Yasak v. Retire. Bd., Police. Ann., Ben., Chicago

• Decision Date: 04 February 2004
• Docket Number: No. 03-1733.,03-1733.
• Citation: 357 F.3d 677
• Parties: Joseph YASAK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 677

357 F.3d 677

Joseph YASAK, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. RETIREMENT BOARD OF THE POLICEMEN'S ANNUITY AND BENEFIT FUND OF CHICAGO, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 03-1733.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued September 19, 2003.

Decided February 4, 2004.

Thomas J. Pleines (argued), Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

David R. Kugler (argued), Chicago, IL, for Defendant-Appellee.

Before BAUER, RIPPLE, and WILLIAMS, Circuit Judges.

WILLIAMS, Circuit Judge.

Joseph Yasak was convicted of a federal felony, and his request for pension benefits was denied as a result. Yasak then applied for and received a refund of his pension contributions. Years later, Yasak received a presidential pardon, and attempted to get his pension benefits restored. The pension board denied Yasak's request, and a federal district court agreed that the pension board had no duty to reinstate benefits. Because we find that Yasak forfeited his property interest in his pension when he elected to receive a refund of his pension contributions, we affirm the district court's decision.

I. BACKGROUND

Joseph Yasak served as a Chicago police officer for almost twenty-eight years before retiring in September 1988. During that period, Yasak paid a portion of his salary into a police pension fund controlled by the Retirement Board of the Policemen's Annuity and Benefit Fund of Chicago (the Board). In December 1988, Yasak was convicted of making false declarations before a grand jury, a federal felony under 18 U.S.C. § 1623. The Board denied Yasak's request for pension benefits in April 1991, on the ground that pursuant to 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-227, Yasak had forfeited his entitlement to pension benefits as a result of his felony conviction. Yasak then applied for and received a refund of his contributions to the fund. The Board's 1991 check was lost, so Yasak was issued a replacement check in January 1995, which he cashed.

Yasak received a full and unconditional pardon from former President William Jefferson Clinton in January 2001. In May 2001, Yasak asked the Board to restore his pension benefits both prospectively and retroactively, and provided a copy of the pardon to the Board. During the next six months, Yasak repeatedly asked the Board for various documents, and to calculate how much money he needed to repay to the fund to get benefits reinstated for himself and his wife. He also requested a hearing on his claim. Other than the issuance of two subpoenas that Yasak requested, Yasak received no response from the Board until December 2001, when the Board sent him a letter denying his claim. In the letter, the Board asserted that it lacked jurisdiction to reconsider its 1991 decision, and that even if it had jurisdiction, state law precluded reinstatement of benefits.

Yasak sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court in January 2002. Count I alleged that, as a result of his pardon, he had a property interest in his pension benefits, and the Board had deprived him of his property without substantive and procedural due process in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Yasak also filed a petition for administrative review of the Board's decision in the Circuit Court of Cook County, and amended his federal complaint in March 2002 to include the administrative review claim; this became Count II.

The Board moved for dismissal under either Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) or (6). After extensive briefing, the district court denied the Board's motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) as to Count I, but declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Count II. It then granted the Board's motion to dismiss Count I under Rule 12(b)(6), finding that Yasak's voluntary acceptance of the refund of his pension contributions resulted in the relinquishment of his property interest in his pension, and Yasak's pardon did not reverse the effects of his acceptance. Yasak appeals the dismissal of Count I.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review

We review de novo a district court's dismissal of a complaint under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), "examining a plaintiff's factual allegations and any inferences reasonably drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Chavez v. Ill. State Police, 251 F.3d 612, 648 (7th Cir. 2001). Dismissal is warranted "only if the plaintiff could prove no set of facts in support of his claims that would entitle him to relief." Id.

B. The Due Process Claims

The crux of Yasak's argument on appeal is as follows. By denying Yasak his pension benefits, the state punished Yasak for his conviction. Although Yasak then received a refund of his pension contributions, his receipt of the refund was involuntary. Therefore, he never relinquished his property interest in his pension, and the issuance of the presidential pardon necessitates reinstatement of his pension benefits. Failure to reinstate his benefits violates the rule that once an individual receives a pardon, the state can no longer punish the individual for the crime for which he was pardoned. Although we sympathize with Yasak's predicament, we disagree with many of his assertions.

