Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Paseman

• Decision Date: 20 April 1990
• Docket Number: No. D010360,D010360
• Citation: 219 Cal.App.3d 958,268 Cal.Rptr. 514
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: YAMAHA MOTOR CORPORATION, U.S.A., Defendant, Cross-Complainant, and Appellant, v. Robert David PASEMAN et al., Cross-Defendants and Respondents.

Page 514

268 Cal.Rptr. 514

219 Cal.App.3d 958

YAMAHA MOTOR CORPORATION, U.S.A., Defendant, Cross-Complainant, and Appellant, v. Robert David PASEMAN et al., Cross-Defendants and Respondents.

No. D010360.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

April 20, 1990.

Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, George A. Pisano, L. Victor Bilger, Jr., Los Angeles, and John S. Einhorn, San Diego, for defendant, cross-complainant and appellant.

John J. McAvoy and Christopher D. McIntire, San Diego, for cross-defendants and respondents.

HUFFMAN, Associate Justice.

Yamaha Motor Corporation, U.S.A. (Yamaha) appeals the trial court's dismissal of its cross-complaint for equitable indemnity against Robert David Paseman and Carol Ann Paseman (the parents), whose adult son, David Paseman (David), is the plaintiff in the underlying action. Judgment of dismissal of Yamaha's cross-complaint was rendered after the trial court sustained the parents' demurrer without leave to amend.

In the underlying action, David is suing Yamaha for injuries he sustained while riding a seven-year-old moped owned by his parents. The complaint alleges the moped was defective and Yamaha is liable on the grounds of strict product liability, general negligence in design and manufacture of the moped and failure to warn. Yamaha's cross-complaint for equitable indemnity alleges the parents negligently failed to maintain and repair the moped, thus contributing to or solely causing the injury to David.

Yamaha contends comparative fault principles may be applied to apportion fault between a strictly liable defendant and a negligent defendant and, therefore, it should be allowed to seek indemnity from the parents in proportion to their contribution to David's injury. We agree and reverse the judgment of dismissal after the order sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The pleadings set forth the following operative facts: On November 25, 1985, David was injured while riding a seven-year-old Yamaha moped purchased and owned by his parents. His complaint, filed about a year later, alleges the pedals of the moped spontaneously engaged, causing David to lose control of the vehicle and incur injuries. Various theories are set forth against Yamaha in the complaint: Strict products liability, general negligence, breach of warranty and negligent failure to warn.

On January 24, 1989, Yamaha filed a cross-complaint against the parents. This cross-complaint, the subject of this appeal, alleges two causes of action: Indemnity and negligent failure to maintain and repair. ¹ In particular, Yamaha alleges the moped in question was not defective. Alternatively, if the moped is found to have been defective, Yamaha pleads the parents knew or had reason to know of the defect and necessity for maintenance or repair prior to David's accident, but failed to properly maintain and repair the moped or to warn David of its defective condition. ² For these reasons, Yamaha seeks equitable indemnification from the parents in the event any judgment is rendered against Yamaha in the underlying action.

The parents generally demurred to Yamaha's cross-complaint claiming failure to state a cause of action. (Code Civ.Proc., § 430.10(e).) Their demurrer was sustained without leave to amend and the trial court rendered judgment of dismissal of the cross-complaint. Yamaha timely appeals the judgment.

DISCUSSION

To begin, we recite our standard of review as set forth by this court in Lewis v. Purvin (1989) 208 Cal.App.3d 1208, 1213, 256 Cal.Rptr. 827:

"On appeal, in assessing the sufficiency of a pleading upon demurrer, the court will deem true all material facts pleaded in the cross-complaint and those which arise by reasonable implication. [Citations.] The cross-complainant bears the burden of demonstrating either that the demurrer was sustained erroneously or that sustaining the demurrer without leave to amend was an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] It is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend where the cross-complainant has alleged facts showing entitlement to relief under any possible legal theory. [Citations.]"

