Wright v. State

• Decision Date: 21 September 2004
• Docket Number: No. C044302.,C044302.
• Citation: 122 Cal.App.4th 659,19 Cal.Rptr.3d 92
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Justin WRIGHT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of California et al., Defendants and Respondents.

19 Cal.Rptr.3d 92

122 Cal.App.4th 659

Justin WRIGHT, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. STATE of California et al., Defendants and Respondents.

No. C044302.

Court of Appeal, Third District.

September 21, 2004.

William E. Gilg for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, Darryl L. Doke, Thomas D. McCrackin and Kevin W. Reager, Deputy Attorneys General, for Defendants and Respondents.

NICHOLSON, Acting P.J.

Plaintiff Justin Wright appeals from a judgment of dismissal in favor of the State of California, the Department of Corrections and certain administrative and medical personnel in that department (collectively, the State). The trial court granted the State's demurrer to Wright's complaint alleging medical malpractice and failure to furnish medical care. We affirm the judgment.

We conclude, as did the trial court, that Wright cannot maintain this action because he failed to exhaust his available administrative remedies. Wright concedes that he has not completed the administrative process provided by the Department of Corrections (Department). Although money damages are unavailable in the administrative process, Wright must exhaust his administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. Even where money damages are unavailable, the exhaustion requirement furthers important interests: prison autonomy, mitigating damages, application of Department expertise, and order in the court system. We also conclude the State is immune from suit for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence.

FACTS

Wright is a state prison inmate. Beginning August 22, 2001, he alleges, the State improperly denied him timely medical care to repair two detached retinas, resulting in extensive loss of vision. Specifically, from August 22, 2001, to September 3, 2001, the State failed to provide him with any medical attention. In addition, after a doctor examined him on September 4, 2001, the State denied him timely surgery to repair the two detached retinas, despite the recommendations of three doctors. Finally, after his surgery on October 31, 2001, the State failed to provide the medications prescribed for his recovery.

Wright alleges six counts: four based on state law, and two on federal law. Under state law, he alleges medical malpractice (count one), failure to furnish medical care (count two), intentional infliction of emotional distress (count three), and negligence (count four) (collectively, the state counts). Under federal law, he alleges deliberate indifference to serious medical needs (count five), and cruel and unusual punishment (count six) (collectively, the federal counts).

In his complaint, Wright alleges that on March 31, 2002, he filed a government tort claim with the State Board of Control, which the board rejected on May 10, 2002.

Wright also alleges that he has exhausted his administrative remedies. Although Wright asserts the State denied him medical care beginning on August 22, 2001, he did not start the administrative process until March 24, 2002. He still had not received his final administrative decision (third-level review) by the time he filed his first amended complaint on December 13, 2002, the operative pleading here. The Department, by regulation, normally has 60 working days to complete the third-level review. (Cal.Code Regs., tit. 15, § 3084.6, subd. (b)(4).)¹ According to Wright, the "time limit is way past since [he] began his appeal process on March 24, 2002. As a result [he] has substantially complied with the administrative exhaustion requirement of Title 42 of the United States Code, section 1997e" (italics added) and has "exhausted his administrative remedies."

The State demurred to Wright's entire complaint, asserting his failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and asked the trial court to dismiss the complaint without prejudice. The State and the Department demurred to Wright's third and fourth counts (intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence), claiming public entity immunity for those counts and asking the trial court to dismiss those counts with prejudice. The trial court granted the demurrers, and Wright appeals.

DISCUSSION

Because we are reviewing a demurrer sustained without leave to amend, we treat the complaint's properly pled material facts as true. (Zelig v. County of Los Angeles (2002) 27 Cal.4th 1112, 1126, 119 Cal.Rptr.2d 709, 45 P.3d 1171.)

I Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

A. Wright Must Exhaust His Administrative Remedies

Wright contends that he need only substantially comply with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies. The contention is without merit. Under both state and federal law, a prisoner must exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. By 1941, as a rule of general application, state courts required litigants to exhaust their administrative remedies. (E.g., Abelleira v. District Court of Appeal (1941) 17 Cal.2d 280, 291-296, 109 P.2d 942; McHugh v. County of Santa Cruz (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 533, 538-539, 109 Cal.Rptr. 149.) The exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional: a court cannot hear a case before a litigant exhausts administrative remedies. (Abelleira, supra, 17 Cal.2d at pp. 291-293, 109 P.2d 942; McHugh, supra, 33 Cal.App.3d at p. 539, 109 Cal.Rptr. 149.)