Yasak rightly notes that the forfeiture of his pension benefits following his felony conviction was intended to be a punishment for his conviction. See Devoney v. Ret. Bd. of the Policemen's Annuity & Benefit Fund for the City of Chicago, 199 Ill.2d 414, 264 Ill.Dec. 95, 769 N.E.2d 932, 935 (2002) (explaining that the purpose of 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-227 is to "`discourage official malfeasance by denying the public servant convicted of unfaithfulness to his trust the retirement benefits to which he otherwise would have been entitled'") (quoting Kerner v. State Employees' Ret. Sys., 72 Ill.2d 507, 21 Ill.Dec. 879, 382 N.E.2d 243, 246 (1978)). We further agree that in light of his pardon, the state cannot continue to punish Yasak for his conviction. As we explained in Bjerkan v. United States, 529 F.2d 125, 127-28 (7th Cir.1975), "after a pardon, a state may not take cognizance of the offense pardoned in any way which would constitute a `punishment.'" See also Carlesi v. New York, 233 U.S. 51, 57, 34 S.Ct. 576, 58 L.Ed. 843 (1914).

However, our analysis diverges from Yasak's when we consider his contention that his acceptance of the refund was involuntary. Notwithstanding Yasak's claim to the contrary, the Board did not force Yasak to accept a refund of his pension contributions. Yasak himself filled out an application and requested a refund. Indeed, Yasak's own complaint states the following: "Plaintiff applied for a refund of his contributions and the Board issued a refund to him in April 1991."¹ (emphasis added). Yasak argues that because we must draw all reasonable inferences in his favor when reviewing the dismissal of his complaint, a finding that he voluntarily initiated the refund process is an impermissible inference. However, under the circumstances, this is not an impermissible inference, but rather a rational conclusion dictated by Yasak's own language. Indeed, based on the pleadings, it would be unreasonable to assume that Yasak's actions were anything but voluntary.² See Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 407 (7th Cir.2000) ("[W]hile we must draw reasonable inferences in the [plaintiffs'] favor, we should not draw inferences that while theoretically plausible are inconsistent with the pleadings.") (emphasis in original); cf. Mills v. Health Care Serv. Corp., 171 F.3d 450, 459 (7th Cir.1999) (explaining that in the summary judgment context, "while any inferences drawn from the facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, only reasonable inferences need be made").

Once we accept the fact that Yasak voluntarily sought a refund, it becomes clear that the issuance of the pardon does not trigger reinstatement of his pension benefits. In Knote v. United States, the Supreme Court stated that

[a] pardon is an act of grace by which an offender is released from the consequences of his offence, so far as such release is practicable and within control of the pardoning power.... It gives [the offender] a new credit and capacity, and rehabilitates him to that extent in his former position. But it does not make amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the offender in his person by imprisonment, forced labor, or otherwise. ...

95 U.S. 149, 153, 13 Ct.Cl. 517, 24 L.Ed. 442 (1877). Later cases have made clear that numerous acts committed by the state may be deemed "consequences of [an] offence" from which pardons provide relief. See, e.g., Carlesi, 233 U.S. at 57, 34 S.Ct. 576 (stating that the "act of the state in taking into consideration a prior conviction" despite a pardon would be "void" if "it was in any just sense a punishment" for the prior conviction); Bjerkan, 529 F.2d at 128 (explaining that the deprivation of basic civil rights "by a state," such as the right to vote, would constitute punishment in violation of a pardon).

However, the pardon power has its limits. For example, we stated in Grossgold v. Supreme Court of Illinois, 557 F.2d 122, 126 (7th Cir.1977), that "a presidential pardon does not relieve an attorney from discipline," while the Third Circuit held in United States v. Noonan, 906 F.2d 952, 960 (3d Cir.1990), that a pardon does not warrant expunction of all court records relating to an individual's conviction. More recently, the D.C. Circuit determined that a pardon does not entitle an individual who has been indicted, but not convicted, to attorneys' fees incurred as a result of an investigation conducted by independent counsel. See In re North, 62 F.3d 1434, 1438 (D.C.Cir.1994).

Similarly, the case law does not suggest that a pardon prevents an individual from having to deal with the consequences of his own actions taken in response to his conviction. Unlike the forfeiture of Yasak's pension benefits, the provision of the refund was not a punishment meted out by the state on account of Yasak's...