State Ex Rel. Sbordy v. Rowlett

• Decision Date: 15 January 1936
• Citation: 125 Fla. 562,170 So. 311
• Parties: STATE ex rel. SBORDY v. ROWLETT et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

170 So. 311

125 Fla. 562

STATE ex rel. SBORDY v. ROWLETT et al.

Florida Supreme Court

January 15, 1936

Rehearing Denied Nov. 12, 1936.

En Banc.

Prohibition by the State, on the relation of Henry V. Sbordy, against William M. Rowlett and others, as and constituting the State Board of Medical Examiners.

Writ awarded.

BROWN J., dissenting in part.

COUNSEL E. R. Jones, of De Leon Springs, for relator.

John W Prunty, of Miami, and Erle B. Askew and Osmond R. Bie, both of St. Petersburg, for respondents.

OPINION

GRAY Circuit Judge.

Written charges, under oath, were filed with the respondent board against relator, seeking the revocation of the license of relator to practice medicine in the state of Florida, which charges appear to be as follows:

'1. That Enrico V. Sbordi, also known as Enrico V. Sbordy, also known as Henry V. Sbordy of the County of Pinellas and State of Florida, in the State aforesaid, was guilty of fraud in the practice of medicine, or fraud or deceit in his admission to the practice of medicine, in that the said Enrico V. Sbordi above referred to appears to hold Certificate No. 8 of the Board of Eclectic Medical Examiners, dated April 6, 1915, which said certificate is fraudulent and improper which fact is and has been well known to the said Enrico Sbordy, and which said fraudulent and improper certificate has been relied upon and is now being relied upon by the said Enrico V. Sbordi as authority to practice medicine in the State of Florida.

'2. That Enrico V. Sbordi, also known as Enrico V. Sbordy, also known as Henry V. Sbordy, of the County of Pinellas and State of Florida, in the State aforesaid was guilty of fraud in the practice of medicine, or fraud or deceit in his admission to the practice of medicine, in that the said Enrico V. Sbordi, above referred to has never been and is not now a graduate of a legally incorporated medical college maintaining a standard satisfactory to the State Board of Medical Examiners of Florida, and the said Enrico V. Sbordi has represented on numerous occasions while engaged in the practice of medicine in the aforesaid state that he was a graduate, and the said Enrico V. Sbordi does now represent while engaging in the practice of medicine in the aforesaid State that he is such a graduate.'

Said charges were filed with the secretary and treasurer of said board and the board issued its summons, a copy of which was duly served upon relator more than ten days before the day fixed for a hearing of said charge, as required by chapter 8415, Laws of Florida 1921, as amended by chapter 12285, Laws of Florida 1927 (section 3404 et seq., Compiled General Laws of Florida 1927). Prior to the date upon which such charges were to be heard, the relator applied to and obtained from this court a rule nisi in prohibition, commanding said board to show cause to this court why it should not be prohibited from further proceeding with said cause. The respondents, individually and as constituting said board, have demurred to the relator's suggestion for a writ of prohibition and have moved to dismiss the said rule and have filed their return thereto, admitting that the written charges filed with the board are as herein-above set forth. The relator has filed herein his motion to strike the said demurrer and motion to dismiss, and has also filed herein a motion for further return which the court has considered as a motion to quash the return of the respondents.

The first question raised is whether or not the remedy by prohibition is proper. See section 3404 et seq., Compiled General Laws of 1927, chapter 8415, Laws 1921, as amended by chapter 12285, Laws Florida 1927; and in State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman et al., State Board of Dental Examiners, 116 Fla. 196, 150 So. 136, 156 So. 705, 707, 95 A.L.R. 1416, this court, speaking through Mr. Chief Justice Davis, said: 'In so far as the legal weight and effect to be accorded administrative decisions of a quasi legislative or quasi executive character is concerned, the decisions are clear that the courts will not review them for mere errors of procedure or erroneous conclusions of fact, where the administrative agency in arriving at its decision violated no rule of law and the record as an entirety does not show an abuse of the delegated authority, or arbitrary or unreasonable action. * * *

'But regardless of the apparently conclusive force and effect that the courts have heretofore accorded to the findings and decisions of administrative agencies acting in a quasi legislative or quasi executive capacity, singly or in combination with each other, it is certain that the function and prerogative of deciding finally the law and the facts of an actual controversy bearing upon a vested legal right sought to be divested or impaired in a proceeding initiated under statute before an administrative tribunal is, in its last analysis, a pure judicial power, the exercise of which is subject to review in courts of competent jurisdiction having power to issue the writs and processes whereon legal review of official acts of other tribunals or bodies can be had.

