Wright v. Ohio Bur. of Motor Vehicles

• Decision Date: 19 July 1994
• Docket Number: No. 94-CV-11449,94-CV-11449
• Parties: WRIGHT v. OHIO BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Common Pleas

Page 29

67 Ohio Misc.2d 29

644 N.E.2d 743

WRIGHT v. OHIO BUREAU OF MOTOR VEHICLES. ^*

No. 94-CV-11449.

Hamilton County Municipal Court, Ohio.

Decided July 19, 1994 and Nov. 7, 1994.

John H. Flessa, Cincinnati, for plaintiff.

Lee Fisher, Atty. Gen., and Jeffrey R. Goldsmith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for defendant.

MARK P. PAINTER, Judge.

This opinion is in two parts. Part I holds that a municipal court has jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action involving the constitutionality of R.C. 4507.169. Part II holds that (1) R.C. 4507.169 is constitutional when read in pari materia with R.C. 4507.60, and (2) the proper court for a petition for occupational driving privileges under a suspension imposed under R.C. 4507.169 is the municipal or county court where the petitioner resides.

Part I, Issued July 19, 1994

This case is before this court on the state's motion to dismiss. Plaintiff, Steven Wright, a Hamilton County resident, received notice from the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles ("BMV") that his driving privileges were suspended for a period of six months, under R.C. 4507.169, because of a conviction in the state of Indiana for driving under the influence of alcohol. Plaintiff appealed the suspension to the BMV and requested an administrative hearing. An administrative hearing was held, which confirmed plaintiff's suspension. Plaintiff then brought this action seeking to have R.C. 4507.169 declared unconstitutional, alleging that it violates the due process, equal protection, and double jeopardy provisions of the United States Constitution.

The state has moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that this court lacks jurisdiction to determine this matter. The state's argument is twofold: (1) plaintiff's action is actually an appeal of the administrative agency's denial of plaintiff's administrative appeal and, as such, is governed by R.C. 119.12, which states that an appeal of an administrative agency's decision must be filed in the court of common pleas; and (2) even if plaintiff's complaint is construed as a suit for declaratory judgment, this court does not have jurisdiction to hear it, since plaintiff's misdemeanor offense occurred outside the court's territorial limits.

First, this court must determine whether plaintiff's action is an appeal of an administrative agency's decision. If so, then pursuant to R.C. 119.12, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear it, and the case should be transferred to the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas. However, if plaintiff's action is not an appeal, then this court has jurisdiction over this case unless this court's jurisdiction fails on other grounds.

Plaintiff's only claim is that R.C. 4507.169 is unconstitutional. When a party's sole claim is that a statute is unconstitutional, the claim may be heard in a declaratory judgment action outside of the administrative proceeding, since an administrative agency cannot determine the constitutional validity of a statute. See Fairview Gen. Hosp. v. Fletcher (1992), 63 Ohio St.3d 146, 586 N.E.2d 80. See, also, Staffilino Chevrolet, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp. (1993), 86 Ohio App.3d 247, 250, 620 N.E.2d 256, 258. Since plaintiff is seeking a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality of R.C. 4507.169, plaintiff's action is not an appeal of the license suspension that is governed by R.C. 119.12, but rather an original action properly brought before a court.

The state also argues that, even if plaintiff's suit is not an appeal of an administrative decision, this court lacks jurisdiction over plaintiff's suit for declaratory judgment. It is well settled that a municipal court is a court of record with the power to grant declaratory relief provided it has subject-matter jurisdiction over the underlying action. R.C. 2721.02; State ex rel. Foreman v. Bellefontaine Mun. Court (1967), 12 Ohio St.2d 26, 41 O.O.2d 159, 231 N.E.2d 70. The state further argues that this court does not have jurisdiction over this action on the grounds that a municipal court's jurisdiction over misdemeanors is granted by R.C. 1901.20, which limits a municipal court's jurisdiction to a "violation of any ordinance of any municipal corporation within its territory and of any misdemeanors committed within the limits of its territory." (Emphasis added.)

The state correctly asserts that plaintiff's misdemeanor resulting in the driving suspension occurred in Indiana, well outside the territorial limits of this court's jurisdiction. Unfortunately, the state is attempting to apply the standard for subject-matter jurisdiction of misdemeanors to a civil case. Plaintiff's underlying misdemeanor conviction in Indiana is not the subject matter of plaintiff's civil suit, but rather the alleged unconstitutional suspension of plaintiff's driving privileges in Ohio. Plaintiff's suit is undoubtedly civil in nature and, as such, must meet only the standard for subject-matter jurisdiction of civil matters.

