Xeng Vang v. State Of Minn.
| Decision Date | 09 September 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. A09-2297.,A09-2297. |
| Citation | 788 N.W.2d 111 |
| Parties | Jerry VANG, a/k/a Vang Toua Xeng Vang, petitioner, Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Syllabus by the Court
1. In light of the exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of Vang's case, we exercise our inherent authority to construe the proceedings as a direct appeal.
2. Vang's convictions and sentences are void because the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to convict and sentence Vang as an adult.
Melissa Sheridan, Assistant State Public Defender, Eagan, MN, for appellant.
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Susan Gaertner, Ramsey County Attorney, Mark Nathan Lystig, Assistant County Attorney, St. Paul, MN, for respondent.
The juvenile court convicted and sentenced 14-year-old appellant Jerry Vang as an adult in this first-degree murder case. Vang, who was indigent, made a timely request that the State Public Defender's Office (SPDO) file a direct appeal on his behalf. The SPDO did not file a direct appeal. Well after the time to file a direct appeal expired, the SPDO filed a petition for postconviction relief on behalf of Vang. The postconviction court denied Vang's request for relief. We hold that Vang's convictions and sentences are void because the juvenile court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to convict and sentence Vang as an adult. Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
On August 7, 2001, Kor Vang met 14-year-old appellant Jerry Vang (Vang) at Vang's house to drive together to a funeral. On their way to the funeral, the two turned into an alley and saw several people, including Kao Vang and Kou Vang, “standing around.” Kor, who was driving, stopped the car and backed up. Vang and Kao “got into a verbal argument” regarding problems between their younger brothers. Vang left the car, took out a loaded nine-millimeter gun, and shot Kao “six or seven times.” Vang also shot Kou twice. Vang returned to the car, and Kor drove the two to Chee Thao's house, where Vang was arrested an hour later. Although Kou survived the shooting, Kao did not.
On August 10, 2001, the State filed a delinquency petition in Ramsey County Juvenile Court alleging first-degree murder (drive-by shooting), Minn.Stat. § 609.185(3) (2008), and second-degree murder (drive-by shooting), Minn.Stat. § 609.19, subd. 1(2) (2008), involving the death of Kou. The delinquency petition also alleged attempted first-degree murder (drive-by shooting), Minn.Stat. §§ 609.17, .185(3) (2008), involving Kao. In accordance with Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.02, subd. 2, the State presented Vang's case to a grand jury for consideration of indictment under Minn.Stat. ch. 628 (2008). The grand jury indicted Vang on the three charges alleged in the juvenile delinquency petition.
On September 17, 2001, the State filed a motion to certify the proceedings for action under the laws and court procedures controlling adult criminal violations. Vang underwent a certification study, psychological evaluation, and neuropsychological evaluation.
On November 6, 2001, Vang made an in-custody appearance before the Ramsey County Juvenile Court. The parties informed the juvenile court that they had negotiated a resolution of Vang's case. Vang's attorney asked Vang a series of leading questions to confirm that Vang understood he was “giving up” his certification hearing, would be “treated as an adult,” and would be sentenced as an adult. However, Vang did not stipulate to any of the factors required to certify the proceedings for action under the laws and court procedures controlling adult criminal violations. The juvenile court made no findings or ruling on the adult certification issue. Instead, the juvenile court simply accepted Vang's guilty pleas to first-degree murder (drive-by shooting) and the attempted first-degree murder (drive-by shooting). Based on Vang's guilty pleas, the court convicted Vang of adult criminal violations and imposed an adult sentence of life imprisonment for the first-degree murder (drive-by shooting) conviction and a concurrent 200-month prison sentence for the attempted first-degree murder (drive-by shooting) conviction.
On November 7, 2001, the juvenile court issued a written order certifying the proceedings for action under the laws and court procedures controlling adult criminal violations. The order was captioned “Juvenile Division” and listed the juvenile court file numbers. The juvenile court found that Vang “knowingly and intelligently waived his right to a certification hearing.” The juvenile court also found that Vang had pleaded guilty to the first-degree charges and that the second-degree charge had been dismissed, but made no other findings.
