Wright v. Worth

• Decision Date: 10 February 1922
• Citation: 83 Fla. 204,91 So. 87
• Parties: WRIGHT v. WORTH, Municipal Judge.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

91 So. 87

83 Fla. 204

WRIGHT v. WORTH, Municipal Judge.

Florida Supreme Court

February 10, 1922

Error to Circuit Court, Hillsborough County; F. M. Robles, Judge.

Petition by Mamie Wright against C. Edmund Worth, as Municipal Judge in which a rule of prohibition was issued to prevent the enforcement of an ordinance relating to the unlawful custody of intoxicating liquors and sale thereof in the city of Tampa, and providing a penalty therefor. Demurrer to the petition sustained, and, petitioner declining to plead further, or amend, the petition was dismissed, and petitioner brings error.

Affirmed.

Brown C.J., dissenting.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

Legislature may by special laws regulate practice in municipal courts. The Constitution contains no express limitations upon the power of the Legislature to prescribe the procedure for municipal courts. Under section 20, art. 3, special laws may be enacted 'regulating the practice' of municipal courts.

Indictments for offenses are not required or permitted in municipal courts. Indictments for offenses against municipal ordinances are not required or permitted in municipal courts.

Due process requires that person charged with violating municipal ordinance be duly advised of the nature and cause of accusation, and have opportunity to defend. Due process of law requires that a person charged with an 'offense' against a municipal ordinance shall be duly advised of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, and have reasonable opportunity to conserve his defense, whether by securing witnesses or otherwise, and have it presented to and considered by the court before rendering judgment in the cause.

Statute dispensing with verified complaint to give municipal court jurisdiction and making docket entry sufficient notice to accused, does not deny due process. A statutory provision that a sworn or verified complaint shall not be necessary to give the municipal court jurisdiction of offenses triable in that court, but the docket entry shall be sufficient to put the accused upon notice of the offense with which he is charged, does not deny due process of law.

Docket entry naming accused as charged with possession in violation of ordinance held to comply with statute and afford due process. A docket entry in the municipal court of Tampa that contains the name of the accused, with a statement of the offense charged, as 'having liquor in her possession in violation of section 18a,' is sufficient as a compliance with the statute as to the charge and to afford due process of law, at least in the absence of some showing that advantage was taken of the accused in making and prosecuting the charge.

Regulations and reasonable prohibitions against possession are appropriate. Any laws that are valid and appropriate to enforce the organic prohibitions are within the power of the state; and regulations and reasonable prohibitions of the possession of intoxicating liquors are appropriate as a means to enforce the paramount organic prohibitions.

State may authorize municipalities to enforce prohibitions by ordinances. The state may authorize its municipalities to enforce prohibitions by ordinances that are consistent with state and federal law.

Ordinances adopting federal law which does not conflict with state law do not violate charter powers. As the federal law is the law of the land, and as it does not in essence conflict with state law, ordinances adopting the federal law by reference do not violate charter powers which authorize ordinances that are consistent with state and federal law.

Petition may be dismissed where writ of error available. A writ of prohibition to prevent the enforcement of a city ordinance may be dismissed where a writ of error would be available to the petitioner if conviction resulted.

COUNSEL

R. E. L. Chancey, of Tampa, for plaintiff in error.

Hilton S. Hampton, of Tampa, for defendant in error.

OPINION

WHITFIELD J.

A petition was filed in the circuit court of Hillsborough county, in which it is alleged:

'That Mamie Wright was arrested by police officers of the city of Tampa, 'and that, following her arrest on said date, the following charge, in substance, was made and entered against her on the police docket of the municipal court of said city of Tampa, to wit, No. 47018, name and complaint, Mamie Wright, having liquor in her possession in violation of section 18a, which said charge is unsupported by oath or affirmation, and does not put this petitioner on notice of crime or offense of which she is charged in said municipal court. That the ordinance of said city of Tampa designated as section 18a is in substance as follows:

'Ordinance No. 18a.