In light of these rules, the issue before this court is whether Yamaha has alleged facts in its cross-complaint entitling it to relief on any legal basis. Resolution of its claims requires analysis of the duties owed by the parents to their son and of the equities involved in applying indemnity doctrines to these facts. ³

I Duty of Parents

In assessing the validity of Yamaha's cross-complaint, we start with two basic premises. First, as stated in Munoz v. Davis (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d 420, 425, 190 Cal.Rptr. 400: "[U]nless the prospective indemnitor and indemnitee are jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff there is no basis for indemnity." Second, as stated by this court in GEM Developers v. Hallcraft Homes of San Diego, Inc. (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 419, 431, 261 Cal.Rptr. 626:

" 'Where the transaction rests upon related facts, whether concurrent or successive, joint or several, which legally create a detriment compensable against multiple actors, the right of indemnity should follow.... [Citation.]"

The parties have addressed the issue of the requisite joint and several liability by inquiring whether there was any concurrent causation of David's injuries due to the separate acts of Yamaha and the parents. We agree this is a necessary approach to the issue presented. As a threshold matter, we add that before this causation question may be reached, a determination must be made as to the existence of a duty on the part of the parents that was arguably breached, for without such a duty, there can be no causation.

Generally, determination of the existence of a duty is a question of law for resolution by the court. (Lopez v. McDonald's Corp. (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 495, 506-507, 238 Cal.Rptr. 436.) The court is not to decide whether a particular plaintiff's injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular defendant's conduct, but instead is to evaluate more generally whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the type of harm that was experienced so that it would be appropriate to impose liability on the negligent party. (Ibid., citing Ballard v. Uribe (1986) 41 Cal.3d 564, 572, fn. 6, 224 Cal.Rptr. 664, 715 P.2d 624.)

In examining the pleadings, our inquiry is whether they fairly raise the issue of whether these parents owed a duty of care to third-party users of their property (the moped) to maintain the product in a safe condition and to warn any users of defects in the property if they had or should have had such knowledge. If so, breach of that duty could arguably lead to concurrent or successive causation of injury, thus giving rise to a right to indemnity. Here, Yamaha has pled in its cross-complaint its product was not defective, but if there were a defect and Yamaha is held liable, the parents should be held jointly and severally liable. Yamaha has therefore raised the issue of whether David's injuries were caused by its manufacturing defect or instead solely or partially by the parents' alleged negligent maintenance.

We rely on basic rules applicable to owners of motor vehicles to determine whether a duty exists on the part of the parents that is separate from Yamaha's duty to make a defect-free product; existence of such an independent duty of the vehicle owners may validate the application of concurrent causation theory here. We begin with the general duty of care imposed by Civil Code section 1714, subdivision (a), applicable to owners of motor vehicles:

"Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by his want of ordinary care or skill in the management of his property...."

An owner or operator of a motor vehicle has both a statutory and common law duty to use reasonable and ordinary care, by properly maintaining the motor vehicle, to prevent an increase in the chances of inflicting injury on others by use of the vehicle. (Twohig v. Briner (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1102, 214 Cal.Rptr. 729; Civ.Code, § 1714(a).) Likewise, an owner or motorist can be held negligent for failure to exercise the care an ordinary, prudent person would have exercised to maintain one's motor vehicle in a reasonably safe condition. (Sherman v. Frank (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 278, 146 P.2d 704.)

Additionally, this duty of care encompasses the duty to reasonably inspect the motor vehicle for defects. (Sherman v. Frank, supra, 63 Cal.App.2d at p. 282, 146 P.2d 704.) An owner who is aware or reasonably should be aware his or her motor vehicle is defective or in need of repair is liable for negligence upon permitting the defective vehicle to be driven by another person. (See Benton v. Sloss (1952) 38 Cal.2d 399, 240 P.2d 575, involving a used car dealer.)

These basic authorities convince us that, as a matter of law, the facts in the pleadings fairly, though incompletely, pose the issue of whether the parents were under an independent duty of care to adequately maintain their moped, inspect it for defects and warn any user, including David, of a defective condition prior to permitting use of the moped. The nature of any such defect has not yet been resolved. For example, if an operational defect developed after manufacture, the parents may have had knowledge of that. Possibly, too, even if a manufacturing defect existed, it could have been worsened by lack of maintenance. All these issues, as well as a determination of whether any duty on the part of the parents was breached and whether such a breach was a proximate cause of David's injury, are factual issues not yet before any court at this pleadings stage of the proceeding. We restrict our review of the correctness of this ruling on demurrer to a consideration of whether Yamaha has stated sufficient facts showing it may be entitled to...