'To the extent therefore that an administrative statutory tribunal or agency is vested with statutory power to make decisions having a judicial character or attribute, as distinguished from mere exercise of delegated legislative or executive functions under the law, resort may be had to the courts of the land for the purpose of review, whether any special method of appeal be provided or not, and in such cases the courts of general jurisdiction to whom complaint is addressed against an alleged improvident, erroneous, or unjustified administrative decision shown to divest or impair some vested legal right, unless abrogated or modified, will grant an aggrieved party relief against quasi judicial decisions of such administrative agencies, by means of those available common-law processes adapted and designed to be used by the courts to restrain excessive or unauthorized exercises of powers on the part of subordinate jurisdictions or quasi judicial tribunals.' And in State ex rel. Swearingen v. Railroad Commission of Florida, 79 Fla. 526, 84 So. 444, 445, this court said that the writ of prohibition 'lies against any person or persons assuming to exercise judicial or quasi judicial power, although not strictly or technically a court.' It must also be borne in mind that in Curtis v. Albritton, 101 Fla. 853, 132 So. 677, we said that the writ of prohibition is the counterpart of mandamus in the manner in which it operates, being negative, while mandamus is positive in its commands, and that in the following cases, writs of mandamus against the respondent board have been sustained: State ex rel. Tullidge v. Hollingsworth, 103 Fla. 801, 138 So. 372; Id., 108 Fla. 607, 146 So. 660; State ex rel. Page v. Hollingsworth, 115 Fla. 851, 156 So. 286; Id., 117 Fla. 288, 157 So. 887. So that we hold that in cases where the respondent board is acting without jurisdiction or is exceeding its jurisdiction in not proceeding in accordance with the essential requirements of law, those common-law processes adapted and designed to restrain such lack of jurisdiction or excessive exercise of power, including the remedy by prohibition, are proper. State ex rel. Crabtree v. Porter, 111 Fla. 621, 149 So. 610.

The only other question raised which is necessary for consideration in the disposition of this matter is whether or not the relator has been charged with having committed any act which constitutes a ground for the revocation of his license to practice medicine. In State ex rel. Williams v. Whitman, supra, we held that while charges before boards, such as the respondent board, need not be stated with the technical nicety or formal exactness required of pleadings in the courts, yet the accused must be informed with reasonable certainty of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and must be given reasonable opportunity to defend against the attempted proof of such charges, and that any such proceedings must be conducted in a fair and impartial manner, free from any just suspicion of prejudice, unfairness, or fraud, or oppression. In State ex rel. Jordan v. Pattishall et al., State Board of Dental Examiners, 99 Fla. 296, 126 So. 147, 148, we held that the accusation failed to charge the dentist, whose license was sought to be revoked, with having committed any act which, under the provisions of the statutes, constituted grounds for the revocation of his license to practice saying: 'The rule is that, where statutes of this kind are invoked, the provisions of the statutes must be strictly construed, and such provisions must be strictly followed, because the statute, as hereinbefore stated, is penal in its nature.' As we held in that case, proceedings in matters of this kind are summary in their nature, but not arbitrary or despotic, and the charges preferred must be specific.

It appears that the relator herein has been granted and holds a license, being certificate No. 8, granted him by the board of eclectic medical examiners in 1915. and paragraph numbered 1 of the charges hereinabove quoted, obviously fails to charge the relator in such fashion as to inform him with reasonable certainty, of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. In what manner relator has been guilty of fraud or fraud or deceit in his admission and why it is that the certificate granted him is fraudulent and improper, does not appear from such charges so attempted to be made in said paragraph numbered 1, and in the absence of specific charges, such paragraph fails to charge the relator with being guilty of any acts which, under the provisions of the applicable statutes, constitute grounds for the revocation of his...