Wyatt v. People

• Decision Date: 01 February 1892
• Citation: 28 P. 961,17 Colo. 252
• Parties: WYATT v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

28 P. 961

17 Colo. 252

WYATT v. PEOPLE.

Supreme Court of Colorado

February 1, 1892

Error to criminal court, Arapahoe county.

Proceedings against John J. Wyatt for contempt. From a judgment on conviction defendant brings error. Reversed.

The other facts fully appear in the following statement by HELM J.:

In July, 1889, the secretary of state being absent, the duties of the position devolved upon plaintiff in error, Wyatt, who was his deputy. By virtue of law, the control of the legislative halls, and the custody of the legislative furniture and other state property therein, was held by the secretary of state. The grand jury of the criminal court of Arapahoe county, the county in which were situate the office of the secretary of state, the legislative halls, and the state property in question, demanded of Wyatt admission to these halls for the purpose of inspecting this property. The demand was refused, and thereupon the following affidavit was filed: 'S. S. Abbott, first being duly sworn, deposes and says: That he is a deputy district attorney within and for said county and state, and that as such he was before the grand jury of the criminal court of said county and state on the first and second days of July, A. D. 1889, and that on the said first day of July the said Wyatt was subpoenaed before the said grand jury, and ordered to bring with him the keys of the room and building wherein the furniture used by the general assembly of the state of Colorado during the session of A. D. 1889 was stored. That the said Wyatt came before the said grand jury as required, but failed and refused to deliver up said keys, and failed and refused to allow, on demand thereof by the foreman of said grand jury to conduct the said grand jury to the said room and building or in any way to allow the said grand jury to inspect said furniture. That on the following, or second, day of July, A. D. 1889, the said grand jury called upon the said Wyatt at his office, at the office of the secretary of state of the state of Colorado, and then and there the foreman of the said grand jury demanded of the said Wyatt that he admit the said grand jury to said room and building to inspect the furniture therein contained, which the said Wyatt then and there refused to do. And the deponent herein further alleges that the said Wyatt was then and there the deputy secretary of state of the state of Colorado, and was then and there the custodian of the said room and building, and of the keys to the same, and that through him alone could the said grand jury gain a quiet and orderly access to the room and building. S. S. ABBOTT. Subscribed and sworn to before me this second day of July, A. D. 1889. WILSON D. REID, Clerk. By F. L. BISHOP, Deputy. [Criminal Court Seal Arapahoe County.]' An attachment for contempt issued, a motion to quash was made and overruled, and an answer was filed. Upon the pleadings the court found Wyatt guilty of contempt, and pronounced judgment against him. Thereupon, at his request the present writ of error issued, and was by order made a supersedeas. Other matters essential to a correct understanding of the opinion sufficiently appear therein.

Syllabus by the Court

1. The grand jury is an adjunct or appendage to the court; but it has no power to adjudge contempts, or to punish the same. In the absence of statute, a disobedience of its process, or defiance of its authority, should be reported to the court for an order in the premises. It is the disobedience of this order that then constitutes the contempt.

2. A grand jury, investigating a criminal charge connected with property of the state in the custody of the secretary of state, may inspect such property; but an order of court should first be obtained, and the directions, if any, given in the order must be carefully obeyed. The granting or refusing of permission to make such an inspection is a matter within the sound discretion of the court.

3. An affidavit for contempt in obstructing such action of a grand jury, which fails to show that the grand jury obtained permission of the court to inspect the property, or that an order of court was made commanding defendant to permit such inspection, or that defendant disobeyed this order, does not state a cause of action.

4. Where judgment is rendered upon the pleadings, and no order of court or its disobedience is alleged or admitted in the pleadings, the declaration in the judgment that such an order was made and disobeyed does not cure the jurisdictional defect.

5. The statutory provision that judgments in contempt proceedings shall be 'final and conclusive' simply declares a principle of the common law. This principle forbids the review of such judgments on the ground of mere error; but an appellate court may set the judgment aside if the court below is without jurisdiction, and also where the judgment pronounced is wholly unauthorized.