Beginning in the 1960's, prisoners, often through advocacy groups, began using state and federal courts, including California courts, to reform jail and prison conditions. (Feeley & Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons (2000) pp. 34-50 (Judicial Policy Making); Judicial Intervention in Corrections: The California Experience — An Empirical Study (1973) 20 UCLA L.Rev. 452, 455 [no author named].) In many states, including California, courts virtually took over the day-to-day operation of jails and prisons. (See, e.g., Judicial Policy Making, supra, at pp. 111-128 [detailing Santa Clara County's jail litigation].)

Prisoner filings increased in the ensuing decades. In 1980, prisoners filed 23,230 petitions in federal courts. (Sullivan, Prisoners Seeking Monetary Relief for Civil Rights Claims: Must They Exhaust Administrative Remedies Under § 1997e before Filing a Claim in Federal Court? (2002) 8 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol'y 419, 421, fn. 14.) By 1996, that number tripled to 68,235 petitions. (Ibid.) According to a 1994 report, inmate suits accounted for 55 percent of all suits filed against the State of California. (Mueller, Inmates' Civil Rights Cases and the Federal Courts: Insights Derived From a Field Research Project in the Eastern District of California (1995) 28 Creighton L.Rev. 1255, 1278, fn. 91 (Inmates' Civil Rights Cases).)

In the 1970's, California's state courts specifically applied the general exhaustion requirement to prisoner suits, requiring prisoners to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief. For example, courts applied the general rule that "a litigant will not be afforded relief in the courts unless and until he has exhausted available administrative remedies" to prisoners seeking access to their inmate records. (In re Muszalski (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 500, 503, 125 Cal.Rptr. 286 (Muszalski); accord In re Thompson (1975) 52 Cal.App.3d 780, 783, 125 Cal.Rptr. 261 (Thompson).) Moreover, the California Supreme Court held that "[t]he requirement that administrative remedies be exhausted `applies to grievances lodged by prisoners.'" [Citations.] (In re Dexter (1979) 25 Cal.3d 921, 925, 160 Cal.Rptr. 118, 603 P.2d 35.)

Under state law, "`exhaustion of the administrative remedy is a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the courts.'" (Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 85, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373 (Rojo); accord Karlin v. Zalta (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 953, 979, 201 Cal.Rptr. 379 (Karlin).) "As Witkin explains: `The administrative tribunal is created by law to adjudicate the issue sought to be presented to the court. The claim or "cause of action" is within the special jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal, and the courts may act only to review the final administrative determination. If a court allowed a suit to be maintained prior to such final determination, it would be interfering with the subject matter jurisdiction of another tribunal.'" (Rojo, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 85, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373, italics in original, quoting 3 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (3d ed. 1985) Actions, § 234, p. 265.)

Paralleling the exhaustion requirement under state law, the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) provides that "[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under [42 U.S.C.A.] section 1983 ... or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted." (42 U.S.C.A. § 1997e(a) [amended in 1996 by the PLRA].) Congress passed the PLRA to curtail frivolous prisoner lawsuits. (Porter v. Nussle (2002) 534 U.S. 516, 522 [122 S.Ct. 983, 987, 152 L.Ed.2d 12, 20] (Porter).) Before enactment of the PLRA in 1996, lawsuits by prisoners were a significant percentage of the civil docket of the federal courts. (Inmates' Civil Rights Cases, supra, 28 Creighton L.Rev. at p. 1307.) In 1995 alone, prisoners filed nearly 40,000 new suits, amounting to 19 percent of the federal civil docket. (Schlanger, Inmate Litigation (2003) 116 Harv. L.Rev. 1555, 1558.) Federal courts in this state were no exception. In 1995, "inmates' civil rights actions constitute[d] nearly 30% of the case filings" in the Eastern District of California. (Inmates' Civil Rights Cases, supra, 28 Creighton L.Rev. at p. 1259.)

The exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement furthers several important societal and governmental interests. These include bolstering administrative autonomy, mitigating damages, giving agencies opportunity to make factual findings, encouraging settlement, filtering out frivolous claims,...