"An ordinance prohibiting the unlawful custody of intoxicating liquors, or the sale thereof, within the city of Tampa, and providing penalty therefor.

"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, firm or corporation to have or keep in possession any intoxicating liquors, the possession of which is made unlawful by the act of Congress of the United States, or to offer the same for sale within the limits of the city of Tampa.

"Section 2. Whoever violates section 1 of this ordinance shall be punished by a fine of not more than five hundred dollars or by imprisonment in the city jail not more than sixty days, or by both such find and imprisonment in the discretion of the court.'

'That under said ordinance nothing is made criminal or an offense, for the reason that the things undertaken by said ordinance to prohibit or forbid are dependent not upon the terms or provisions of said ordinance, but upon the terms of some act or acts of the Congress of the United States which have never been adopted or enacted by the city of Tampa. That since the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and the passage of the existing acts of Congress pursuant thereto, the several states in the union now have concurrent jurisdiction to legislate only on the making, selling, and transportation of intoxicating liquors. That the federal government alone has the power to make the possession of intoxicating liquors a criminal offense; that the concurrent power or jurisdiction given to the several states to enforce the provisions of the Eighteenth Amendment is limited so that the same can apply only to the making, selling, and transportation of intoxicating liquors and the federal government, and the several states have the sole and exclusive power to enforce the provisions of the Eighteenth Amendment, and the several states are wholly without power to delegate to a municipal corporation power or jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of the Eighteenth Amendment or to legislate thereon. That the city of Tampa has no power to adopt or enforce Ordinance No. 18a. That said ordinance abridges the privileges and immunities of Mamie Wright, this petitioner, she being a citizen of the United States of America, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. That for the reasons above shown your petitioner filed a motion to quash the charge docketed against her in said municipal court whereof C. Edmund Worth is judge, and that the judge of said court denied said motion and retained jurisdiction in said municipal court to hear, try, and determine said charge, and is now holding your petitioner under bond to appear in said court on the 19th day of August, 1921, to answer said charge; but your petitioner charges that the municipal court of the city of Tampa was and is without jurisdiction to enforce said Ordinance No. 18a, and that the attempt so to do as herein charged is a usurpation of authority by said municipal court, and the said judge thereof, and that your petitioner will be tried in said court on the said 19th day of August, 1921, notwithstanding said court has no jurisdiction so to do, unless prohibited from so doing.

'Wherefore, your petitioner prays that a rule may be awarded against the said C Edmund Worth, as municipal judge of the city of Tampa, Fla., a municipal corporation, and the said judge be ordered to show cause, if any he has, why the writ of prohibition shall not be awarded to petitioner prohibiting said C. Edmund Worth, as municipal judge of the city of Tampa, from proceeding further in said suit or prosecution against your petitioner in said municipal court, or from tkaing any further action therein as being without warrant of authority or law so to do.'

A rule in prohibition was issued. Section 3586, Rev. Gen. Stats. 1920.

To the petition a demurrer was filed stating the following grounds:

'(1) Said petition sets forth no cause of action.

'(2) Said petition sets forth no reason why this respondent should be prohibited from proceeding.

'(3) Said petition shows on its face that the ordinance therein set forth is a valid exercise of police power.'

The court sustained the demurrer, and, the petitioner declining to plead further or amend, the petition was dismissed. Writ of error was taken by the petitioner.

The petition for prohibition could have been dismissed below because a writ of error was available to the petitioner if conviction had resulted. State ex rel. Rheinauer v. Malone, 40 Fla. 129, 23 So. 575; State ex rel. v. Hocker, 33 Fla. 283, 14 So. 586.

It is contended:

'That the mere docket entry of the charge in the police court against plaintiff in error was insufficient to give the police judge power or jurisdiction to entertain or try said charge notwithstanding chapter 7716, Special Acts of 1917;' that chapter 7716 is in conflict with section 11 of the Declaration of Rights; and that, if the statute is valid, the docket entry does not comply with the statute.

The...