Wright v. Woodard

Decision Date24 January 1974
Docket NumberNo. 42549,42549
Citation83 Wn.2d 378,518 P.2d 718
PartiesC. R. WRIGHT et al., Respondents, v. J. Wesley WOODARD, Assessor of San Juan County, and Fred R. Barnes, Treasurerof San Juan County, Appellants.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Warren W. Russell, San Juan County Pros. Atty., Friday Harbor, for appellants.

Charles C. Schmidt, Friday Harbor, for respondents.

ROSELLINI, Associate Justice.

In this action brought by certain owners of real property in San Juan County, the superior court issued a writ prohibiting the treasurer of the county from collecting any taxes upon any unimproved parcels of real estate until the assessor carried out the court's mandate ordering him to classify as forest lands, under RCW 84.33, lands within the county upon which there was timber growing.

The defendants, who are the county assessor and treasurer, have appealed and contend that the court erred in mandating a discretionary act, in refusing to dismiss the action on the ground that the petitioners had failed to exhaust their administrative remedy, and in issuing an order which amounted to an injunction restraining the collection of a tax, contrary to the provisions of RCW 84.68.010. 1

We find it necessary to discuss only one of the appellants' contentions, namely, that the court erred in taking jurisdiction of the case, because the petitioners had failed to pursue the available administrative remedy.

The act in question was passed in 1971 and provided a new method of taxing timber lands and timber. Where theretofore standing timber had been taxed as real property, under the act an excise tax was imposed on the timber when cut and the land was taxed separately as 'forest lands.'

The purpose of the act is set forth in RCW 84.33.010(1), which reads:

(1) The public welfare requires that this state's system for taxation of timber and forest lands be modernized to assure the citizens of this state and its future generations the advantages to be derived from the continuous production of timber and forest products from the significant area of privately owned forests in this state. It is this state's policy to encourage forestry and restocking and reforesting of such forests so that present and future generations will enjoy the benefits which forest areas provide in enhancing water supply, in minimizing soil erosion, storm and flood damage to persons or property, in providing a habitat for wild game, in providing scenic and recreational spaces, in maintaining land areas whose forests contribute to the natural ecological equilibrium, and in providing employment and profits to its citizens and raw materials for products needed by everyone.

The act then refers to the difficulty of valuing and assessing timber lands, the fact that the existing tax system was unsatisfactory, and the need to modify the ad valorem system of taxation.

Under the statute, forest land, as defined therein, may be either classified (RCW 84.33.020) or designated (RCW 84.33.130). When the land has no higher or better use than as forest land and is being primarily used for the growing of timber, it is to be classified and valued at the timber land values established by the Department of Revenue (RCW 84.33.110, 84.33.120(1) and (2)). When lands being used for timber production have a higher and better use on the assessment date, they must be valued and assessed accordingly, unless the owner requests and is granted designation under RCW 84.33.130. If he succeeds in having his land designated as 'forest lands,' that use must be maintained or he will be required to pay a compensating tax under RCW 84.33.140. If lands are classified as forest lands by the assessor, under RCW 84.33.120(2), no compensating tax is imposed if they are converted to another use.

The statute expressly provides (RCW 84.33.130(4)) for appeals from the assessor's refusal to designate land as forest land.

The superior court in this case found that while forest lands as defined in the statute exist in San Juan County, the assessor had not acted to classify and of the land as such. The assessor maintained in that court and maintains here that he was justified in concluding that there were no lands in San Juan County which did not have a higher and better use than that of timber growing. We need not consider the merits of this contention, inasmuch as we find that the court should not have entertained the case.

It is the general rule that when an adequate administrative remedy is provided, it must be exhausted before the courts will intervene. State ex rel. Ass'n of Wash. Indus. v. Johnson, 56 Wash.2d 407, 353 P.2d 881 (1960); Sunny Brook Farms v. Omdahl, 42 Wash.2d 788, 259 P.2d 383 (1953). The appellants maintain that the designation procedure provided in RCW 84.33.130 provides an adequate remedy for a land owner who feels that his land should be taxed as forest lands.

However, as the respondents point out, the remedy under this section is less than a completely satisfying one, inasmuch as land designated as forest lands is always subject to a compensating tax if it...

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    ...pass on the matter, See, e.g., Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 58 S.Ct. 459, 82 L.Ed. 638 (1938); Wright v. Woodard, 83 Wash.2d 378, 518 P.2d 718 (1974). Although the judiciary possesses authority to check the arbitrary or unconstitutional exercise of power by legislativ......
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    ...rule that when an adequate administrative remedy is provided, it must be pursued before the courts will intervene. Wright v. Woodard, 83 Wash.2d 378, 381, 518 P.2d 718 (1974). If the administrative mechanisms available can alleviate the harmful consequences of the governmental activity at i......
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