Wyatt v. Scott

• Decision Date: 18 November 1907
• Parties: WYATT v. SCOTT
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

105 S.W. 871

84 Ark. 355

WYATT v. SCOTT

Supreme Court of Arkansas

November 18, 1907

Appeal from Logan Chancery Court; J. Virgil Bourland, Chancellor affirmed.

STATEMENT BY THE COURT.

Appellants brought suit against appellee in the Logan Chancery Court, to have appellee declared a trustee of and for his wife, Martha F. Scott, during her life, and for appellants since her death, as to all lands purchased by him and the improvements made thereon, alleged to have been purchased and improved with certain moneys received by appellee from his wife; the money being the distributive share of his wife in her father's estate, some of it being the proceeds of the sale of land inherited from her father. The prayer was that judgment be rendered for the amount, and that same be declared a lien on appellee's land so purchased and improved, or else that title to the land be vested in appellants and for all proper relief, that an account be taken of the amounts of money so received, and for rents and profits.

The chancellor found the facts as follows: "That appellants are the sisters and only heirs at law of Martha F. Scott wife of appellee, R. C. Scott; that the said Martha F. Scott died childless and intestate in 1902; that appellee and his wife were married in 1861, and her father died in 1863; that appellee received in 1867 her distributive share of the estate of her father, amounting to about $ 800; that appellee's wife and her sisters partitioned the lands of her father's estate, and that the appellee sold her part of the lands in parcel during the period from 1870 to 1884 for an aggregate sum of about $ 1,700; that the money arising from the sale of her lands was used from time to time with the knowledge and consent of his wife, along with moneys belonging to appellee accruing from his farm and from trading, for general domestic purposes, and that she did not intend to hold the same as a charge against the appellee, and did no substantive act indicating a purpose to treat the same as a debt against her husband, the appellee; that it is not shown, or attempted to be shown, that appellee used undue influence or artifice; and that the money was used and intended to be used for their common benefit; that some of the money might have been used in the improvement of appellee's lands, but how much or when used is not known."

Upon these facts the chancellor held: "That the moneys which came to appellee's hands in 1867 became his absolutely by virtue of his marital rights, under the law then existing that as to the money arising from the sale of lands a formal gift was not requisite; that when a wife permitted her husband to mingle her money with his: and use it along from time to time through a number of years for domestic purposes and for their mutual benefit, it will be presumed to have been done without any intention to charge the husband with same; that, before appellants could be entitled to have a lien declared against the husband's lands, it would be necessary to show when and how much money was used, and what land it was invested in, and that it was wrongfully converted to such use."

Decree affirmed.

John M Parker, for appellant.

1. When a wife permits her husband to have the custody, care and management of her separate property, the presumption of law is that the husband was acting as the agent or trustee of the wife. Kirby's Digest, § 5227; Lewin on Trusts § 778. The presumption of a gift to him, because of the control of the money by her husband, is not sufficient to overcome that created by the statute. A gift from wife to husband must be clearly proved. 81 Ark. 147. And must be fair and reasonable, not imprudent on her part, and not unfairly procured, 20 Cyc. p. 1219; 1 Am. St. 719; 51 Id. 281; 34 So. 320; 73 Ga. 275; 75 Ill. 446; 39 N.J.Eq. 215.

2. Acts to protect married women are liberally construed. Const. 1868, art. 12, § 6; Ib, 1874, art. 9, §§ 7, 8; act April 28, 1873. As there is no sufficient evidence to support a gift, the law implies a trust in the heirs, (10 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law I Ed. p. 25); and the funds may be followed into any land or property invested in by the trustee. Ib. p. 47, 62, 21 and note; and 44 note 4, etc.

3. Parol evidence admissible. Ib. 26, 30, 49, and 50.

Priddy & Chambers, for appellee.

1. The property became the husband's by virtue of his marital rights. 50 Ark. 356; 39 Id. 434. The Constitution of 1874 could not divest marital rights acquired before its adoption.

2. No formal gift requisite--an intention sufficient. There was sufficient evidence to rebut the preemption raised by Kirby's Digest, § 5227; 10 S.W. 460; 50 W.Va. 226; 54 Md. 35; 46 N.Y. 218.

3. Where a wife permits her husband for a long period to manage her property, receive rents and profits, and expend surplus without question, a finding of a gift is warranted. 58 Am. Rep. 259; 42 Id. 548; 2 Tenn. Ch. Rep. 5; 36 A. 607; 1 McN. & G. 599; 36 Eng. Ch. Cas. 643; 92 Am. Dec. 681; 30 Ark. 79; 60 Id. 461.

4. Kirby's Digest, § 5207, provides that separate property of married woman shall, so long as they may choose, be her separate estate. She can do what she pleases with it. While gifts to a husband are scrutinized closely, the object is to ascertain, and not to defeat when ascertained, the real intentions of the parties. 75 Ark. 127.

OPINION

WOOD, J., (after stating the facts.)

The testimony is voluminous. It would be needless to set it out and to discuss it in detail. It suffices to say that we are of the opinion that the chancellor's findings of fact are not clearly against the weight of the evidence. In fact, the fair preponderance may be said to be in favor of the chancellor's findings.

Appellants rely upon section 5227, Kirby's Digest, as authority for having appellee declared a trustee of the money received by him from his wife, and for...