Wright–Jones v. Nasheed

Decision Date20 June 2012
Docket NumberNo. SC 92621.,SC 92621.
Citation368 S.W.3d 157
PartiesRobin WRIGHT–JONES, Respondent, v. Jamilah NASHEED, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

David E. Roland and Eric E. Vickers, St. Louis, for Nasheed.

Elbert A. Walton Jr., Metro Law Firm LLC, St. Louis, for Wright–Jones.

Chris Koster, Attorney General, James R. Layton, Solicitor General Attorney General's office, Jefferson City, for State of Missouri, which submitted a brief as a friend of the Court.

PER CURIAM.

Jamilah Nasheed appeals from the trial court's judgment in favor of Robin Wright–Jones on her petition challenging the qualifications of Nasheed to run for election in the Democratic Party primary for state senator for the 5th district. The trial court found the residency requirement of art. III, sec. 6 of the Missouri Constitution was ambiguous and Nasheed did not satisfy that requirement to run in the 5th district. This Court holds that Nasheed is eligible to run in the Democratic primary for the 5th district because an exception in art. III, sec. 6 does not require Nasheed to live within the boundaries of the reapportioned senate district she seeks to represent. The exception provides that if the reapportionment of the districts is less than one year before the general election, candidates may reside in any district from which a portion was incorporatedinto the new district where the candidate seeks office, even if the candidate does not reside in that incorporated portion. The judgment of the trial court is reversed.1

FACTS

The facts in this case are not in dispute. Wright–Jones and Nasheed both filed declarations as candidates for nomination by the Democratic Party in the 5th senate district. The Missouri Senate Reapportionment Commission filed a senate district reapportionment plan on March 12, 2012,2 changing the boundaries of the old 5th district to include areas previously located within other old state senatorial districts, including the old 4th district. At all times relevant, Wright–Jones resided, and continues to reside, in the new 5th district.

Prior to the reapportionment plan, and at all times relevant, Nasheed resided in the old 4th senate district. Following reapportionment, her residence remained within the boundaries of the old 4th district, but not in an area that was incorporated in the new 5th district as a result of reapportionment.

Wright–Jones filed suit under section 115.526, RSMo 2000, challenging Nasheed's qualifications to seek the nomination of the Democratic Party to run for election in the 5th district. Wright–Jones asserted that art. III, sec. 6 requires a candidate for state senate to have resided for one year in the relevant legislative district. Wright–Jones acknowledged that the new 5th district will not be established for one year prior to the general election. She argued, however, that art. III, sec. 6 requires that candidates for state senate must have resided within the district as defined after reapportionment. Because Nasheed does not reside within the boundaries of the new 5th district, Wright–Jones contends that Nasheed does not satisfy the constitutional residency requirements to be eligible to seek nomination to run for state senate in the 5th District.

Nasheed countered that she satisfied all constitutional requirements because art. III, sec. 6 provides an exception to the requirement of in-district residency when reapportionment occurs less than one year prior to a general election, as is the case here. She argued that in this circumstance, art. III, sec. 6 allows a candidate to seek election in any senate district in which the candidate does not reside when any part of the senate district in which the candidate does reside is incorporated within the boundaries of the senate district the candidate seeks to represent, provided the candidate has lived anywhere within the senate district in which he or she currently resides for one year.

In its judgment, the trial court noted the parties' opposing constructions of the relevant constitutional provision. The trial court found the one year residency requirement of art. III, sec. 6 ambiguous as it relates to senate districts following reapportionment when the general election is scheduled to take place less than one year after reapportionment. The trial court held that art. III, sec. 6 requires that a candidate must have resided for one year within the senate district the candidate seeks to represent as it is defined followingreapportionment. Accordingly, the trial court held that Nasheed did not satisfy the residency requirement to run for senator for the 5th District. Nasheed appeals.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews the trial court's interpretation of the Missouri Constitution de novo. State v. Biggs, 333 S.W.3d 472, 477 (2011).

ANALYSIS

This case presents a question regarding the construction of art. III, sec. 6 in the context of residency requirements after a reapportionment of a state senate district. Article III, section 6 states:

Each senator shall be thirty years of age, and next before the day of his election shall have been a qualified voter of the state for three years and a resident of the district which he is chosen to represent for one year, if such district shall have been so long established, and if not, then of the district or districts from which the same shall have been taken. (emphasis added).

Mo. Const. art. III, sec. 6.

The issue before this Court is whether, in the...

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    ...“Words used in constitutional provisions are interpreted to give effect to their plain, ordinary, and natural meaning.” Wright – Jones v. Nasheed , 368 S.W.3d 157, 159 (Mo. banc 2012). “Challenges to legislation based on constitutionally imposed procedural limitations are not favored.” Mo. ......
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