Wyatt v. Polk Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs & Commercial Risk Mgmt.

• Decision Date: 02 November 2022
• Docket Number: 1D19-4601,1D20-2383
• Parties: Mandy Lynn Wyatt, Appellant, v. Polk County Board of County Commissioners and Commercial Risk Management, Inc., Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Mandy Lynn Wyatt, Appellant, v. Polk County Board of County Commissioners and Commercial Risk Management, Inc., Appellees.

Nos. 1D19-4601, 1D20-2383

Florida Court of Appeals, First District

November 2, 2022

Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331.

Date of Accident: November 27, 2018.

On appeal from an order of the Office of Judges of Compensation Claims. Robert A. Arthur, Judge.

Nicolette E. Tsambis of Smith, Feddeler, Smith P.A. Lakeland, for Appellant.

Thomas P. Vecchio of Vecchio, Carrier, Feldman & Johannessen P.A., Lakeland, for Appellees.

TANENBAUM, J.

Mandy Lynn Wyatt started working as an emergency medical technician ("EMT") and paramedic for Polk County Fire Rescue in August 2015. Over the course of her employment, she witnessed several horrible things on the scene at emergency calls involving women and children. According to unrebutted testimony and other evidence, the first of these occurred when Wyatt responded in May 2016 to a domestic violence incident in which the victim had been badly beaten by her boyfriend and suffered severe head trauma. The victim died shortly after arriving at the hospital. Then, in January 2017 and June 2017, Wyatt responded to cardiac arrest calls involving three-month-old children. In between these two events, she went to a call where a mother had wrecked her car, pulled her child out of the car, and run into a pond with the intent to drown him. In April 2018, she responded to a call involving a small child seriously injured by two pit bulls. Finally, in June 2018, she responded to a car crash in which a five-year-old had been killed. The deceased child had already been removed from the scene, but Wyatt was responsible for taking care of the child's two-year-old sister. As she did so, Wyatt noticed the deceased child's brain matter stuck in the girl's hair and proceeded to pick out the pieces.

Wyatt first began experiencing nightmares and flashbacks- the first signs of a possible post-traumatic stress disorder ("PTSD")-in 2016, as a result of the domestic violence call. Around the same time, she sought assistance with her symptoms from a critical incidence stress management team, which was available to first responders with on-the-job experiences like Wyatt's. She began seeing a therapist in March 2017. Her trauma worsened as she was exposed to the incidents in 2017 and 2018 involving children. She continued to feel depressed and anxious and consistently experienced nightmares. Even so, she was not exposed to another traumatic incident at work following the tragic June 2018 crash scene. Wyatt continued working, but there were times when she would have to take leave and cut short her overnight shifts so she did not have to sleep at the fire station. She worked her last shift with Polk County Fire Rescue on November 27, 2018. A few days later, she took a leave of absence under the Family and Medical Leave Act because she felt like she no longer could do her job. Her condition did not improve during that leave, and she never returned.

On April 26, 2019, Wyatt filed a petition for benefits ("PFB").^[1]In the PFB, she asserted the PTSD she had been suffering because of her repeated responses to emergency calls. She sought indemnity for her lost wages on theories of both temporary total disability and temporary partial disability pursuant to section 440.15, Florida Statutes. She also sought authorization for medical care and treatment of the PTSD under section 440.13. She claimed November 27, 2018-the last day that she worked-as the date of her accident.

Wyatt, of course, sought benefits under the Workers' Compensation Law, but as a first responder, she relied on section 112.1815, Florida Statutes, to support her claim. That provision, originally enacted in 2007, see ch. 2007-87, § 1, at 1066-67, Laws of Fla., establishes special provisions to govern the determination of benefits "relating to employment-related accidents and injuries of first responders," including EMTs and paramedics. § 112.1815(1), (2)(a), Fla. Stat.; see Palm Beach Cnty. Fire Rescue v. Wilkes, 309 So.3d 687, 688 (Fla. 1st DCA 2020). To be sure, this statute does not establish a parallel system of workers' compensation for first responders. Cf. § 440.03, Fla. Stat. (binding "every employer and employee as defined in s. 440.02 [to] the provisions of [chapter 440]"); § 440.02(16)(a), Fla. Stat. (defining "employer" to include "the state and all political subdivisions thereof"); see also § 440.02(15)(a), Fla. Stat. (defining "employee" to "mean any person who receives remuneration from an employer for the performance of any work or service while engaged in any employment under any appointment or contract for hire or apprenticeship").^[2] Rather, it treats first responders as a specific class of state and local employees who otherwise are entitled to coverage under the Workers' Compensation Law, and it sets out various special definitions, exceptions (e.g., regarding burdens of proof, caps, and time limits), and compensability variations to be applied in the determination of first responders' claims for benefits made under chapter 440.