"A municipal court has subject-matter jurisdiction of an action when three jurisdictional requirements are met: (1) Monetary jurisdiction--in an action for money damages the amount claimed must not exceed ten thousand dollars (R.C. 1901.17); (2) Categorical jurisdiction--the action must fall within one of the categories of actions which the court is authorized to hear and determine (R.C. 1901.18); and (3) Territorial jurisdiction--the action must have at least one of the three well-defined contacts with the territorial limits of the municipal court (R.C. 1901.02; 1901.19[D] )." Melamed v. Catalano (M.C.1981), 20 O.O.3d 428, 435.

Plaintiff's action meets all three jurisdictional requirements of this court. The monetary jurisdictional requirement is obviously met, since plaintiff does not demand any monetary damages.

Categorical jurisdiction is also met. In Urbana ex rel. Newlin v. Downing (1989), 43 Ohio St.3d 109, 539 N.E.2d 140, certiorari denied (1989), 493 U.S. 934, 110 S.Ct. 325, 107 L.Ed.2d 315, plaintiff brought a declaratory judgment action in municipal court to have five adult magazines declared obscene under an Urbana obscenity ordinance. On appeal, defendants contested the municipal court's categorical jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief. The Ohio Supreme Court held that the Urbana Municipal Court had categorical jurisdiction over declaratory judgment actions. In its reasoning, the court stated: "R.C. 1901.18 sets forth the subject-matter jurisdiction of the municipal courts. It provides in pertinent part: '(A) Subject to the monetary jurisdiction of municipal courts as set forth in section 1901.17 of the Revised Code, a municipal court has original jurisdiction within its territory * * * (1) In any civil action, of whatever nature or remedy, of which judges of county courts have jurisdiction * * *.' " (Emphasis sic.) Urbana, 43 Ohio St.3d at 110, 539 N.E.2d at 141.

County courts are courts with limited jurisdiction that is set forth in R.C. Chapter 1907. However, like municipal courts, county courts are courts of record for all purposes of law. R.C. 1907.01. And according to the Declaratory Judgment Act, courts of record may declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. Since a county court has the authority to grant declaratory relief, then this court has categorical jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief, if the monetary and territorial elements of jurisdiction are met.

Finally, territorial jurisdiction can be met in one of the following three ways, any one of which is sufficient: "(1) The subject matter of the action or proceeding is located within the territorial limits of the municipal court; (2) the defendant or some one of the defendants resides within the territorial limits of the municipal court; or (3) the defendant or some one of the defendants is validly served with a valid summons within the territorial limits of the municipal court." Melamed v. Catalano, supra, 20 O.O.3d 428, 435.

In this case, territorial jurisdiction has been met. Plaintiff's ability to drive legally upon the highways and streets of Ohio, which is the subject matter of this proceeding, is arguably located within the jurisdiction of this court. That is, plaintiff seeks driving privileges to drive to and from work within the jurisdiction. Granting of driving privileges is the daily work of the municipal courts, not the courts of common pleas. In addition, municipal courts hear appeals from Bureau of Motor Vehicle administrative license suspensions. R.C. 4511.191; R.C. 4507.21(K). Also, plaintiff served a copy of the complaint on the Bureau of Motor Vehicles at the bureau's Cincinnati office, which falls within the territorial limits of this court.

This court has monetary, categorical, and territorial jurisdiction over this action. Since all three jurisdictional elements are met, this court has subject- jurisdiction. ¹ Therefore, pursuant to Foreman, supra, this court has the authority to issue a declaratory judgment, if appropriate. The state's motion to dismiss is overruled. ²

Motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction overruled.

Part II, Issued November 7, 1994

The second part of the decision has been deferred in order to have the benefit of memoranda from both parties. In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that R.C. 4507.169 violates the equal protection, due process, and double jeopardy provisions of the United States Constitution. However, plaintiff has since abandoned the due process and double jeopardy arguments and simply alleges that R.C. 4507.169 violates the Equal Protection Clause.

A. Mootness Issue

Also, plaintiff's six-month driving suspension imposed by the Ohio Bureau of Motor Vehicles automatically terminated on August 7, 1994. Because of this, the state has filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on mootness grounds. The state is correct in that no actual controversy exists between the parties since the plaintiff's suspension is over and that plaintiff's...