

Negligence -- contributory.

3. There was an issue of fact as to whether there had been contributory negligence, especially in view of evidence of an assurance of safety given by defendant.

Negligence -- installation of shield over smoke flue.

4. On the evidence for plaintiffs there was also a fact issue as to the negligence of defendant in the installation of a shield placed on the joists immediately over but close to the smoke flue.

Negligence -- instructions interpreting city ordinances.

5. There was no error in the construction put upon two ordinances (referred to in the opinion) by instructions to the jury.

Morphy, Bradford, Cummins & Cummins, for appellant.

Bundlie & Kelley and Ernest Torinus, for respondents.

OPINION

STONE, J.

Four actions, tried together, resulting in verdict for plaintiffs, each of whom seeks damages for loss of property destroyed in a fire alleged to have been caused by the negligent installation by defendant of a hot air furnace in a residence belonging to plaintiff Edith A. Wright. Defendant appeals from the order denying its alternative motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdicts or a new trial.

1. The dwelling belonged to plaintiff Edith A. Wright and was in a suburb of St. Paul. September 25, 1927, defendant contracted with Edith A. Wright to install a hot air furnace, reserving "the right to locate" heater, piping, and registers. The furnace was accordingly and soon installed by defendant. The negligence charged is that it placed the smoke-pipe too close to and just under the joists, unprotected except as hereinafter stated, of the cellar furnace room. There is evidence that for a distance of some feet the smoke flue was not more than six inches from the joists, which, because of their age and dried out condition, were easily inflammable. The fire started about seven p.m. January 6, 1929, during a 28-mile wind and a temperature well below zero. Realizing that the house was burning, witnesses rushed to the basement to investigate. They gave such testimony that the jury reasonably could have concluded that the fire originated on the lower edge of the joists just over the smoke-pipe at the point of the alleged negligent installation.

The charge of negligence is based on both the general duty to exercise care and alleged violation of two ordinances hereinafter considered. Without further details of evidence, except mention that there was explicit expert testimony that the installation indicated by the testimony for plaintiffs was negligent, we hold that on that issue the verdicts are sustained by the evidence. The building was old and of frame construction. Obvious and great could the jury have considered the fire hazard. Commensurate with the danger was defendant's duty to exercise care to minimize danger of igniting the near-by framework by ordinary operation of the furnace. The greater the danger the greater the duty. The evidence presented a fact issue, the jury's decision of which is sustained by evidence for plaintiffs. That applies not only to plaintiffs' claim that the smoke flue was too close to the joists, but also to the charge that the woodwork overhead was inadequately protected -- as to the latter, more later.

2. Plaintiff Francis L. Wright is the husband of the plaintiff Edith A. Wright. The other two plaintiffs are their sons. The husband and sons sue for the value of personal property destroyed by the fire. Defendant, assuming its negligence for the purposes of argument, urges that, having had no contractual relations with the plaintiffs other than Edith A. Wright, it is under no liability to the other three. That argument finds its remote ancestor in Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, but has been out of line with common law doctrine ever since Heaven v. Pender, 11 L.R. (Q.B.D.) 503. Contract obligation may sometimes be incidental to, but is not the basis of, liability in tort. It has long been the law that one who manufactures and sells an article not ordinarily of a dangerous nature, intended for use by others than the vendee, may be liable to one of the latter who uses it in the usual course of things and receives injuries due to defects which render use of the article dangerous. Krahn v. J.L. Owens Co. 125 Minn. 33, 145 N.W. 626, 51 L.R.A.(N.S.) 650. It is no enlargement of that doctrine, but only a plain application, to let it rule in favor of one whose property is destroyed by fire arising from the negligence of another. The presence of a contract between tortfeasor and third party is incidental only. Schubert v. J.R. Clark Co. 49 Minn. 331, 51 N.W. 1103, 15 L.R.A. 818, 32 A.S.R. 559; Holmvik v. Parsons B.C. & S.F. Co. 98 Minn. 424, 108 N.W. 810; Wolden v. Deering, 105 Minn. 259, 117 N.W. 493; O'Brien v. American Bridge Co. 110 Minn. 364, 125 N.W. 1012, 32 L.R.A.(N.S.) 980, 136 A.S.R. 503; Goar v. Village of Stephen, 157 Minn. 228, 196 N.W. 171.

3. Another defense is that of contributory negligence, urged especially against plaintiffs Edith and Francis Wright. To be here noted is testimony of plaintiff Francis L. Wright that when the furnace was being...

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