6. Where imprisonment is being suffered under a judgment for contempt, habeas corpus is the usual proceeding for inquiry into the question of jurisdiction. But this question may be raised in the supreme court by writ of error.

7. Contempts of court are civil, i. e., where they consist in the disobedience of some judicial order entered for the benefit or advantage of another party to the proceeding; criminal, i. e., acts disrespectful to the court or its process, or obstructing the administration of justice, or tending to bring the court into disrepute.

8. Under the constitution, the Civil Code is by its title limited to procedure in civil cases. The provision of this Code limiting the penalty for contempt to 'fine or imprisonment' is therefore not applicable to criminal cases. Such cases are governed by the common law, and a judgment of both fine and imprisonment in a criminal contempt is valid.

9. The power to punish contempts is inherent in courts. Summary proceedings for contempts, without indictment or trial by jury, have always been recognized. The constitution was not intended to change the practice in this respect. Such summary proceedings are therefore not inconsistent with the constitutional guaranties relating to criminal prosecutions.

10. The refusal to obey an order of court made in connection with the investigation of a criminal charge by a grand jury is a criminal, not a civil, contempt.

11. The legislature cannot take away from courts created by the constitution the power to punish contempts; but reasonable regulations by that body touching the exercise of this power are binding.

12. A constructive contempt must be brought to the court's attention by affidavit. This affidavit must state facts which if established would constitute a contempt; and, if it does not do so, the court is without jurisdiction to proceed. This rule now prevails both at common law and under the statute.

13. Whether or not the common law requires that the orders of court in actual contempts shall recite the facts, a due regard for the rights of the accused strongly sanctions such practice.

Wolcott & Vaile, A. M. Stevenson, and H. Riddell, for plaintiff in error.

Joseph H. Mauphin, Atty. Gen., H. H. Babb, and I. N. Stevens, for the People.

HELM, J., ( after stating the facts.)

Statutes such as section 334 of the Civil Code, declaring that the judgment in contempt proceedings shall be 'final and conclusive,' simply express a principle of the common law. This principle is decisive against the right of review on the ground of mere error in the trial. It does not, however, preclude inquiry into the question of jurisdiction. If, as a matter of fact, the act complained of constituted no contempt, the court is without jurisdiction to find the party guilty, and its judgment will be set aside by the proper appellate tribunal. A like result also follows when, though the act may have been a contempt, yet the judgment pronounced is wholly unauthorized. Rap. Contempt, § 155; Cooper v. People, 13 Colo. 337, 22 P. 790; Thomas v. People, 14 Colo. 254, 23 P. 326; Ex parte Grace, 12 Iowa 208. Where imprisonment is being suffered, habeas corpus is the usual procedure for inquiry into the question of jurisdiction. And in Butler v. People, 2 Colo. 295, a doubt was expressed concerning the power to investigate contempts by writ of error. But the latter method of procedure possesses decided advantages over the former, and jurisdiction in cases pending on error for review is always a pertinent inquiry. In Cooper v. People, supra, the subject was carefully considered and the writ of error sustained. The practice has been recognized in a number of other cases, and may not be regarded as firmly established in this state. Hughes v. People, 5 Colo. 436; Thomas v. People, supra; Mullin v. People, 15 Colo. 437, 24 P. 880. But, whether the judgment in contempts be examined upon habeas corpus or by writ of error, the inquiry is always limited to the single question of jurisdiction, and all other matters are carefully excluded. The jurisdiction of the court below in the case at bar is challenged upon both of the grounds above mentioned. Counsel for plaintiff in error strenuously contend-- First, that no contempt was committed; and, second, that the judgment, had there been a contempt, was unwarranted by law. We proceed to consider these jurisdictional objections, reversing, however, in the discussion the order of their statement above.

1. Wyatt was sentenced to both fine and imprisonment, the imprisonment not being conditional upon payment of the fine. But section 334 of the Civil Code, supra, limits the penalty to fine or imprisonment, forbidding the infliction of both as substantive punishments in the same case. It is conceded that we have no other statute upon the subject, and, if the Code provision be applicable, the court...