Wright v. Kansas Water Office

• Decision Date: 22 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 70196,70196
• Parties: , 9 IER Cases 1705 Lee WRIGHT, Appellee, v. KANSAS WATER OFFICE, Appellant.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 567

881 P.2d 567

255 Kan. 990, 9 IER Cases 1705

Lee WRIGHT, Appellee, v. KANSAS WATER OFFICE, Appellant.

No. 70196.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Sept. 22, 1994.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The Kansas Civil Service Act (KCSA), K.S.A. 75-2925 et seq., controls a classified employee's employment status. The KCSA affords the right of continued employment in the absence of a valid cause for termination. A classified civil service employee's relationship to the State is one of statutory status. Statutes and the regulations of the appropriate agency or agencies affect the relationship. The relationship is generally not contractual.

2. The terms and conditions of classified civil service employment, under the facts of this case, are not determined by a written contract.

3. K.S.A. 60-512(2), a three-year statute of limitations based "upon a liability created by a statute," is discussed and applied.

David D. Plinsky, Asst. Atty. Gen., argued the cause, and Robert T. Stephan, Atty. Gen., was with him on the brief, for appellant.

Wesley A. Weathers, Weathers & Riley, Topeka, argued the cause and was on the brief, for appellee.

SIX, Justice.

This is a novel civil service employment termination case. The primary questions are whether the plaintiff, a state classified employee whose position was declassified and terminated by the legislature, was employed by written contract and whether the plaintiff's wrongful termination claim is controlled by K.S.A. 60-511, a five-year statute of limitations. In resolving the statute of limitations issue, we consider the employment relationship of a classified civil service employee and the State.

Background--The Legislative Termination

The plaintiff, Lee Wright, began working in the Kansas Water Office (KWO) in 1959 and held a classified position as hydrologist in 1984. That year, the Kansas Legislature enacted S.B. 501 (K.S.A. 74-2614a), which declassified 17 KWO civil service employees and also directed their termination. Wright was among those terminated. Five years later, in Darling v. Kansas Water Office, 245 Kan. 45, 774 P.2d 941 (1989), we held that S.B. 501 was unconstitutional. Six of Wright's KWO co-workers were the Darling plaintiffs. Wright was the "other" person referred to in the Darling opinion. 245 Kan. at 47, 774 P.2d 941. He did not seek and obtain reappointment with the KWO as an unclassified employee, as 10 of his co-workers did. He did not join the six Darling plaintiffs in their pursuit of relief in the courts, which they eventually obtained. Wright did nothing about his termination for four years, until the district court in Darling held that S.B. 501 was unconstitutional. The stipulated facts indicate that Wright made a conscious decision not to join his co-workers, the Darling plaintiffs. The Darling plaintiffs, in addition to the administrative appeal filed with the Board, filed a separate action in the district court against the KWO and its director, testing the constitutionality of S.B. 501. The two actions were consolidated and reached us as Darling.

Wright first heard of the introduction of S.B. 501 through an announcement by the KWO Director at a staff conference in the early part of 1984. The Director advised Wright and other KWO employees not to speak with any legislators about the bill. Later, the Director called a staff meeting and informed the employees that it was beyond his authority to tell them not to talk to their legislators and that he really did not mean what he had said. Wright felt he could discuss the bill with legislators despite the Director's directions because "the stakes were very high." However, he elected not to do so. He did talk to a legislator at a social gathering and mentioned he felt S.B. 501 was a mistake.

Because of the humiliation he felt and his belief that he could not have worked amicably with the Director, Wright would not have accepted reinstatement at the KWO so long as the Director was there. This fact was not known until Wright's deposition in August 1990. Wright testified that since the Director has now left the KWO, he would accept reinstatement contingent upon: (1) the offered position having the same level of responsibility as the one from which he was terminated, (2) the offered position being one for which he is qualified, and (3) his supervisor agreeing to an amicable relationship.

Wright believed that he had no legal recourse to the declassification of his position or his termination because these actions were accomplished through legislation. He was aware of the Board's refusal to entertain the appeal of the Darling plaintiffs, even though their appeal was filed within 30 days of termination.

