Wright v. Moore
| Decision Date | 14 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:20-CV-473-DPJ-FKB |
| Parties | DORSYL WRIGHT PLAINTIFF v. SHERIFF JAMES R. MOORE, ET. AL DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
This case involves a property dispute between Plaintiff Dorsyl Wright and Defendant Kathy Davis that escalated and eventually involved law enforcement. Wright says four officers with the Kemper County Sheriff's Department including Sheriff James R. Moore, violated her constitutional rights and various state laws while helping Davis take possession of Wright's property. There are two pending motions: (1) Wright's motion to dismiss counterclaim [19] and (2) the individual officers' qualified-immunity-based motion for judgment on the pleadings [26]. For the following reasons, the Court finds that Wright's motion to dismiss is granted, and Moore and the deputies' motion for judgment on the pleadings is granted in part and denied in part.
In January 2015, Plaintiff Dorsyl Wright moved from Nebraska to her father's home in Preston, Mississippi, to be his caretaker. Compl. [1] ¶¶ 1, 16-17. Her presence at the residence has been disputed by family members and the current owner, Defendant Kathy Davis.
First on August 23, 2016, Wright's father revoked the power of attorney he had previously given Wright and gave it instead to Jean Anderson and two others. State Ct. Order [31-2] at 4.[1] Anderson then sought a permanent injunction in state court to keep Wright off the property. Id. at 10. The state court denied that remedy on June 18, 2019, but the court noted that it was “not of the opinion . . . that Wright has the legal right to stay at the home.” Id.
One month later, on July 11, 2019, Defendant Davis purchased the home through a foreclosure sale. Compl. [1] ¶¶ 20-21. That same day, Davis allegedly visited the property, told Wright she had purchased it in a short sale, and informed Wright “she could take her time” moving out. Id. ¶ 23. Then, on July 15, the property was conveyed to Davis through a substituted-trustee's deed. Id. ¶ 22.
On July 18, Davis allegedly mailed Wright a certified letter instructing Wright to “vacate the premises no later than July 20, 2019.” Id. ¶ 23-24. Davis also revisited the property that day and objected to Wright's efforts to sell the personal property Wright kept on premises. Id. ¶ 25. During this visit, Wright says Davis called Defendant Deputy Sheriff Daniel Haggard, to “apparently force [Wright] off the property, ” and together they entered the residence without Wright's consent so Davis could take photographs. Id. ¶ 25. Wright was not removed from the property. See id. ¶¶ 25-26. Wright believes this violated her Fourth Amendment rights.
On July 22, Wright says she received Davis's July 18 certified letter telling her to vacate by July 20. Wright did not, however, leave, and the next day (July 23) Davis returned to the property. This time, Defendant Deputy Sheriff Eric Scott accompanied Davis to allegedly assist with changing the locks and preventing Wright from entering the home. Id. ¶ 26. Wright claims that during this visit Scott handcuffed her, accused her of “trespassing on the property, ” and gave her 20 minutes to gather her belongings. Id.
Believing that Scott “wrongfully threatened, handcuffed[, ] and detained” her on July 23, 2019, Wright went to the Sheriff's Office on August 12, 2019, to file a complaint. Id. ¶ 27. Instead of allowing her to file a complaint, Wright says Defendants Sheriff James Moore and Defendant Deputy Sheriff Allen Griffin immediately handcuffed Wright and incarcerated her overnight. Id. Wright also says she has never fully recovered her personal property despite “numerous demands” to Davis seeking their return. Id. ¶ 29.
Aggrieved by these events, Wright brought both federal- and state-law claims against Davis, Moore, Haggard, Scott, and Griffin, as well as Defendants Kemper County, Mississippi, and the Kemper County Sherriff's Department. Davis responded by asserting counterclaims against Wright for punitive damages, lost wages, and court costs. Davis Ans. [11] at 1, 9 (styled “Answer and Countersuit”).
Wright now moves the Court to dismiss Davis's counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Pl.'s Mot. [19]. At the same time, Moore, Haggard, Griffin, and Scott seek an order dismissing the federal claims against them under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c). Those federal-law claims include claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violation of Wright's Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights and a conspiracy claim. Davis never responded to Wright's motion to dismiss counterclaims, but Defendants' motion is fully briefed.
“The standard for deciding a Rule 12(c) motion [for judgment on the pleadings] is the same as a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Guidry v. Am. Pub. Life Ins. Co., 512 F.3d 177, 180 (5th Cir. 2007). This standard requires the Court to “accept[] ‘all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'” Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dall. Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). To overcome either motion, a plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).
Defendants argue that the standard for a Rule 12(c) motion is heightened when qualified immunity has been raised. Defs.' Mem. [27] at 10-11. But “[§] 1983 claims implicating qualified immunity are subject to the same Rule 8 pleading standard set forth in Twombly and Iqbal as all other claims; an assertion of qualified immunity in a defendant's answer or motion to dismiss does not subject the complaint to a heightened pleading standard.” Arnold v. Williams, 979 F.3d 262, 267 (5th Cir. 2020) (citing Anderson v. Valdez, 845 F.3d 580, 590 (5th Cir. 2016)).
Since the Rule 12 standard is not heightened for § 1983 claims, under both Rule 12(b)(6) and 12(c), “[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations and footnote omitted). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). It follows that “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged--but it has not ‘show[n]'--‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.'” Id. at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). “This standard ‘simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of' the necessary claims or elements.” In re S. Scrap Material Co., LLC, 541 F.3d 584, 587 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
Wright withdrew Counts 3 and 8. Pl.'s Resp. [30] at 14. She also clarified Count 9, which advanced a failure-to-train claim against Sherriff Moore and Kemper County under Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). Defendants asserted that Moore could not be held individually liable under Monell, and Wright confirmed in her response that the claim applied to Kemper County, not Moore individually. Pl.'s Resp. [30] at 15. The claim will therefore be limited to Kemper County, and Defendants' motion is granted to the extent it seeks dismissal for Moore in his individual capacity.[2]
Counts 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 seek damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. That statute provides a claim against any “person” who, “under color of” state law, deprives another of his or her constitutional rights. 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to Wright, Defendants violated her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights.
Defendants say Wright fails to state any constitutional violations against them, and, even if she could, Defendants are otherwise entitled to qualified immunity. A qualified-immunity defense protects government officials from individual liability “as long as their actions could reasonably have been thought consistent with the rights they are alleged to have violated.” Good v. Curtis, 601 F.3d 393, 400 (5th Cir. 2010) (quoting Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 638 (1987)).
When a defendant asserts qualified immunity, “the burden is on the plaintiff to demonstrate the inapplicability of the defense.” McClendon v. City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 323 (5th Cir. 2002). To do so, a plaintiff must show: “(1) the official violated a statutory or constitutional right and (2) the right was clearly established at the time of the challenged conduct.” Khan v. Normand, 683 F.3d 192, 194 (5th Cir. 2012) (citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 735 (2011)).
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