Application of section 112.1815 makes a difference in the determination of a claim like Wyatt's. For example, Wyatt does not claim to have suffered a physical injury at work, and the Workers' Compensation Law generally places strict limits on compensability for a mental or nervous work injury. A compensable physical injury must be the major contributing cause of the mental or nervous injury, and temporary benefits may not be paid for more than six months following the date of maximum medical improvement for the physical injury. See § 440.093, Fla. Stat. (2018). Under this provision (considered alone), Wyatt's claimed injury would not be compensable at all. Since its original enactment in 2007, however, section 112.1815 has eased this limitation for first responders like Wyatt by allowing for medical benefits under section 440.13 to treat a mental or nervous injury suffered at work, even if it was "unaccompanied by a physical injury." § 112.1815(2)(a)3., Fla. Stat. (2018); see ch. 2007-87, § 1, at 1066-67, Laws of Fla.; see also Wilkes, 309 So.3d at 688 (contrasting this subparagraph with the general preclusion in section 440.093).^[3] This subparagraph, then, would entitle Wyatt to medical treatment for her anxiety, depression, and nightmares to the extent these symptoms were caused by her work as a paramedic, and she would not be subject to the limitations ordinarily placed on such a benefit. See § 112.1815(2)(a)3., Fla. Stat.

In 2018, the Legislature added a subsection five to section 112.1815. See ch. 2018-124, § 1, at 1655-57, Laws of Fla. The law took effect October 1, 2018, which was after Wyatt's exposure to the various traumas that we identified above, but before Wyatt suffered lost wages as a result of going out of work for her PTSD. See id. § 3, at 1657. The new provision expands compensability for first responders who suffer specifically from PTSD, a particular type of mental injury that ordinarily would have to be addressed under subparagraph (2)(a)3., which we just discussed. Subsection five now directs that PTSD suffered by a first responder be considered a "compensable occupational disease" as provided in section 440.151. § 112.1815(5)(a), (c)1, Fla. Stat. (2018); see Wilkes, 309 So.3d at 688. Under section 440.151, then, a first responder who cannot work because of PTSD is entitled to not just medical benefits but also indemnity for lost wages stemming from the disability-even without any accompanying physical injury. Cf. § 440.151(1), Fla. Stat. (providing that an employee "shall be entitled to compensation as provided by this chapter" if the employee becomes disabled as a result of "an occupational disease").

Under the new subsection, if a first responder wants to receive indemnity under section 440.15 for lost wages due to work-caused PTSD, she must prove her PTSD by "clear and convincing medical evidence" that the PTSD "resulted from the first responder acting within the course of his or her employment,"^[4] and-through a licensed and authorized treating psychiatrist-that the PTSD is due to one or more of eleven enumerated "events," including the following:

• Seeing for oneself a deceased minor;

• Directly witnessing the death of a minor;

• Directly witnessing an injury to a minor who subsequently died before or upon arrival at a hospital emergency department;

• Seeing for oneself a decedent whose death involved grievous bodily harm of a nature that shocks the conscience;

• Directly witnessing a death, including suicide, that involved grievous bodily harm of a nature that shocks the conscience;

• Directly witnessing an injury, including an attempted suicide, to a person who subsequently died before or upon arrival at a hospital emergency department if the person was injured by grievous bodily harm of a nature that shocks the conscience.

§ 112.1815(5)(a) 1., 2.a.-c., f.-g., i., Fla. Stat. (2018) (sub-subparagraph lettering omitted); id. (5)(b); see Wilkes, 309 So.3d at 688.

Prior to the final evidentiary hearing on Wyatt's claim, the employer conceded in its trial memo that Wyatt suffers from PTSD that developed because of her exposure to the on-the-job traumatic events described above. It explained that it denied Wyatt's claim because all of the qualifying events that led to her PTSD occurred before the effective date of the law adding subsection five: October 1, 2018. The JCC denied Wyatt's claim in its entirety-her claim for both medical treatment under section 440.13 and wage indemnity under section 440.15.

In explaining his denial, the JCC focused on what he considered to be Wyatt's ...