Following the district court in Darling's ruling that S.B. 501 was unconstitutional, Wright appealed his termination to the Civil Service Board (Board) under K.S.A. 75-2949(f). Appeals under K.S.A. 75-2949(f), however, must be filed within 30 days after the challenged termination. The Board dismissed Wright's appeal on jurisdictional grounds.

Wright then sought relief from the Board's dismissal by filing a "Petition for Judicial Review" in the district court under the Act for Judicial Review and Civil Enforcement of Agency Actions (KJRA), K.S.A. 77-601 et seq. Wright named the KWO as defendant. In his petition, Wright argued that the KWO was estopped from asserting his failure to file within 30 days as a defense because: (1) The State's own unconstitutional and bad faith conduct prevented him from filing within the 30-day period; (2) KWO's notice of termination failed to advise him of the right to an appeal to the Board within 30 days as was required by statute; and (3) the State terminated him in a manner that would have rendered an appeal to the Board within the initial 30-day period futile because the Board would have declined jurisdiction.

The District Court's Decision

The district court noted that the KWO arguments concerning the 30-day K.S.A. 75-2949(f) requirement are based on the presumption that Wright must exhaust administrative remedies before appealing. The district court concluded that exhaustion was not required in Wright's case, reasoning:

"The Kansas Civil Service Board admits to this limitation. [An administrative agency is not allowed to make final decisions on constitutionality of a statute.] In the related case brought by plaintiff's co-workers the Board dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction due to the fact plaintiffs were no longer classified employees and 'because the Board had no authority to determine the constitutionality of the legislation which had ordered their termination.' Darling v. Kansas Water Office, 245 Kan. 45, 53 (1989) (quoting the decision of the Shawnee Dist. Ct.). In the case currently before the court no administrative remedy was available to the plaintiff and therefore, he is not required to pursue an appeal before the Civil Service Board. Since plaintiff was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies the K.S.A. 75-2949(f) thirty (30) day time limit should not bar this action."

Acting sua sponte, the district court converted Wright's administrative law appeal under K.S.A. 77-607 to a Chapter 60 civil action for wrongful termination. The district court reasoned that Wright had no administrative remedy to pursue because his claim rested on the constitutionality of S.B. 501, upon which the Board could not pass. Thus, the case moved forward not as an administrative appeal but as a contract case, with the KWO defending Wright's legislative termination. The KWO filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Wright's claim of wrongful termination was barred by a statute of limitations or laches. The KWO asserted that Wright's claim arose out of an oral contract or, in the alternative, out of a liability created by statute.

The district court held that Wright had a binding written contract with the State. Consequently, although Wright's converted Chapter 60 civil action was filed 4 years and 122 days after termination, it was not time barred as the five-year statute of limitations, K.S.A. 60-511(1), controlled. The court awarded Wright damages for back pay, longevity pay, a health insurance differential, annual leave pay, costs for job search, and prejudgment interest. The district court also ordered reinstatement.

The KWO appeals. We exercise jurisdiction under K.S.A. 20-3018(c) (a transfer from the Court of Appeals on our own motion).

We reverse the district court. Wright did not have a binding written contract with the State. K.S.A. 60-511(1) does not apply. Wright's wrongful termination claim is controlled by a three-year statute, K.S.A. 60-512(2), as "[a]n action upon a liability created by a statute other than a penalty or forfeiture."

Discussion

The case was submitted to the trial court on an agreed stipulation of facts and documentary evidence. We have the same opportunity as the trial court to examine and to determine what the facts and documentary evidence establish. Therefore, a de novo standard of review applies. Hudgens v. CNA/Continental Cas. Co., 252 Kan. 478, Syl. p 1, 845 P.2d 694 (1993).

We choose to decide the case as it is presented to us on appeal from the district court. We focus on the concepts of civil service, classified employee, written contract, and limitation of actions. We hold that Wright did not have a written contract with the State, and consequently, his converted Chapter 60 civil action filed 4 years and 122 days after termination is time barred. Our disposition of the appeal by the application of K.S.A. 60-512(2), a three-year limitation statute, negates the obligation to address the numerous other contentions raised by the KWO, including the propriety of the district court's sua sponte conversion of Wright's administrative appeal under the KJRA to a Chapter 60 civil action.

Whether Wright was employed under a written contract is relevant to the consideration of the statute of limitations question....