Yakima Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Yakima County
Decision Date | 09 November 1928 |
Docket Number | 20985. |
Citation | 271 P. 820,149 Wash. 552 |
Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Parties | YAKIMA VALLEY BANK & TRUST CO. v. YAKIMA COUNTY et al. |
Department 2.
Appeal from Superior Court, Yakima County; A. W. Hawkins, Judge.
Action by the Yakima Valley Bank & Trust Company against Yakima County and another. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.
R. G Sharpe, of Olympia, and G. E. Clark, M. C. Delle, and O Sandvig, all of Yakima, for appellants.
Rigg & Venables and Nat U. Brown, all of Yakima, for respondent.
This action was brought by the plaintiff bank to recover a portion of the taxes paid by it under protest for the year 1926 and for the recovery of like claimed excess taxes paid the same year by 20 other banks in Yakima county, all of which claims were assigned to the plaintiff for suit.
The substance of the action is that the capital stock of the banks in question were assessed in 1926 at 50 per cent. of the full and fair value of the stock, while property generally in the county was intentionally valued at not to exceed 44 per cent. of its true value. To the complaint a demurrer was interposed and overruled, whereupon the county elected to stand upon its demurrer and appealed when judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff. The main ground of the demurrer argued below and in this court involves the question of whether an appeal from an unlawful discrimination assessment by the taxing authorities must first be presented to the county and state boards of equalization, and if relief is there denied then appeal to the courts, or whether the courts may be resorted to in the first instance. A brief review of the history of our statutes providing for actions of this character will be helpful in disposing of the question.
Prior to 1890 the statute (Code 1881) provided as follows
In that year a new and comprehensive act was passed (Laws 1889-90, p 530) which omitted entirely from its provisions the main elements of the section we have just set out. The distinction between the two may best be noticed by quoting from our opinion in Whatcom County v. Fairhaven Land Co., 7 Wash. 101, 34 P. 563, where we held that it was unnecessary for a taxpayer to appear before the board:
notice. (3) They shall reduce the valuation of land where in their opinion the assessment is too high; but nothing is said about an appearance or complaint by any person--it is their opinion which is to dictate the change. (4) Upon complaint they shall reduce the valuation of certain personal property. (5) But, most important of all, they shall not reduce the aggregate value of the property of their county below the aggregate value thereof as returned by the assessor, except for manifest errors in his valuation. The substance of the old § 2879 is entirely absent from this law; there is no power in the board to subpoena witnesses; and the authority to hear and determine is not expressed. The property owner is nowhere in this law invited to appear and make objections, if any he may have, until we reach § 105 (p. 568), where he is accorded the right to appear and set forth, by answer, the facts constituting his defense or objection to the tax and the penalties thereon, and by § 109 (p. 570) there can be no refuge in technicalities, nor any escape from the payment of a proper tax, but, if the lands 'have been partially, unfairly or unequally' assessed, the court may reduce the amount of taxes, and give judgment accordingly.'
The doctrine of that decision has been followed by us in Miller v. Pierce County, 28 Wash. 110 68 P. 358, and Puget Sound Realty Co. v. King County, 50 Wash. 349, 97 P. 226.
We now come to the change in the statutes which the appellant insists in controlling and requires an appearance before the boards. In 1925, at the regular session of the Legislature an act was passed providing for the creation of a state tax commission (chapter 18, Laws of 1925). The act generally provides for full and complete power in the commission to hear and determine all tax matters, specifically conferring on the commission or any member thereof or officially designated employé the power to administer oaths in all matters pertaining to the duties of the commission or its proceedings; grants it the power formerly vested in the director of taxation and examination; the general supervision over the administration of tax and assessment laws of the state and over county assessors in particular; to order county boards of equalization to raise or lower the valuations on property for taxing purposes and for hearings before the board. The section of the act most necessary here to be noticed is section 6, which provides:
Section 7 provides for appeal from the tax commission to the superior court.
At the extraordinary session of the Legislature in 1925 (page 277), a new act was passed governing the assessment, levy, and collection of taxes. But an investigation of its terms indicates that it is a codification of already existing statutes for the most part. Section 68 of the act is the one providing for the duties of the county commissioners sitting as a board of equalization. It is too long to set out in this opinion, but in general it constitutes the board of county commissioners as a board of equalization and provides for the raising and lowering of values of real and personal property and requires the county assessor to keep an accurate record of the proceedings showing the facts and evidence upon which the actions of the board are based. It is this section which the appellant contends gives the county board of equalization sufficiently broad powers to hear and determine all questions of tax relief. The difficulty of accepting such a contention arises by reason of the fact that section 68 of the Laws of 1925 (Extraordinary Session) is almost identical with section 73 of the Laws of 1890, and that sec...
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