Vang, who was indigent, wrote to the SPDO on November 26, 2001, and requested a public defender to represent him in appealing his convictions. The SPDO sent Vang the necessary appeal forms, which he completed and returned on January 22, 2002, within the time for filing a notice of appeal. 1 On February 1, 2002, a public defender wrote to Vang and stated that there was “nothing the public defender could do for [Vang].” Vang wrote back within two weeks to submit his request again. The office sent Vang another letter stating that there was “nothing the public defender's office could do for [Vang].” Vang sent three additional letters-in February 2002, April 2005, and June 2005-reiterating his request. Each time, the SPDO responded that a public defender would not represent Vang. In October 2008 Vang wrote again to ask for a public defender to represent him in appealing his convictions. The office assigned a public defender in March 2009.
On July 20, 2009, Vang's public defender filed a petition for postconviction relief. Vang argued that his adult certification was invalid, that he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel, and that the court should consider the petition in the interests of justice. The postconviction court denied Vang relief. This appeal followed.
As a threshold matter, the State argues that Vang's postconviction claims are barred by the two-year statute of limitations for filing a postconviction petition, Minn.Stat. § 590.01, subd. 4 (2008). We need not and do not decide the postconviction statute-of-limitations issue because, as discussed below, we conclude that the exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of Vang's case warrant the exercise of our inherent authority to directly review the juvenile court's actions.
We have “appellate jurisdiction in all cases.” Minn. Const. art. VI, § 2. In State v. Wingo, 266 N.W.2d 508, 511 (Minn.1978), we interpreted Minn. Const. art. VI, § 2 as granting us “constitutionally independent authority to review determinations by the other state courts.” In extremely rare and exceptional cases, we have invoked this inherent authority to hear an appeal. See State v. Lessley, 779 N.W.2d 825, 832 (Minn.2010); State v. Losh, 721 N.W.2d 886, 890 n. 3 (Minn.2006); see also In re Welfare of J.R., Jr., 655 N.W.2d 1, 4 (Minn.2003) ().
Vang's case is a rare and exceptional case both procedurally and substantively. Vang was only 14 years old when he asked the SPDO to file a direct appeal on his behalf. The record contains uncontroverted documentary evidence that Vang made his request to the SPDO well within the 90-day period to file a direct appeal. Vang completed all the necessary SPDO forms and was indigent at the time of his request. Vang persistently requested that the SPDO file a direct appeal on his behalf. When the SPDO denied Vang's initial request, Vang mailed a second letter to the SPDO before the 90-day period to file a direct appeal expired. Nonetheless, the SPDO never filed a direct appeal on Vang's behalf. 2 The postconviction petition filed by the SPDO in this case presents the first review of Vang's convictions and sentences. Substantively, Vang's case involves a nonwaivable subject-matter jurisdiction claim that renders Vang's convictions and sentences legally void. In light of these exceptional and extraordinary circumstances, we exercise our inherent authority to directly review the juvenile court's actions. Because our review is akin to a direct appeal, we need not and do not decide the postconviction statute-of-limitations issue.
On appeal, Vang claims his adult convictions and sentences are void for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We agree.
The juvenile court has original and exclusive jurisdiction in proceedings concerning children alleged to be delinquent prior to having become 18 years of age. Minn.Stat. § 260B.101, subd. 1 (2008). Under the Juvenile Court Act, Minn.Stat. chs. 260 and 260B, a juvenile court does not have the authority to impose adult sentences. See Minn.Stat. § 260B.198 (2008) (). No adjudication on the status of any child in the jurisdiction of the juvenile court shall be deemed a conviction of crime, except as provided by Minn.Stat. §§ 260B.245, .255 (2008). See Minn.Stat. § 260B.245, subd. 1(a).
A child may not waive the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. In re the Welfare of K.A.A., 410 N.W.2d 836, 842 (Minn.1987). Instead, the Juvenile Court Act and the Minnesota Rules of Juvenile Delinquency Procedure define the process by which a juvenile court terminates its original and exclusive jurisdiction. The process is commonly referred to as “adult certification” and involves the issuance of a juvenile court order certifying the proceedings for action under adult criminal laws and procedures. See Minn.Stat. § 260B.125 (2008); Minn. R. Juv. Delinq. P. 18.
The juvenile court may certify the proceeding for action under adult criminal laws and procedures when a child who is at least 14 years old is alleged to have committed a crime that would be a felony if committed by an adult. Minn.Stat. §...
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